

Internal Security Comm.
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100080001-2

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

PART 1-A

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 23-25, 29, AND 30, 1971

(INCLUDING INDEX)

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1971

58-594

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 70 cents

Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100080001-2

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[Appendix II (Constitutions of the several countries discussed in committee hearings on "The Theory and Practice of Communism" in 1970 and 1971 printed separately as part 1-B.)]

The House Committee on Internal Security is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 92D CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 22, 1971.

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-first Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, be, and they are hereby adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-second Congress * * *

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(k) Committee on Internal Security, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

11. Committee on Internal Security.

(a) Communist and other subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.

(b) The Committee on Internal Security, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make investigations from time to time of (1) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, whether of foreign or domestic origin, their members, agents, and affiliates, which seek to establish, or assist in the establishment of, a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States, or to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or alteration of, the form of government of the United States or of any State thereof, by force, violence, treachery, espionage, sabotage, insurrection, or any unlawful means, (2) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, their members, agents, and affiliates, which incite or employ acts of force, violence, terrorism, or any unlawful means, to obstruct or oppose the lawful authority of the Government of the United States in the execution of any law or policy affecting the internal security of the United States, and (3) all other questions, including the administration and execution of any law of the United States, or any portion of law, relating to the foregoing that would aid the Congress or any committee of the House in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Internal Security shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Internal Security, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has

adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

28. (a) In order to assist the House in—

(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of the application, administration, and execution of the laws enacted by the Congress, and

(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of such modifications of or changes in those laws, and of such additional legislation, as may be necessary or appropriate,

each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.

* * * * *

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

Part 1-A

TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1971

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Richard H. Ichord of Missouri, Claude Pepper of Florida, Richardson Preyer of North Carolina, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Roger H. Zion of Indiana, Fletcher Thompson of Georgia, and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee last year held hearings during the 91st Congress for the purpose of updating its information on the theory of communism and also to gain insight relative to the functioning of communism in actual practice.

In those hearings recent defectors from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia furnished testimony concerning life under communist domination. They were followed by an academician's views concerning the current theoretical aspects of the international communist movement.

This morning the committee meets in the first of a series of hearings which we anticipate will extend over the next several days to continue the committee inquiry into the theory and practice of communism. We will hear testimony from witnesses from Asia, Europe, and the United States. I would direct that the resolution authorizing these hearings be placed in the record following my remarks.

The Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), founded in 1919, just 2 years after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, has appealed to a wide-ranging and diverse membership over the years. But its basic ideology, guided by the teachings of Marx and Lenin, appears to have never wavered. The CPUSA is an integral part of the international communist movement. It is a tightly knit and a highly disciplined group that has conducted an intensive propaganda campaign against the United States Government ever since it was founded.

(1)

In these hearings we are particularly concerned with the need for updating information relative to the oversight responsibilities of the House Committee on Internal Security, as well as determining the necessity for any remedial legislation by Congress. Certainly we would be remiss if we confined our examination to reading an interpretation of the *Daily World*, *Pravda*, or other communist publications. Accordingly, we seek firsthand information about the experiences of people who by choice have succeeded in casting off the shackles of communist domination and, at the risk of losing their lives as well as their property, have gone to extreme lengths in search of freedom.

In addition to the testimony of these individuals, we will also receive the testimony of academicians knowledgeable in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrines, both in relation to the CPUSA and to the common goal in statements sought by the international communist movement.

Our witnesses today and through next week will include recent defectors from Red China and East Berlin, who will present testimony describing life under communist rule. We will also receive testimony again from prominent academicians concerning the theoretical aspects of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung and the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

In addition, the committee will hear witnesses who have been in recent attendance at the Center for Marxist Education in New York, and thus we may be able to gain a penetrating and current view of the activities and teachings of the CPUSA within our own country.

I direct at this time that the resolution authorizing these hearings be included in the record.

(The resolution referred to follows:)

RESOLVED, That the Committee on Internal Security, or any subcommittee thereof appointed for such purpose, conduct investigation and hearings, at such time and places as the Chairman may determine, to receive testimony and evidence illustrative of the Communist ideology, its character and objectives, as applied by Communist organizations, their agents, members, and affiliates.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you have as your first witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Professor Richard K. Diao, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the swearing of Mr. Diao, may I make two announcements.

First, we are very happy to have with us today, as guests of the Chair, 22 young journalists representing high school newspapers in the District of Columbia area. I personally have invited the budding young journalists, and the staff has been instructed to admit them with the proper press credentials.

The second announcement concerns action of the committee upon the bills, both to repeal and amend title II, the so-called Detention Act of the Internal Security Act of 1950. As I announced some 2 weeks ago, all of the transcripts have been furnished the committee. I do not think it would be necessary for the committee to hear testimony on these bills again. We heard some 30 or 40 witnesses last year, some 1,000 pages of testimony. I hope that the committee will be able to act upon these bills without the necessity of further hearings.

A bill was reported to the Rules Committee during the last session, but not in time to be acted upon by the Congress. So the Chair has

provided the members with notice of the meeting tomorrow at 9 o'clock, prior to continuation of these hearings, for the purpose of taking action upon such legislation.

Mr. Diao, would you first rise and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DIAO. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee.

You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. DIAO

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Diao has prepared a narrative statement which I would like to offer for inclusion in the record. I would like permission for Professor Diao to proceed at his own pace in a summary opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. And, Mr. Diao, would you lean into the mike, please, so that we will be certain to hear you up here?

(Mr. Diao's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR RICHARD K. DIAO

My name is Richard K. Diao. I was born April 29, 1924, in Chengtu, China. I graduated from the National Central University, Department of Economics, in Chungking, China, in 1946, with a B.A. degree. In 1947 I came to the United States, and attended the University of Illinois, Department of Economics, Graduate School, at Urbana, Illinois. I graduated in 1948 with a Master's degree. In 1948-1949 I attended the Columbia University in New York City. From 1949-1950 I attended the Graduate School of Business Administration of New York University, New York City, as a candidate for a Ph. D. I did not complete my studies for my Ph. D. and returned to China in 1950, prompted by glowing reports of prosperity and opportunity in my native country. I was accompanied by my fiancée, Eva Hsu, born August 5, 1927, in Shanghai, China. She had been attending Mary Crest College in Davenport, Iowa. We were engaged in New York City on June 16, 1950 and married in Peking on December 16, 1950. We have a daughter 18, and a son, 14.

From 1950 until 1951 I worked at the Ministry of Finance, in Peking, China, as a researcher. From 1951 to 1952 I was a researcher for the Government Administrative Council's Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs in Peking. From 1952 to 1953 I was Associate Professor of Public Finance at the Central Institute of Finance and Economics, Peking, China. From 1953 to 1958 I was Associate Professor and Deputy Head of Teaching and Research in the Department of Finance at the Central Academy for Financial Cadres in Peking. In 1957, during the program known as the "Hundred Flower Movement", the Party encouraged criticism by non-Party members. They promised that no punishment would be given to those who criticized the Party and the government, but that this would be used to improve their work. However, after I criticized the Party I was subjected to considerable harassment, I was labeled a "rightist" and enemy of the State. I was accused of being a U.S. spy, since the State Department had paid for my transportation back to China through the ECA fund then available to all Chinese students in this country after the communist take over of mainland China. In the meantime, my three brothers, two sisters and parents were all still living in the United States. My father, a retired Lt. General of the Republic of China, has since died in New York, in 1956.

In April of 1958 I was sent to the Military 850th State Farm at Heilungkiang as a laborer to undergo thought reform. This camp was located in what is called the "Chinese Siberia" in the remote northeastern part of the country. It was only 20 miles from where the Sino-Soviet border incident occurred in 1969. I stayed in this camp for two years and ten months. I feel that the treatment at this camp was more inhuman than what I had heard of the concentration camps of the Nazis.

We worked at hard labor 14-16 hours per day, 7 days a week with very little food in bitter cold. At one time they worked us 10 days and nights with only a one hour nap in the snow covered and frozen ground after midnight. We built railroads, roads, dams, but mostly we dug and built drainage canals. Most of this area is very swampy. Many people at the camp died from exhaustion and malnutrition.

In addition to landlords and rich peasants, there are three types of persons designated as anti-government in China; 1) counter-revolutionaries; 2) rightists; 3) bad elements. There were some in each category in this camp. Due to the poor condition of the persons in the camp, we were finally released in December 1960 and returned to Peking where I remained about one month.

At the end of 1960, I was then sent to Shansi province in China to the Shansi College of Finance and Economics. At the college my job was to prepare lectures for others to give since I no longer could be trusted to deliver lectures, but most of the time I was still assigned to do manual work in the countryside, which included the cleaning of public toilets. In addition, I had to report each week without failure about my thought and deeds to a Party member who was assigned to "help" me and also to submit, through this man, a written report to the Party Committee every month. At this time, my wife who had worked at the Ministry of Public Health in Peking for some 10 years was also transferred to Shansi province to teach at a medical college. We began to plan how we could escape from China. Writing to one of my brothers in New York giving him a hint that we wished to come out, it was hoped that he would write me a letter claiming that my mother had come to Hong Kong hoping to see us once more before she died. Using this as a ruse and with a good record of hard work after I got out of the Labor camp, they finally let me and my son go to Hong Kong. I made up my mind that once there I would never return to China. For almost two years my wife attempted to get an exit permit and finally on the pretext of talking me into returning to China or at least to bring my son back to China, she was permitted to bring my daughter with her to visit me in Hong Kong.

After our reunion I joined Union Research Institute in Hong Kong as a Senior Researcher and Head of Research Department in Finance and Economics. My wife also obtained a position as a Mandarin Chinese teacher in the New Asia Yale-in-China Language Center of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Through much legal maneuvering and the help of many friends, we were finally able to come to the United States and arrived in New York on the 23rd of October, 1966. From 1966 until 1969 I was a Research Associate with the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York City.

While in Peking I found that many of the persons with whom I had associated in the United States prior to my return to China were in reality communists.

Looking back, I suppose that in those days I was very much pro-New China. I have never joined the Communist Party and after seeing China as it is I know I never shall.

My main reasons for leaving China were the knowledge that the Socialist system will never work in China or anywhere else. There was a constant fear of being arrested for something. Each knock on the door, each visit to a superior, especially during the political movements held the threat of being detained for something. I never knew when I went to work in the morning if I would come home that night. There is absolutely no freedom of thought and absolutely no consideration of an individual as a human being.

In discussing the economy of China prior to the Great Leap Forward, the situation in China was quite good. People had enough to eat, but during 1959-1961 the situation was terrible. People had barely enough to eat. Everything was rationed according to categories. The highest category was the Army and heavy labor. Ordinary people received 15 kilograms of grain and 2 oz. of edible oil per month. Meat or fish was rationed to a few oz. once every several months. While I had had no experience under the Japanese occupation of China, persons that I have known say that things were much worse during this time in China than it was under the Japanese control. People hoarded their food and feared that others would steal it. The fixed prices were not very high but there was just no food available. Clothes also were very difficult to obtain. Each person was rationed to a few yards of cloth per year. If you bought socks or handkerchiefs you had to surrender a certain amount of cloth ration tickets. This applied to Communist Party members as well as those who were not Party members. Soldiers were given the best ration. Their rations on clothes and for food were the highest together with the highest officers in the Party and Government. Before 1958 things were much better. At

that time the so-called higher intellectuals, which included myself, received more meat and rice and we also had the privilege of not standing in line to do our shopping. We had a card which allowed us to go to the front of the line each time. This was only from 1956 until 1958. During the bad years the higher intellectuals did receive more cigarettes and more oil than other people, but by that time I had been branded as a "rightist" and I did not receive this.

From the latter half of 1962 on, things began to get better. At that time you could buy extra food on the "free market". Some of the peasants in the country had extra vegetables or eggs or food grains and could bring it to the "free market" in the city where they would sell it. Prices here to be determined simply by supply and demand were extremely high but while the "free market" was officially illegal, the Party and Government turned their back on these transactions. At that time the Party had lost some control over the people. Later on, I understand the "free market" was closed down. I believe that the countryside was worse off in the bad days than the cities. Peking and Shanghai were show places and were always somewhat better than the rest of the country. Many persons died of malnutrition. Frequently they would become so ill and so weak that the slightest cold or illness would kill them.

In China everyone must work. When we first returned to China from the United States we were given our choice of work, the area where we thought we could do the most. However, once we selected a job we were not allowed to change unless the Party decided to transfer us. Most of the rest of the people are assigned by the Party to the job where they are needed. You can request a transfer to another job but very seldom are these requests granted. At this time you are also subject to criticism because they would ask you why you questioned the wisdom of the Party in assigning you a job. Generally speaking they put you in a job where they need you. If you decided that you did not want to work or would not work, then you have two choices; 1) you can die without food; 2) you are subject to arrest as a bad element for not contributing your part to the state. The crime of being a counter-revolutionist covers nearly everything in China, from being a thief, to not working or engaging in financial transactions not authorized by the authorities.

During 1959-1961 things were very bad. Many people resorted to stealing—not money but food. You could buy nothing with money, but food coupons and clothes were stolen very frequently. China has since imported substantial amounts of wheat every year from Australia, New Zealand and Canada and still continues to do so. During the bad years, the Party and Government encouraged people who had friends outside of China to ask for food packages. I had a sister-in-law, for example, in Hong Kong, who sent me packages. I received butter, milk, chocolate, etc., which enabled me to effect a speedy recovery from my poor condition resulting from the Labor camp.

To take care of discipline in the country, I believe there is a large network of Labor Camps throughout mainland China. Most of these are in the northeast and northwest. The land where I was in the remote northeast had never been farmed and there was almost no population living there except the demobilized soldiers from the Korean War. The land is very fertile but it is mostly swamp. The soil was black and rich and it did not need to be fertilized, but it was mostly covered with water. We dug and built drainage ditches but the water would still come back. There were many Russian built tractors there but they just stood idle most of the time as they could not be used in that mud. The growing season was only 120 days long and the rest of the time it is bitter cold. The coldest weather is in the forties or even fifties below zero.

Since 1950 all of the large land holdings of the landlords were taken away and distributed to the poor peasants. The land was not owned by the peasants but they were told that they would be able to use it. The state retained ownership. After 1953, and especially after 1956, the Agricultural Cooperative Movement assumed close control of the land. During the hardship years around 1959 very small pieces of land next to the houses which had been seized by the Peoples' Communes during the Great Leap Forward were given back to the peasants to raise vegetables, for their own use or to enable them to sell it in the "free market". I understand that during the recent Cultural Revolution that all these private plots were again taken back by the communes. As far as owning homes, it was a very difficult situation. Before 1958 some people did own their own. After that they were all taken by the state. They were reimbursed by the state only in the form of so-called "fixed interest" which was calculated at a price decided upon by the state. When you owned your own house you were required to keep it repaired and the Government assigned you tenants if they thought that you had too

much room. People were so hard pressed to keep up the taxes and repairs that they were glad to give the houses to the state in order to be rid of the troubles. Generally speaking, each family is allowed one or two rooms, though it depends upon their size and the interpretation of the authorities in the area in which you were living. Sometimes you had a community kitchen and sometimes you had a stove outside the house and you did your cooking outside. Bathrooms are always communal.

When I was Associate Professor at the Central Academy For Financial Cadres in Peking I had a quite nice apartment with two rooms, plus kitchen and bathroom. We used one room for our bedroom and the other for the children and as a living room. I even had a maid. At that time this was alright with the Party and Government as it cut down on unemployment in the countryside and enabled both husband and wife to work. Later this practice was considered a bourgeois, capitalist practice. The maids were all forced to resign and work in street factories or on farms in the countryside. This is one of the big problems with the Chinese Government, it keeps changing from year to year, no one ever knows what is right. What is right one year is bad the next. They are always changing.

There is almost no religion in China anymore except among the older people. It makes no difference which religion is involved, whether it is Christian, Buddhist or what. It is all bad as far as the Party is concerned. Of all the religions, I believe the Catholic was persecuted the most because the Party and Government felt they had closer ties to the West. All members of the Communist Party are not allowed to have any religion. The younger persons are discouraged from having any religion as well. Most of the churches and temples have been converted to schools, hospitals, or warehouses. Only in the big cities like Peking and Shanghai are a few churches and temples still operating as a sort of window dressing for foreign visitors. When the Premier of Ceylon visited China some years ago, for example, the Mayor of Shanghai and the protocol officials from Peking went to the temple with her for worship but this was only a propaganda move.

Everyone who has reached the age of 18 years may vote in China if they are not a convicted criminal. If you don't vote they question you as to the reasons. To vote you go to the voting place and pick up your ballot. You go into a voting booth, mark the ballot, and drop it in the ballot box. All the nominees have been screened by the Party and match exactly the number of posts to be filled and thus all are elected. You just don't have any choice. To avoid trouble, people just vote for the candidates listed. In China there are 8 so-called "democratic parties" besides the Communist Party but all take their guidance from Chairman Mao and the Communist Party. Having this many parties helps to present a picture of democratic government to the peoples of the world. It is not possible for one of these parties to become stronger than the Communist Party. There is no competition between them and the Communist Party. If any party begins to gather any strength and to challenge the Communist Party all the other parties are directed to move against it. There is one thing I might mention, concerning voting. Since China still has many illiterate persons the voting place has someone to read the ballot to you so that you can mark it. This means that it is possible that this individual does the voting, and the voter is never aware of whom he voted for. There are no campaigns for elections such as there are in the United States. There are meetings where the Party will tell you about the candidates. In China the people are so naive and so interested in avoiding any trouble that they do as they are told.

In China, as in all the rest of the Communist countries, there are labor unions. Back before the Communists seized power they controlled the labor unions and struck against the Nationalist Government. After the Communists took over the situation was changed. Now there are no strikes. The union speaks to the worker for the state. In Western countries the union speaks to the management for the workers. The function in China is to see that the workers work and that their welfare is provided for. They arrange vacations and pensions. They arrange for labor heroes and give political incentive for more work. They act as agents of the Party in all the factories and their main function is to give the workers ideological indoctrination.

As far as schooling in China goes, you can go or not as you wish. There are not enough schools in the country if everyone had to go to school. Most of the city dwellers send their children to school but in the countryside most of the children must work. If you want to go to school you can. If you don't want to go you don't have to. School is free. There is no charge for tuition, books, or supplies. At the university the students have two kinds of scholarships, known as Peoples' Scholarships or Aid Type A and Type B. Type A is a basic scholarship. When you are

accepted at the university it provides some money to cover food and clothes. Type B provides more money. This is for the poorer families. In all universities all students live on campus because of the many extracurricular activities in which they must engage. This is also a way the Party has of separating them from the influence of their families and the rest of the population. A student can go to college or university for four years to study liberal arts or social sciences, 5 years for engineering or applied sciences and 8 years for medicine. The Government pays for all of this. In China there is no degree offered.

In China children under 16 usually belong to the Young Pioneers and then from 16 to 25 many of them belong to the Communist Youth League. Being a member of the Communist Youth League does not necessarily make you a member of the Communist Party, but you have a better chance to join if you are a member of the Communist Youth League. The Young Pioneers, on the other hand, are somewhat like Boy Scouts and attract children by interesting programs along the Party defined lines. All children from the very young of kindergarten are taught that "no matter how good your parents are they are not as good as Chairman Mao," and that they should prepare themselves to become good communists.

If you wish to travel, from one area in China to another, you must have permission. Each individual has an identity card issued by his employing agency or his school or his factory. You must check out at wherever you work and then you must check in with the police at your destination. If you are a farmer you must obtain a pass from your brigade or commune. This is for travel inside China. Travel outside of China is always discouraged and is hence very difficult to arrange.

In China we were never allowed to contact foreigners directly. Even if you speak their language you must use an official interpreter. This applies to every foreigner and especially to those from the West. It applied to contact with the Russians too but of course not many Chinese people speak Russian, though at one time everyone was encouraged to study Russian at school or through radio. It was very fashionable to study Russian in the 1950s.

After the Sino-Soviet split-up in 1959 they no longer wanted people to learn Russian. Now, I have heard that a person cannot take Russian at all. Any foreigner visiting China today is prepared for in advance. Everyone who will have contact with him is provided with a paper giving the foreigner's background, political feelings, and the questions that he might ask, and what the answers should be. Some foreigners realize that the information they are receiving is all planted propaganda and try to evade their interpreters and guides. This is not really possible because in the area of the hotels used by the foreigners, all the taxi drivers and shop keepers are part of the show. Also the people don't dare to speak up, because the foreigners soon leave and then the Party looks at you as an enemy of the state. All foreign embassies have a guard who acts to protect the embassy and also to keep people from visiting the embassy. If an embassy wants to hire a Chinese as a cook or a driver or a clerk or something, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take care of placing the individual. This enables them to carefully select someone to do their bidding.

There is very little anti-semitism in China because there are almost no Jews. At one time back before the Communists came into power, there were a number of Jews in some of the large cities as merchants but they are all gone now.

If you are arrested in China and brought to trial, you will be given a Government appointed defense lawyer. This presents problems for a defense counsel. First, they often arrest people without any basis, almost anyone can be arrested for anything. It can come at any time. They can just confine you to your office until you write down your confession. If you don't know what to confess to they will tell you. They use three shifts for interrogation—8 hours each—while you sit there until you confess to something. The defense counsel usually advises his client to confess. He cannot justify any crime you may have committed against the state, therefore there is no real defense. If he did try to defend an accused he would probably be the next one on trial himself. These trials are really public shows. They use the trial to demonstrate to others what happens to enemies of the state so in effect it acts as a control method. It is not really a trial as we know it here but a show of public punishment. The prosecution is not even required to furnish any proof that a crime has been committed. Of course, many of the arrests are not brought to trial at all. The offender is punished with no public hearing.

I have been asked often whether China has a secret police. Yes, they do. They call it Public Security. It is similar to the Soviet Secret Police. From my observations, however, in China the power of the secret police is not as great as in Russia. In China, especially today, the Army is the most powerful of all of the branches

of the hierarchy. I think the Army also has a Secret Police of its own. In China so many people are informers for the authorities of one sort or another even though they are not directly linked with the secret police that there is a saying that if you don't need an answer, don't ask a question and never trust anybody even your own kin. It is hard to tell who is a Secret Police source. As a result you never ask your friends any questions. You comment on the weather and that's about all.

According to the Chinese constitution they say that they have almost every right that people have here in the United States, but they don't exist. There are no rights. The only rights are those of the Party to rule in any manner that they see fit.

Mr. DIAO. Since I have prepared a written statement, there is no need to go over it again. I would like to brief a few points.

I was born and grew up in Yunnan Province, China. I came to this country in 1947 as a graduate student. I earned, in 1948, a master's degree from the University of Illinois and then I transferred to Columbia University and New York University as a candidate for Ph. D., but I did not finish. Rather, I returned to China.

I met my wife in Chicago when we attended a meeting sponsored by the Chinese Student Christian Association, and were engaged in New York City in June 1950 and married in Peking in December 1950 after we returned there. We have a daughter 18 and a son 14.

This decision to return to China was prompted by communist propaganda, especially that of the communistic government, and a new government crisis. We hoped that we could contribute ourselves to the construction of our country. However, after return, we gradually discovered that the real situation was very disappointing and we realized that communism is nothing but a dictatorship which rules over people to satisfy the dictator's ambitions.

(At this point Mr. Thompson entered the hearing room.)

Mr. DIAO. At first we were treated quite well because the communists were in great need of educated people. I was given a job in the Ministry of Finance in Peking, and then the Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Government Administration Council. But due to my family and educational background and also my relatives abroad, I was regarded not suitable for a highly sensitive position in the Government. So I was transferred to teach at college.

There were numerous political movements, one after one, but I was not attacked until 1957, when the so-called "Hundred Flowers Movement" started. The communist party encouraged people, especially intellectuals outside the communist party, to criticize the party and the Government, and they promised there would be no punishment. So I did. But I was branded as a bourgeois. That means the enemy of the state. So, after numerous strike meetings and harassment, I was sent to a labor camp in a remote part of the country near the Sino-Soviet border.

I stayed in this camp for 2 years and 10 months. I feel that the treatment at this camp was more inhuman than what I had heard of the concentration camps of the Nazis. The work hours were extremely long, averaging 14 to 16 hours per day, 7 days a week, with very little food, and in the bitter cold weather.

Almost everybody was sick, and I saw many of my fellow victims die. And I myself fell to the ground twice, but I was to survive.

In December 1960, we all were released from the camp. I was transferred to Shansi Province to a college there. Although my job was teaching, I was not allowed to give lectures to students. Rather,

I was asked to prepare lectures for others to give. Most of the time I was still assigned to manual work in the countryside. In addition, I had to report each week about my thoughts and deeds to a party member who was assigned to help me, and also to submit a written report to the party committee every month.

At this time my wife, who had worked at the Ministry of Public Health in Peking for some 10 years, was also transferred to Shansi Province. So at this time we began to plan how we could escape from China. With the help of my relatives—that means my brother in the States and also my sister in Hong Kong—we made up a story that my mother had come to Hong Kong hoping to see us. So it took about 4 months to get the permission to go to Hong Kong, but I was supposed to return to China by the end of the year.

So when the time was up, I excused myself from not returning to China on the grounds of sickness and that I was supposed to have a major operation on cancer. I asked my wife to come to Hong Kong to take care of me, but at this time the communist authorities refused to grant my wife permission. Instead, they asked me to go back. She begged the authorities almost every day with tears and finally she got a permission to go to Hong Kong to visit me on the pretext to talk me into going back to China.

After she got out, I started to work in a research institute in Hong Kong and also she taught in the Center of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We stayed in Hong Kong almost 4 years and finally we got permission from the State Department to return to the States.

We arrived in New York on 23d of October 1966. From then until 1969 I was a research associate at the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

Our main reason for leaving China was to seek freedom because, from our experience, we realized the socialist-communist system would never work in China or anywhere else.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Professor Diao, were you a member of the communist party?

Mr. DIAO. No, I was not.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I am wondering, now you have just told us that you left the United States to return to China after you had obtained a master's degree, and they welcomed you with open arms at first. And subsequently you complied with their Hundred Flowers program which was, in effect, requesting criticism of the Government. May I ask you, what criticism did you make?

Mr. DIAO. I made my criticism on several occasions. First, there was in the Ministry of Finance a meeting for the higher intellectuals. At that occasion, I criticized the party about the school where I taught. I urged that the party hook up the school to the Ministry of Higher Education because their leaders in the Ministry of Finance did not know how to run a school.

Afterwards, in the school meetings I criticized the party because it did not trust intellectuals. I urged the party to give more freedom to the people.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Your criticism, then, was lack of intellectual freedom within the school?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What was the real purpose of the Hundred Flowers program?

Mr. DIAO. I think it was promoted by the Hungarian incident. According to Mao Tse-tung, he wanted to give the people limited freedom to express their opinion to prevent a revolution in China.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you actually believe that your criticism of the Government would go unpunished?

Mr. DIAO. No, I didn't believe they would punish at first. I thought the criticism would be used to improve the Government work.

Mr. SCHULTZ. And for this criticism, then, you were sent to a labor camp?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, correct.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How many other people went with you to this labor camp, and who went?

Mr. DIAO. I don't know the exact number because the camp was formed after the mode of the army. In our company it consisted of a little bit more than 100 persons, who came from several Ministries in Peking: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Now to understand, these are all Government officials who were sent to the labor camp?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Why was this? Were they also people who had criticized the Government?

Mr. DIAO. They sent us there to undergo thought reform through labor.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned that you worked 14 to 16 hours a day. What did you do?

Mr. DIAO. We did various hard works. We built a railroad, a road, a house, farm work. But most of the time we dug ditches, because the water was too high there and they wanted to drain it out so the land could be utilized.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I can understand the punitive nature of the hard work, but did you also in your thought reform process attend classes or attend lectures which would change your philosophical belief?

Mr. DIAO. For more than 2 years we didn't have study classes at all, mainly work in the field. But only in the later part, when everybody was sick, were we allowed 3 to 4 hours a day to attend study.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then were you required to write papers or discuss?

Mr. DIAO. No, we just were in group discussion.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you study books, too, and manuals?

Mr. DIAO. No books, all the materials issued by the communist party central committee.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned that you were considered a rightist. What other types of people are considered anti-Government?

Mr. DIAO. There are categories: the workers and the peasants, and the counterrevolutionary rightists, and that is the one, the so-called bad elements. That means that there are no grounds for anything; they can brand you as a bad enemy.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Was your labor camp that you were confined in similar to the type of imprisonment that a criminal would have?

Mr. DIAO. Quite similar, but there is a big difference because the real criminals were guarded by the soldiers, who carried a shotgun; also, they beat them badly. I think their conditions were worse than ours.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What did your wife and family do while you were gone this 2 years and 10 months?

Mr. DIAO. When I was away in Manchuria, my wife was sent to a people's commune down to the south of Shansi Province to do farm work there for one year. Our children, my son was then not quite 2 years old, was living in a nursery school and my daughter was entrusted to a relative in Peking. So my family was scattered in four different places.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then you subsequently got together after you were released from the labor camp and all lived in the Shansi Province?

Mr. DIAO. Right.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you receive any special treatment in the labor camp because you were an educated man and in a high Government position?

Mr. DIAO. No. We were treated just the same.

Mr. SCHULTZ. All the people were treated the same. Would you describe for us the economy of China prior to the "Great Leap Forward" movement?

(At this point Mr. Zion entered the hearing room.)

Mr. DIAO. Prior to the so-called "Great Leap Forward," things were quite good: people had enough to eat, they have clothes, they have a decent life. But the situation was getting worse in the start of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1959.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What is the "Great Leap Forward"? What is that movement?

Mr. DIAO. That was the plan of Mao Tse-tung to make China stronger within a short limit. The slogan was to catch and bypass Britain within 15 years.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How effective was this program?

Mr. DIAO. I think it was a failure completely.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were there any privileged people who got more food than others?

Mr. DIAO. Only the high officials of the party and the Government. They got a special treatment. But before the "Great Leap Forward" we, as the higher intellectuals, received more food than other people.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you receive any special privileges during this period?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. During the 1956 to '57, as a higher intellectual we received these privileges and we also had a card to entitle us to shop at the head of the lines.

Mr. SCHULTZ. In other words, you could go to the head of the grocery lines?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What was the availability of food products in the stores? Did you have a great selection of food products?

Mr. DIAO. Before the "Great Leap Forward" there was quite a selection, but not after the "Great Leap Forward".

Mr. SCHULTZ. How about the prices. Did you experience any black market in China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, during the bad years we had a so-called free market. It is, in fact, a black market.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you compare the economy in the country as opposed to the cities? Is there any difference?

Mr. DIAO. There was not very much difference, but in that time a peasant could get more food by his own vegetables, and things like that. Probably it was better than most of the people in the city.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What is the working situation in China? Must everyone work?

Mr. DIAO. The party considers working as the right, also the obligation of the people.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are they allowed to change their jobs if they want to?

Mr. DIAO. No, not by free will. It was assigned by the party, by the Government.

Mr. SCHULTZ. They were assigned to a specific job to do. How about the location?

Mr. DIAO. It includes the location. You cannot transfer by yourself from one to another; you have to clear with the party or the authorities.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do they have labor unions in China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, there were labor unions in China.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, the staff has done a careful study of the constitution of the countries whose former citizens will testify before us this week. My intention is to display a chart on which we have noted those rights specifically and unequivocally guaranteed by the constitutions of the respective countries. I will ask each witness if he personally experienced these rights during the time he lived under the constitution, and I will ask him only at this time about those rights specifically mentioned in the constitution of the country.

If he states he did not experience this right fully and completely, I will ask him to cross out the question on the chart, and a member of the staff will mark this on the display screen.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Professor Diao, I believe I gave you a copy of this chart you have in front of you. I would like to go through these various freedoms that are specifically spelled out in the Constitution of China. I will start with the first one, the freedom of speech. Did you have complete freedom of speech under the Constitution?

Mr. DIAO. No, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, that is designated the Old Constitution of 1954.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir; the constitution under which Mr. Diao lived.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What curtailment was made on freedom of speech?

Mr. DIAO. A good example is my case. The party encouraged you to express yourself, but [when] I did, I was branded as a rightist.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you talk freely among your neighbors and friends?

Mr. DIAO. No, we dared not, because the party encouraged everybody to report others. You couldn't trust your neighbors nor your own relatives.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Diao, I will move to the next one. How about freedom of the press?

Mr. DIAO. No, all the news articles were arranged by the party. You cannot write anything to be accepted by the newspapers and the magazines.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of assembly?

Mr. DIAO. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are there any demonstrations that are allowed at all?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, there were demonstrations, but of a different nature. They were planned by the party. Like an anti-U.S. imperialism and the others, all were planned by the party.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How about freedom of correspondence? Do you write to people in China? Are you free to correspond with them and they with you?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, we had limited freedom in this category because they have a huge population. They cannot investigate and check every letter. But they do check letters; if you get something wrong, they just select it.

Mr. SCHULTZ. To your knowledge, did you live under mail censorship in China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of religion?

Mr. DIAO. No, we didn't have freedom of religion because the party said the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, but there was also freedom against religion. So in China, except the very old generation, there is no religion at all.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have the freedom to engage in cultural pursuits?

Mr. DIAO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you give us an example?

Mr. DIAO. Because when I talked in the colleges, the lectures were prepared in collective manner. We have to accept the point of view beforehand, submit our points of view beforehand to the party committee, and then after that we followed the lines.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom to travel within China and without?

Mr. DIAO. In China, I think that there was limited freedom to travel, but you have to get permission from your organization, the school.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you issued an identification card of any sort that you had to keep with you?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, everybody had an identification card issued by the various agencies, the school, the government agency, or the commune. So whenever you want to travel, you have to clear it with the authorities. For instance, when I was in Taiwan I wanted to go to Peking to visit relatives there, and I had to ask permission from the authorities.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You have already commented on your freedom of education, but I would like for you to state it positively for us. Did you have freedom of education?

Mr. DIAO. No, because whether or not you can attend higher education must be cleared by the party. You cannot choose your education by your free will.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Does the party prescribe the textbooks that will be used in the schools?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are the teachers required to be members of the communist party?

Mr. DIAO. No, teachers were not required to be communist members, but if you were a communist party member you would get more chance to be promoted.

Mr. SCHULTZ. In other words, it might be detrimental to their career if they were not a communist party member?

Mr. DIAO. Right.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you feel, or did you experience that you had freedom to emigrate?

Mr. DIAO. Absolutely not. There were only two ways to get out of China. One is just illegal that is only available to those people on the borders, but not for us in the north part of China. We had to ask permission to go.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Now skip over to the last item, the freedom of secret ballot. This is specifically provided in your Constitution.

Mr. DIAO. It is difficult to tell. If you can vote, you go to the booth and nobody sees you. But for those people who cannot write and read to vote for this person, and even though they have a kind of secret ballot, you didn't have any chance for choice, because all the nominees and the candidates were fixed by the party, one for each position.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned before having to have an identification card and permission to travel. One specific item in the Constitution provides for the freedom to change residence?

Mr. DIAO. No, absolutely not, because if you change your residence on your own, you could not get food rations.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Professor DiaO, what must one do to be successful in China today?

Mr. DIAO. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What must an individual do to be successful in China today?

Mr. DIAO. Follow the line of Mao Tse-tung. I say follow the line of Mao Tse-tung, that means follow the line of the party. Because before the cultural revolution, the slogan was: Listen to the party. But now, if you listen to the news out here you will get in trouble.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are the students in China treated as a privileged class?

Mr. DIAO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You were at Columbia University during the trouble there after you returned from China. Will you compare the Red Guard activities in China with the student uprisings in our country?

Mr. DIAO. On the surface it is quite similar, but inside it is different because the Red Guard was run by the army and the Mao factions. But here, I don't know whether it was influenced by some organization or not. But it seems to me they are very much like communists.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How much information of world affairs outside of China is made available to the Chinese population?

Mr. DIAO. Very little. Only the higher intellectuals in the Academy of Sciences have the priority to look at some magazines or newspapers published outside of China. In Government and from a certain rank, like a second chief in the Government or a lecturer in the university, they have special published newspapers, inside newspapers. The party selects some items from outside publications, like the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, and like that. But these items are selected to suit their interests.

Mr. SCHULTZ. From your observations, do you think that China desires to increase its contact with other nations?

Mr. DIAO. During the 1950's they did. In that time, they wanted to make contact with other countries. But afterwards they were turned

down by the United States, so they want to be doing things by themselves. But after the "Cultural Revolution," from the evidence available recently, they are trying to improve their relations with outsiders.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How much influence does the army in China have on the national policy?

Mr. DIAO. I think before the "Cultural Revolution" the army was quite controlled by the party; but after the "Cultural Revolution," the influence of the army is getting stronger and stronger.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Has China stopped their teaching of Russian in the schools?

Mr. DIAO. Only in the early 1950's there was very little with Russia at that time. But after the dispute with Russia they are not allowed to learn Russian. Now they are shifted to learn English.

Mr. SCHULTZ. They are now learning English?

Mr. DIAO. Now they are learning English.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What is the reason for the change?

Mr. DIAO. I don't know, but I presume they want to learn more about the Western countries and get more technical materials and information from the Western countries because they couldn't get this information from Russia.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, in view of the extensive statement that Professor Diao has submitted this might be a good time to have inquiry from the committee members, if you desire.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Diao, for your appearance this morning.

The Chinese people have made many very significant contributions to the development and the growth of this Nation and as I stated to a representative of an American-Chinese welfare organization the other day, I only wish that all Americans were making an equivalent contribution to the strength of this country as the Chinese people. We greatly appreciate your appearance today.

Are you now a citizen of the United States?

Mr. DIAO. Now I am not, but I have applied for the citizenship.

The CHAIRMAN. You have initiated the naturalization process, you have put that into operation?

Mr. DIAO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say in 1957 the party invited criticism from nonparty members. You made criticism in response to that invitation and then your troubles began. Were you ever a member of the party?

Mr. DIAO. No, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it have been to your advantage to have become a member of the party?

Mr. DIAO. Yes; if you were a party member you got more privileges. But it was very difficult to get in the party after 1949. Besides, I intended not to get into the party.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not intend to go into the party?

Mr. DIAO. Because from my own experience I looked at the party activity, no matter whether it is the Nationalist Party or the communist party; the communist party assumed very tight control of their party members. You have to study, you have to get into the so-called party life every week.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you left China on the pretense of visiting your mother in Hong Kong. What year was that?

Mr. DIAO. It was '62.

The CHAIRMAN. And you stayed in Hong Kong?

Mr. DIAO. Until 1966.

The CHAIRMAN. You came to this country in 1966. Why do you say that socialism will not work in China, Mr. Diao?

Mr. DIAO. From my experience, their system will never work because their system is designed for the leaders, the dictatorship, to conquer the world but not consider the people. From my knowledge about the Soviet Union after the revolution for so many years they still have to turn to the right, to allow the people to get more freedom. So do the European countries.

The CHAIRMAN. What year did you return to China?

Mr. DIAO. 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. You were there from 1950 until 1962. Were you in Shanghai during any period of that time? I observed that you mentioned Shanghai in your testimony.

Mr. DIAO. Only on my way back to Peking, I stayed in Shanghai for 1 month in 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have occasion to be in the International Settlement—

Mr. DIAO. No.

The CHAIRMAN.—what used to be called the International Settlement in Shanghai?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, it used to be there, but now it is open for Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very interested, Mr. Diao, in your discussion about how elections are held in China. Last year we had a young refugee from Russia who lived in Moscow, and he compared the way elections were conducted in Russia with the way they were conducted in the United States. There, he said, you didn't have the opportunity to vote for anyone, you only had the opportunity to vote against, because only one name appeared on the ballot for any one election. He also mentioned that instead of voting your ballot behind the closed curtain, you voted it out on the table before a commissar.

I didn't quite understand your testimony in regard to elections. Do they have more than one name on the ballot in China? You seemed to indicate that the voter in China might have a choice, that there might be more than one name on the ballot. Is that true?

Mr. DIAO. No, there is only one name for one post. If they have two positions, they have two names.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be different positions, but there would only be one name for each post or each office?

Mr. DIAO. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you can only vote against?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, the party said if you wish, you can vote no for this person, to write down your own person. But there was no use, and people would not do that because probably they would get in trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you vote the ballot? Did you have occasion to vote in China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. In what city?

Mr. DIAO. In Peking.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you vote? Do you vote secretly or in the open?

Mr. DIAO. The booth is the spot. You went into the booth to vote, but if you cannot read you have to ask somebody to vote for you. That person was assigned by the party.

The CHAIRMAN. You also mentioned in your statement unions used by the Chinese workers. How are the unions organized? Are you intimately familiar with the organization of unions?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, I was a member of the teachers union in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Unions, then, are organized along craft lines?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. There are many, many unions, according to different trades. But the main function of the trade union in China is to help the party to give political education for their members.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the refugee from Russia—I believe it was his testimony—pointed out that unions operate quite differently in Russia. Instead of representing the people and communicating with employers and with the Government as they do in the United States, there they operate as a means of communicating from the Government to the people. Do you essentially have the same type of union organization in China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, I think the trade union in China was more in the position of the Government, because the Government is the employer. They try to act as agents of the Government and party, not members of the union themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. What about your court system? Is the court system run by a civilian or run by the army in China?

Mr. DIAO. Normally run by civilians, but the judge, the prosecuting attorneys were transferred from the army.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the army also have a system of courts?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, they have their own system of courts within the army.

The CHAIRMAN. But they don't try civilians in their system?

Mr. DIAO. Usually not. Only in the beginning of the regime under the so-called military control, at that time there was a military code.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you indicated in your opening statement, these hearings are for the purpose of updating our committee information on the theory of communism and, as you pointed out, to gain insight relative to the functioning of communism in actual practice.

Along that line, Professor Diao, I was most interested in reading your statement. On the first page you indicate that you came to the United States in 1947, attended the University of Illinois Department of Economics Graduate School at Urbana. You further said you graduated in 1948 with a master's degree and in 1948 and '49 you attended the Columbia University in New York City where, from 1949 to 1950, you attended the Graduate School of Business Administration of New York University, evidently pursuing a course of studies to get a Ph. D., but you did not finish it. You returned to China in 1950.

On page 3, then, you indicate, "In Peking, I found that many of the persons with whom I had associated in the United States prior to my return to China were in reality communists."

I am not going to ask for any names at this point; as a matter of fact, I would be very careful and urge you to refrain from the use of any names. I would be most interested in some further enlightenment on this particular subject. Since you limited the number of associations you had, on page 1, to the University of Illinois and Columbia University in New York, am I to gain the impression that these people you are referring to were Americans that you associated with during this time of study?

Mr. DIAO. No, I was not referring to the university, but rather to Chinese Student Christian Association. Because of the way I met the students—of course, our fellow students from China many of them returned to China. Then I found they were communist members.

Mr. ASHBROOK. When they returned to China?

Mr. DIAO. Before that, but I found out after I returned to China.

Mr. ASHBROOK. So most of the people you are referring to are either Americans of Chinese ancestry or Chinese citizens who were in the United States at the time, who later returned, as you did, to China and you then subsequently found that they were indeed communists while back in China. Would this be all of the people, or were there some who were Americans?

Mr. DIAO. No, only Chinese, not Americans.

Mr. ASHBROOK. What particular line were they promoting at that time? In any interest in the theory of communism, I am sure you, the student, recognize that at any particular time there is a communist line that is being promoted. After you left in 1950, it was the germ warfare line, then it was McCarthyism, and at the present day it seems to be the line that we have a repressive society. But at any given time there is a reasonably consistent communist line, and in the period from 1947 to '50, which you would have particular knowledge about, what was the particular line that the members of the Chinese Student Christian Association then in the United States were promoting at that particular time? Do you recall?

Mr. DIAO. Of course, this association was the Christian Association founded quite a long time ago. But during that time, after World War II, some members were sent by the communist party, I think. So during that time they started a movement to urge the Chinese students to return to China to contribute themselves for a new China.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It sounds like they recruited you, too.

Mr. DIAO. That was correct, because I thought this was a new China and also the communist trend to be run by a coalition government and to give the people a new democracy. So I think I was fooled by this kind of propaganda at that time.

Mr. ASHBROOK. On page 8 you indicate, "There is almost no religion in China anymore except among the older people," and then you go on to indicate the facts as you know them regarding religion and the practice of religion in communist China.

Would it be your impression now in retrospect that the use of the word "Christian" in the association at that time was for propaganda purposes, or was it actually the Christian Association of Chinese students?

Mr. DIAO. I think both. For the communist party members, they wanted to use this association to attract propaganda; but for the most of the members who joined that and attended that association, they didn't know, like myself. We went just to do Christian work.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Again, this strikes at the heart of the communist practice. We recognize, as you pointed out, the difference between what might be thought of the leaders and what might be the principles or motives of those they attract. We know in every case, regardless of the communist leadership involved, that these are always good people, well-meaning people, who are attracted.

Talking specifically of your knowledge of the people who were the leaders of the Chinese Students Christian Association, could you honestly tell us at this point whether any of them were in fact Christian, or were they communist party functionaries merely using the name as an appeal to people like yourself to get you back to China? We are talking about the leaders, not about the people who were attracted by their propaganda.

Mr. DIAO. It is still difficult to determine the leaders because those communist members were behind the scene. They didn't assume the leadership jobs. For instance, I was the cochairman of the New York chapter at that time, and I was not a communist member. But those behind the scenes were communist members.

Mr. ASHBROOK. What you are saying in effect—I don't want to misinterpret your statement—what you are saying in effect is that although many people were attracted, such as yourself, and put in a leadership position, even at that time there wasn't the inclination on the part of the communist organizers to allow other than the party members to promote the program, or to be its hard-core organizers. Is that correct?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. Because they want to use the outsiders to attract the other people because it is more useful for them to put the members in the positions where they assume leadership by themselves. Besides, I think this is the way to try to avoid attention by the authorities, the FBI or someone. If they were very active, they would probably get caught.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I think this is most interesting, because, even with the passage of 23 years, it is interesting to see that you were attracted to the communist cause, in effect, by what might be considered a front group at that time professing to be a student Christian association, but in reality nothing more than an arm of the Chinese Communist Party. Just as in this day and age I think we see, as time goes by, that not many things change. The issue might change, the line might change, the front organization might change, but there is still the effort, as there was then, to set up a front, set up an organization to tie into what might be popular at that moment and to exploit as many people as possible.

I guess you, in your testimony, indicate that you are a living witness to that type of exploitation. I have one question, because I know all of the other members have something to say. You indicated, in your discussion about the freedom of the press, that there was not any substantial press freedom in China. Other testimony has indicated that, despite the repressive brutality in the Soviet Union, there is still in that country what might be referred to as an underground

press. In some cases it is little more than papers that are printed by intellectuals, circulated among themselves. But whatever you want to call it, there is an effort in the Soviet Union among certain classes of people, particularly the intellectuals, to circulate within the confines of their own abilities in that country, some truth and some of their own personal thinking.

Is there any movement of this type that you have been able to see within Red China?

Mr. DIAO. To my knowledge, I don't think so, because I think that political control in China is much tighter than the Soviet Union and the European countries.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you, Professor. That is all the questions I have at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Diao, for your testimony. You have described very vividly in your statement the hardships of life in China now. I would like to ask, in view of those hardships, is there any chance that there will be a change from within the Government of China at this time? That is, is there any chance that the people will overthrow the present Government, or is there any chance that excessive unrest among the people through strikes, such as we saw in Eastern Poland, will bring about changes in that Government?

Mr. DIAO. I think the chance is very little for the people to overthrow the Government or the party because the communist controls, both the organization and the ideology, are very tight. Everybody is isolated; they cannot communicate with others. But I think there will be more chance for themselves to change to the revolutions, especially after the days of Mao.

Mr. PREYER. I gather you are saying that you don't feel that from the people putting outside pressure on the Government that there will be changes, but that the Government itself may revise its theory and practice of government.

When you travel in Eastern Europe, for example, you find people saying things are very hard, "We can't find housing, we don't have enough food, and we can't buy automobiles," etc. But then they say, "It's much better than it was." Is this the attitude of most people in China, that no matter how bad things are now, things are much better than they were before the present government took over?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. I think the party and the Government want people to believe that, even though the situation is very bad now, it is still better than before and than in some other countries. But the Chinese people are so naive to listen to this kind of pressuring because they didn't know anything about the outside world. They believe that. Even though, during the bad years in 1960, I heard quite many peasants complaining about the situation, but during that time the intellectuals, they are not to speak their own opinions, but the peasants did.

Mr. PREYER. You mentioned in your statement hardship years around 1959 and 1960. Have things improved since those hardship years in a substantial way? In other words, what I am getting at, are the people generally satisfied with their Government in the sense that they are saying things are bad, but they used to be much worse?

Or is there so much unrest that there is actually a chance of some change in the government?

Mr. DIAO. During that time there was quite a great change, because the people's dissatisfaction with the Government was getting stronger during that time, the bad years. But later on, from the latter part of 1962, the situation was getting a little bit better, so the people since were more satisfied.

Mr. PREYER. I gather from what you are saying—and I won't go into this any further—that though conditions are bad, terrible by our standards, we would make a mistake to think that the people are on the verge of an uprising, that their attitude is that things are better?

Mr. DIAO. Because the people didn't have any choice. If there is available to choose between certain kinds of governments or systems, the people would be against the communist party, because now they don't have this choice.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ZION. We have particularly appreciated your testimony here this morning. There is an increasing dialogue in this country to admit Red China to the United Nations and also to increase dialogue, to associate with people in communist China. I wonder if you care to comment on what centers of influence exist there.

I have two questions, really: No. 1, with whom would we be communicating, would it be Chou En-lai, Mao, the army, the party as such, the Red Guards?

I understand there are two Red Guards; we have one that is pro-army and one antiarmy. Just who are the influential groups in China today, sir?

Mr. DIAO. I think it is very difficult to get with Peking, even though Peking is getting more stable right now after the cultural revolution.

Mr. ZION. You say Peking is getting more influence now. When you refer to Peking, what particular group or individual do you refer to?

Mr. DIAO. Peking is Mao because Mao is still there. Even after the "Cultural Revolution" I think they have quite a problem within China. So it is very difficult at this moment to begin a dialogue with Peking.

Mr. ZION. Mao, of course, is getting on in years. Do you anticipate that some other group within China might be growing in power?

My question, of course, gets to the point: If we, in fact, wanted to carry on meaningful dialogue in Red China, who would be the people we would contact now and who potentially would be the groups in power or influence?

I am well aware of the fact that in Red China, as well as many other countries, many groups are not "simpatico" one with the other. Can we anticipate that someone actually does speak for Red China now, someone or some group; and if so, who is it, and if not, who potentially would be a group that would represent the feeling of the majority of the people, or at least would hold the authority over the majority of the people?

Mr. DIAO. Through the new constitution of Mao, he has picked his successor, but I think after Mao's death there would be quite a change. Probably some new leaders will emerge to take over after a short period, after the so-called "collective leadership."

So it is very difficult to tell whom to begin dialogue with. Chou has the impression, to intellectuals, of being much more moderate than Mao. But Chou En-lai is very aged right now, and how long he lives is in doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Thank you, Mr. Diao, for coming.

What is your present employment?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Professor Diao would prefer not to discuss his present employment.

Mr. DRINAN. Is there any reason for that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps we should have a conference off the record.

Mr. Counsel, come forward, please.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. The chairman has ruled that since an agreement apparently was made by counsel with you about your present employment, the question need not be answered by you.

How did you come in contact, sir, with the counsel of this committee?

Mr. DIAO. The committee approached me.

Mr. DRINAN. Have you ever testified about this subject before any Federal or State body before?

Mr. DIAO. No, this is my first time.

Mr. DRINAN. What would you suggest, sir, in view of your testimony, as to what this committee can do? This is a Committee on Internal Security, with 47 full-time employees, with a budget of some one-half million dollars. What would you suggest as constructive work for this committee, in view of your testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. I think, gentleman from Massachusetts, that would be outside the competence of this witness. The gentleman from Massachusetts is a member of this committee. I think the gentleman from Massachusetts is capable of making suggestions for the work of the committee. As the gentleman well knows, the Chair will give him ample opportunity to present his views. But I don't think it is necessary to ask this witness to comment upon that question; it is definitely outside his competence.

Mr. DRINAN. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is the status of the family in China today, under communism today, as opposed to the status of the family before the communists took over?

Mr. DIAO. There was quite a change. Before the communists took over, the people were in favor of the family; they stayed together and they were loyal to their family more than others. But now the communists try to break down this concept. They teach the children from very young, kindergarten or nursery school, that Chairman Mao and the party are better than anybody else; you have to listen to your party, not your parents.

Mr. THOMPSON. Are the families kept together as a whole, or at an early age are sometimes the children moved into special schools and special training away from the parents?

Mr. DIAO. They use a kind of organization, the Young Pioneers, like Boy Scouts. They attract the children into this organization and

they have meetings every week. On the weekends they go on trips to do activities in groups. So they try to avoid the children staying in the family.

During the "Great Leap Forward," they even went a step further they separated the husbands and the wives and the children.

Mr. THOMPSON. They separated the husband and wife?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, the husbands and wives were organized into different brigades after the model of the army, and they don't allow the two to stay together.

Mr. THOMPSON. How was that received? How did people accept the separation of husband and wife and the breaking down of the family?

Mr. DIAO. The people did not like this idea at all, so in the night the wives and husbands wanted to be together and they went to the nursery schools to look for their children because they didn't believe the children were in good hands.

Mr. THOMPSON. Is there any apparent resistance to the party's attempt to eliminate religion? Perhaps I am putting words in your mouth, but from the testimony I drew the conclusion that religion is not in favor in China. Do the people seem to resent the fact that there is an official policy against organized religion?

Mr. DIAO. Yes, I think there is an official policy against religion, because the party always teaches the people to not take on the religion because they think the religion, no matter what it is, it is reactionary, according to Marxism.

Mr. THOMPSON. If a person were a member of—a Buddhist or a Catholic, could he become a member of the communist party?

Mr. DIAO. No.

Mr. THOMPSON. In other words, if he is a member of organized religion, he could not be a member of the communist party?

Mr. DIAO. If he is a party member, he would be expelled.

Mr. THOMPSON. Approximately what is the size of the Communist Party in China as related to the total population of China? Do you have an idea as to the number?

Mr. DIAO. I don't have that exact figure. Of course, the Chinese Communist Party is one of the largest in the world of its kind, but compared to the huge population in China, it is still the minority of the population.

Mr. THOMPSON. In your statement you mentioned there were eight other parties in China. Could you tell us briefly what role these parties play? Do you jeopardize your future in China if you belong to one of these eight parties other than the communist party, or are they in effect puppets of the communist party?

Mr. DIAO. These so-called "democratic" parties have been established before the communist takeover, and they attended the political conference in 1949 to prepare the establishment of the communist regime. So these eight so-called "democratic" parties take up the gun of the communist party and the sword of Mao Tse-tung as the guidelines. So in fact they are acting as an agent for the communist party or a front organization for the party.

Mr. THOMPSON. So, in effect, they are "front" parties for the Communist Party in China?

Mr. DIAO. That is right.

Mr. THOMPSON. What is the position of the army as related to the party in China? Now, during the "Cultural Revolution" we heard a great deal that the army was becoming more dominant than the party. Are your army leaders party members also, or are some of your top army leaders nonparty members?

Mr. DIAO. I think all the army leaders, commanders, political commissioners are all communist party members. Even in the Government, the higher ranked leaders are communist party members. Of course, they are allowed a certain position to the so-called "democratic" party members, but this is just a figurehead.

Mr. THOMPSON. You also mentioned a little bit about the public defender system. Is there a trial by jury in China? If a person is accused of a crime, is he entitled as a matter of right to have a trial by jury?

Mr. DIAO. Not necessarily entitled to a trial because many of the people have secret trials by the party. But when the party considers a certain case as worthwhile for publicity, then they go to trial and are assigned a counsel for the defendant. But actually this counselor or the lawyer could not defend for the defense.

Mr. THOMPSON. Why could he not defend for the defense?

Mr. DIAO. Since this case almost always involved counterrevolutionaries, in China nobody can defend a counterrevolutionary; otherwise, probably you will be next. So the function of this appointed lawyer or counselor actually acted as the prosecutor for the State and tried to convince the defense to admit to its crime.

Mr. THOMPSON. What would happen if a defense counsel attempted to defend a counterrevolutionary—in other words, if he took his side and actively advocated that he was not guilty or he had a right to engage in the actions which he was doing—what would happen to the defense attorney if he took the side of a counterrevolutionary?

Mr. DIAO. He would definitely get [into] trouble. Either he would be branded as a rightist or a counterrevolutionary and sent to the labor camp.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Thank you for your testimony.

I would like to ask you a question that pertains to the relationship of Nationalist China to the people on mainland China. What is the attitude of the average person on mainland China toward the Chinese Government in Taiwan? Do they look at them for hope, do they regard them as the true Government of China, or what is the attitude?

Mr. DIAO. Of course not, I think the Nationalist Government and the people in Taiwan are very much against the communist party in mainland China.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I meant what was the attitude of the people on mainland China toward the government on Taiwan?

Mr. DIAO. Because they were told by the Government that people in the Government in Taiwan are in the category of a reactionary and an agent of the U.S. imperialism, and they will liberate Taiwan's human labor, but not by force; probably through some peaceful method approach.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Last week, shall we say, the bridges were beginning to be built to China, and our citizens, according to a news report, are now allowed on a limited basis to go to Red China. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. DIAO. I would rather doubt this measure, whether this measure has its effect on Peking, at least not very much. Because it is not on the American side whether to allow certain people to travel to China but it is on China's side, they refuse to give a visa to the Americans. So far, there are only three persons among some 1,000 Americans.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In other words, you feel they will still make sure that those Americans who do come to China are those Americans who will give some benefit to mainland China?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. I think they will still refuse to allow the Americans to go to China, at least for this period.

Every foreigner when he comes to visit China was well prepared by the party to give the kind of outside questions and their purposes. So suppose the people in China who might contact this fellow—they have the kind of ideas and questions beforehand. I think communist China would not allow foreigners to travel freely in China.

Mr. SCHMITZ. One last question: I don't know what your activities in this country have been since you have been back here, but you must have run across the attitude of our young people. In the latter part of last week I had a young man in my office who, in the course of the conversation, made what I consider a typical comment by our students, and that is that the people of China, referring to China in general, mainland China, are better off now than they were under the previous regime. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. DIAO. I think because they are youngsters they don't know anything about the real China. When I was in Columbia in 1966-67, when the trouble started there, the students wanted to set up a kind of people's commune in Columbia University, because they thought this kind of organization has been set up in Peking University in Peking.

I had a chance to talk with several of the students, I said, "Do you know what kind of organization is that; do you think it was really run by the students themselves?"

They said they do, they do believe that, because they were told that.

I said, "It is not true, because it was run by the party, not by the students." So I think that most of the students are just very naive and ignorant about the real thing happening in China. They thought the regime was better than the old regime, but actually it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California.

Professor Diaoyi, I have heard what I consider some very preposterous stories coming out of China, apparently in an effort to build up a personality cult around Mao Tse-tung. For example, I remember one story that I read about or heard, concerning a young doctor who was attempting to administer medical assistance to a child who, I believe, had its arm severed, and he called upon the "Thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung and received the inspiration and the knowledge to successfully administer medical treatment.

Another story I have heard, about the Chinese pilot coming up against enemy planes and calling upon the "Thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung for the inspiration and the knowledge for shooting down successfully the enemy planes.

Are those propaganda efforts actually promoted in China, or were they promoted while you were there?

Mr. DIAO. Yes. When I was there this kind of stories was promoted by the party, but not so like right now because now they are saying Mao Tse-tung is not a person. They want him as a god in China. The party and the people treat Mao Tse-tung not like a person, because he is a god of China.

When everything is impossible, you try to look for a solution from the "Thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung, his "red book," and even if a person is dying, a doctor can read a few sentences from Mao Tse-tung and the patient will be healed. I don't believe this kind of story, but that is going on, stronger and stronger.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, are there any further questions of Professor Diao?

(At this point Mr. Drinan and Mr. Thompson left the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, do you have any further questions?

Mr. SCHULTZ. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for being here.

Call your next witness.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Our next witness is Daina Palena, and she requests that her appearance not be on television, for fear of harm to her family in Latvia.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that this is the first time the proceedings of this hearing have been broadcast or televised, due to the rules of the House. However, the rules have been changed; televising and broadcasting of the hearings are now permitted.

But the specific House rules do provide that the witness does have the right to request that he not be televised or broadcast. Therefore, in accordance with that rule, the Chair will have to acquiesce in the request of the next witness. So I would instruct the representatives of television and of radio to now please turn off your equipment.

Did the request also apply to radio, Mr. Counsel? The Chair has no alternative except to acquiesce in the request, under the rules. I think perhaps you should contact her about radio. If she has no complaint against radio, we will let the recording proceed.

Do you have your next witness here, Mr. Counsel?

The witness has also objected to being on radio. Therefore, it will be necessary to turn off the recording equipment.

Call your next witness.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Miss Daina Palena.

Mr. Chairman, Miss Palena understands English very well, but was reluctant to try to testify in English.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please be seated.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Assisting her will be Mr. Rudolph Smits, S-m-i-t-s.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be necessary, then, to first swear the interpreter.

Mr. Interpreter, do you solemnly swear that you will truly and accurately interpret the questions put to the witness and properly interpret the answers given throughout this testimony?

Mr. SMITS. I do so swear.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Palena, will you please rise and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss PALENA. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

**TESTIMONY OF DAINA PALENA, AS INTERPRETED BY
RUDOLPH SMITS**

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, before questioning the witness, I would like to state briefly the history of Latvia and ask her if it is correct.

During the past 800 years, Latvia has been a free country for only 20 years. The country was ruled successively by German, Polish, and Russian regimes until the end of World War I, when an independent republic was proclaimed.

Despite a 1920 pact whereby the Soviet Union agreed to respect Latvian sovereignty, the country was again occupied by Soviet troops in 1940, a communist regime was installed, and the country was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the 15th republic of the U.S.S.R. Latvia was occupied by Germany from 1941 to 1945, and again returned to Russian rule after World War II.

Is that substantially correct, Miss Palena?

Miss. PALENA. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you state your full name for the record.

Miss PALENA. My name is Daina Palena.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where were you born?

Miss PALENA. I am born on 15 January in Sigulda, Latvia.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you attend school?

Mr. SMITS. I attended elementary school in Latvia and also in-completed attendance of high school.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you a member of the communist party youth group?

Mr. SMITS. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do you know what Komsomol is?

Mr. SMITS. I was a member of the Young Communist League for only 1 year because, for the most case, young people are forced to join this organization.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What is the purpose of Komsomol?

Mr. SMITS. The purpose of the Young Communist League is to train future members of the party and make them conscientious supporters of communism.

(At this point Mr. Drinan and Mr. Thompson returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. SCHULTZ. Subsequent to leaving high school, did you seek additional educational training?

Mr. SMITS. I joined the Riga Technical School, after completion of which I got a position as a telegraph-telephone operator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, at that point, the witness is not being televised; could we have someone turn off the lights?

Proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Subsequent to the training to become a telegraph operator, did you become gainfully employed?

Mr. SMITS. After completing these courses, I worked for more than 3 years. I was compelled to work by and for the Government because the Government paid me while I was attending these courses.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What job did you finally take?

Mr. SMITS. I worked as a telegraph and telephone operator.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Following this occupation, did you then seek another occupation?

Mr. SMITS. After this, I got a position in the Fishing Administration.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What type of job did you have?

Mr. SMITS. I got a position on board ship as a stewardess.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How many other women were on board this ship?

Mr. SMITS. Usually from seven to 10 or more.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where did this ship travel?

Mr. SMITS. Usually this ship traveled from the North to South Atlantic.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What countries did you visit?

Mr. SMITS. Usually the ship stopped at the countries of Africa and Canada. Personally I was able to visit the Canary Islands and Canada.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What type of ship was this?

Mr. SMITS. This was a fishing ship, a fishing trawler.

Mr. SCHULTZ. While you were on board this ship, were you required to attend political classes?

Mr. SMITS. We usually had political information courses two or three times a month.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you required to be a member of the communist party for your employment on this ship?

Mr. SMITS. No, that was not imperative.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned that you visited Africa and Canada. Were you allowed to go ashore?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, we were allowed to go ashore in groups.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you allowed to visit with the residents of the country you were visiting?

Mr. SMITS. Not without a permit.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Who would issue the permit?

Mr. SMITS. Only the ship's captain could give that.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Now if I understand correctly, when you went ashore, you went ashore in groups, and you had to have a permit from the ship's captain to speak to or have discussions with the natives of the country you were visiting?

Mr. SMITS. Not quite. We were allowed to ask directions, prices, and so on, but we were not allowed to get into political discussions with the natives.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I would like to offer her statement in the record following the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to the statement being inserted in the record following the witness' testimony?

If not, the statement will be admitted into the record.

Will you proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Will you describe the circumstances surrounding your coming to the United States?

Mr. SMITS. I was taken ill on board ship and with the aid of a Coast Guard helicopter I was taken to Staten Island.

Mr. SCHULTZ. When did you first decide you wanted to stay in the United States?

Mr. SMITS. A few days after regaining consciousness, I decided not to return.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Was your return to Latvia solicited by anyone from the Russian Embassy?

Mr. SMITS. Yes. Every day in the hospital I was attended by a representative of the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Why did you decide not to go back to Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. First of all, because I would have lost my previous employment. I might have been able to get a position, but at the present time there is a very critical situation in regard to housing in Latvia. And consequently, I would never have been able to get abroad anymore.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are you in touch with your friends and family in Latvia at this time, or in correspondence?

Mr. SMITS. I correspond only with my closest relatives but not with my friends, since that could have serious consequences for them.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Have you been able to send packages or any items to your friends or family since you have been here in the United States?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, I did send parcels, but I don't know whether they received them or will receive them.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is mail censored in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Miss Palena, I direct your attention to the items listed on the page and as appears on the screen. I would like to go down the items listed specifically in the Latvian Socialist Republic Constitution of 1940 and ask if you can identify for us those items which you experienced.

Mr. SMITS. How would you want that expressed?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better put the questions to her and let the interpreter relay the questions.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of speech?

Mr. SMITS. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have complete freedom of press?

Mr. SMITS. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of assembly?

Mr. SMITS. Partially.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you give us an example of the partial freedom for demonstration? Could you criticize the Government in a demonstration?

Mr. SMITS. No, never.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of correspondence, freedom of writing?

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of religion?

Mr. SMITS. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of education?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, complete.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of the secret ballot?

Mr. SMITS. How shall I explain it?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did they have elections?

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you vote without anyone else's knowing how you voted?

Mr. SMITS. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I may have misunderstood, but I thought you said you had complete freedom in education.

Miss PALENA. Yes.

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were the teachers allowed to teach from any book they so desired?

Mr. SMITS. Of course not.

Mr. SCHULTZ. The communist party controlled the textbooks in the school?

Mr. SMITS. All methods of education were controlled by the Ministry of Education.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then I did understand incorrectly. You did not have freedom of education?

Mr. SMITS. I would just like to explain that anyone who wanted to go and study or have an education could do so; that is the way I wanted to explain it.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Can you describe for us the living conditions in Latvia concerning the availability and quality of food?

Mr. SMITS. It varied from time to time; sometimes there was a shortage of food. When Khrushchev was our leader, there was a shortage of white bread, and very frequently we had to stand in line for food.

I would like further to explain, however, I cannot complain of the circumstances in Latvia, because very many people from White Russia, neighboring White Russia, came to Latvia for bread and food.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where did you buy the dress that you are wearing?

Mr. SMITS. I bought this suit in Latvia in a special seamen's store.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Can anyone shop there, or only seamen?

Mr. SMITS. Only seamen, upon presentation of their documents.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How much did that suit cost?

Mr. SMITS. It cost about 125 rubles in Soviet money.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How does that compare with money of this country, if you know?

I will withdraw the question.

Mr. SMITS. Roughly \$92.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How much were you paid each week or month while you were on board ship?

Mr. SMITS. Every month I received 200 rubles.

Mr. SCHULTZ. So your suit cost you approximately a half month's pay?

Mr. SMITS. We received a salary plus the so-called bonus which they gave us as a supplementary payment.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are all prices set by the Government?

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is there any unemployment in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. No, anyone can work who wants to.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned that after high school you attended a specialized school of training for the purpose of becoming a telegraph operator, and that subsequent to that, you went to work on a boat.

Does the law require that everyone work in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. It is the honorable obligation of every Soviet citizen to work.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have a choice in your study in preparing for a job, and also a choice for going to work on the fishing boat?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, but on board ship I was placed in a position where I was most needed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What happens to people that don't work?

Mr. SMITS. They are considered parasites, and of course they are compelled to work, because no one will pay them if they do not. And in the Soviet Union there is a law that specifies that he who shall not work shall not eat.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do they have labor camps in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. I am not informed whether such exists.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe for us your house where you lived in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. When I lived with my parents, we had one room and a kitchen; that was all.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Was that one room and a kitchen for three people?

Mr. SMITS. We were five people.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you own your own home?

Mr. SMITS. No, that was an apartment owned by the Government.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do the people of Latvia have the right to own their own home, and do they own their homes?

Mr. SMITS. They are allowed to own their homes, but if it exceeds a certain square feet then the property is confiscated.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Who owns the factories and businesses in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. All industry and commerce belongs to the State.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How are the workers paid? Is there an incentive program?

Mr. SMITS. Their salary depends on the level of their education and from their category.

In regard to the question of housing, I would like to explain what conditions people live in.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Go ahead.

Mr. SMITS. Many people live in basement apartments and in converted garages.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How much rent would they pay for these basement apartments?

Mr. SMITS. The rent in general in the Soviet Union is not high. The only thing is, if I personally rent a room or a bed space.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then it is expensive?

Mr. SMITS. For instance, from my salary of 155 rubles I have to pay 10 rubles a month for my bed space.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe for us the educational system for students from high school up through college?

Mr. SMITS. We are given a certain subject that we have to take, and if we choose a certain profession we have to follow that program as defined.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is school mandatory up through any certain grade or age?

Mr. SMITS. In the Soviet Union, education both in elementary school and in high school is mandatory.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do you have a selection of courses? Could you study music, for instance, if you wanted to?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, of course.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You mentioned having elections in Latvia. Does the party designate the candidate?

Mr. SMITS. Only the party.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Can you vote "no"?

Mr. SMITS. Of course not.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe the freedom to travel in Latvia, or outside the country?

Mr. SMITS. I can freely travel throughout Latvia and throughout the Soviet Union, but if I want to travel abroad I have to have a special permit.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Who would issue this permit? The party?

Mr. SMITS. I don't really know.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Can you tell us how the Latvian history is taught in the Latvian schools, before the Russians came and after?

Mr. SMITS. They taught us that Latvia had become a backward country and was exploited by the bourgeoisie, and that is the reason why the working people and the common people were struggling for a better future.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What are your observations about living in this country?

Mr. SMITS. My observations and conclusions are that people live in far better conditions here.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could she discuss freely with her relatives and neighbors ideas about the Government or her own personal philosophies while living in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. Of course, with my close relatives and close friends whom I could trust I could carry on such discussions, but relative strangers would not get into such discussions at all.

Mr. SCHULTZ. To what extent does religion prevail in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. On the surface it appears that there is a freedom of religion, but from my personal observations I have noticed that many churches have either been converted to museums or simply abandoned altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me intervene at this point, Mr. Counsel.

How long do you expect your questioning to continue?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Just a couple of minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, and I will then let the members question.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe for us if there are trade unions in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, there are trade unions in Latvia, and most workers are members of them and they pay their dues.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Just one final question: How does the citizen of Latvia show his concern or discontent for the communist party, if he feels that way?

Mr. SMITS. Of course, they can't express themselves, but they are indifferent to slogans, to speeches, and so on.

Mr. SCHULTZ. That would conclude my questioning, Mr. Chairman, and I ask that the full detailed statement be entered in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been done, Mr. Counsel.

(The statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF DAINA PALENA

My name is Daina Palena. I was born January 15, 1945, in Sigulda, Latvia:

I attended primary school and two years of high school, but did not complete high school in Latvia. I then went to a technical school in Riga, Latvia, to study to be a telegraph operator. I worked more than three years near Riga and then applied to go aboard a ship as a member of the crew. I remained on a ship for two and one-half (2½) years. I decided that I would like to work on a ship because this would give me an opportunity to travel abroad, which I otherwise would not have. When I decided to apply for this position, they checked my background. I was cleared by Komsomol and by the labor union. This took approximately two months. While on the ship I traveled all over the Atlantic; however, did not go to any West European country. We did stop in Africa and in Canada. I did not belong to the Communist Party. I was a member of Komsomol for one year but left as I had been forced to join against my wishes. I was a member of the Pioneers, a young youth group. While on the ship I worked in the kitchen and as a waitress. I held a seaman's passport. On the ship we did have a political officer and were required to attend political classes two or three times each month. Studies consisted of Marxism and Leninism and the story of the revolution and economics in Soviet Russia. When we visited countries such as Canada we were allowed to go ashore in groups, and we were to remain with these groups. We were not supposed to discuss anything with the people of the country we visited. We could ask directions, prices, etc., but were not to engage in discussion with them.

On April 8, 1970, I took an overdose of sleeping tablets for reasons of my own. I became very ill; the doctor on the ship thought I had appendicitis or something and feeling that I would die, radioed for help. At that time we were several hundred miles south of New York, and a helicopter from the United States came to the ship and took me to a hospital on the mainland. Approximately 10 days later, when I came out of the coma, and recovered my memory, I decided that I did not wish to return to Latvia. I told this to the doctor, and several days later I was visited by a representative of the Soviet Embassy. I told him that I did not wish to return home to Latvia. The ship involved was a Soviet trawler, and we were engaged in fishing. To the best of my knowledge this was the only purpose of the ship. We repeatedly took our catch to a mother ship when our ship became filled, and then we returned to fishing. While aboard the ship, I did not have any intention of escaping to the United States. I knew nothing about the United States, and it was only after I awoke in the hospital that I decided I should never go back for several reasons: first, I would not be allowed to retain my job on the ship; secondly, I would never again get a chance to go abroad; and thirdly it would be very difficult for me to find a place to live; and mostly I don't want to live under Russian rule and suppression as everyone does in Latvia. I want to be free and to have rights as an individual.

Concerning conditions in Latvia, food is always in somewhat short supply, and very expensive. For example, a kilogram of butter—that is, 2.2 lbs.—costs approximately 3 rubles, 50 kopeks. Earlier, it was only 2 rubles, 80 kopeks. As a telegraph operator, I made 55 rubles per month. All prices are set by the government, that is, they are the same in all the stores. Most of the food available was produced in Latvia; however, some of it was imported from other sections of the Soviet Union, Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

There is no unemployment in Latvia. You have to work in order to live. The law requires that a person work. Everyone has a job. If you cannot work because you are physically disabled, you can be taken care of by the state, but it is very difficult. My mother was unable to work; she was sick and old and had to receive a pension. It was very difficult to obtain this. She had to find people who could testify that she had worked before, and how well she had worked. This was up to her to find these people. In Latvia we do not have any welfare system such as I see here in the United States. I know of no forced labor camps in Latvia; however, most of the people who are sent to labor camps work in the Soviet Union—Siberia, and other sections of Russia.

I lived with my parents until I went to work. At that time I had to find my own place to live. Housing is very difficult to obtain in Latvia. Frequently several families live in one room. If one is not married, you have to share a room with many other persons who may be strangers. The family rooms in the older homes have only one kitchen and one bathroom for several rooms, each one having several families. I have never lived in the newer apartments, but they are also

very crowded. If you formerly owned your own home, and the government decided that you have too much room, they can put other people in your house to live. All new property is owned by the state. All factories are owned by the state. No one even dreams of owning one. A person can own only a small plot of ground to raise vegetables on. The only privately owned homes are those which have been owned for many, many years. Rent of an apartment is not high, but often you must pay a sum of money to obtain such an apartment. Sometimes this runs as high as several thousand rubles. For the single person, you would pay maybe 5 to 10 rubles for bed space in a dormitory-type system.

Almost no one owns an automobile in Latvia. If you could save enough money to buy one, it would take years to obtain it. Quite a few people have radios or television sets in Latvia, however. On the radio we can listen to stations all over Europe. I have listened to the BBC from England, the Voice of America, as well as German stations. Most of the TV sets are made in Russia. In Riga we can receive stations in Riga and in Leningrad. I do not remember exactly how many stations—I believe two or three—but it has been many years since I had occasion to listen to the TV. It used to be prohibited at one time to listen to the BBC or Voice of America on the radio. However, this is no longer true.

In Latvia, nearly all teachers in schools are members of the Communist Party. All books must be approved by the Education Ministry. The only foreign books available are non-political ones. Schooling is required of all children through eight years of primary school and three years of high school. High school used to be mandatory for only two years. Russians still only have to go two years to high school. There is no tuition in school. This also includes the university. The only charges are for books and supplies. Some students in the university receive some money from the government to attend school. For example, while I was attending the technical school, I received 20 rubles per month from the government. I believe that a student can attend school up to four years at the university. Then, unless he is especially skilled in a particular subject, he must leave school and find a job. As I said before, there is no unemployment, and the government will find him a job.

I should like to comment on elections and political activities in Latvia. All citizens who are not criminals can vote at 18 years of age. To vote, you go to the voting place, pick up your ballot, and drop it in the ballot box. You can mark it or not, as you wish. It makes no difference. Very few people mark their ballots, as the government has already decided who will be elected. For the most part, people are not interested in who wins an election. The government knows who is best for the people in this system, and there is only one political party—the Communist Party. Most people want only enough to eat and a place to live. If they have this, they are satisfied. Elections in Latvia are not like elections in this country. I do not know of any difficulties in elections in Latvia. Even if a person tore up his ballot, I don't think anything would happen to him. Someone would probably ask him why he did this, and would talk to him about it, but that is all I think would happen.

While in Latvia everyone belongs to a trade union; the function of these unions is to speak to the workers for the government. They arrange for vacations, payment when you are sick, and a pension when you can no longer work. They are never involved in strikes, as I see here in this country. Any strikers in Latvia would go to jail or to a labor camp in Russia. I might also say that in Latvia the government decides what work you will do, because they know where they can best use your skills. If you do not like your job, you can ask to be given another one, and if your reasons are good enough, they may move you. This is how I went to work on the ship. They must have needed waitresses, so I was given the job. I was not used as a radio operator on the ship, because I had not been trained in that type of work.

I have not seen the Latvian constitution, but I am sure that they have one since the laws and rights of the people must be based upon something. I noticed that in Latvia the trials of persons for crimes are never mentioned in the papers, or on the radio, as it is in this country. In Latvia we have a security or secret police which watches the people to enable the government to understand what they are thinking. I think they also investigate smuggling, etc. They wear civilian clothing and are composed of both Latvians and Russians. The only time I know or heard of them arresting someone was someone arrested for smuggling literature into the country.

Religion is prohibited for all party members, and children are taught that there is no God. Some people still go to church, but they are mostly the older people. Most Latvians, I believe, belonged to the Lutheran church. There are now quite

a few Jews in Latvia. Many came from Russia after the war. The Russians do not like them, and most Latvians also dislike them.

When it comes to travel, any Latvian can travel all over Russia without a permit. We all have passports which are also an identity card. This passport cannot be used outside of Latvia or Russia. I had a seaman's passport, which I still have. It was sent with my other documents to the hospital.

I notice that here in the United States there is frequent student dissent or demonstrations. We never have that in Latvia. A student can do it, of course, but since it is illegal he would have to think of the consequences. He would be tried and sent to jail or a corrective labor camp. I can remember one Latvian leader who spoke out against the system. He was exiled to Siberia and has not yet returned. The newspapers never mention these matters. They do talk a great deal about foreign spies, however, and everyone is cautioned to be on the lookout for them.

Latvian history as it is taught in the schools tells us that Latvia before the Russians came was very bad. The people were very poor and the leaders were all fascists. I found this very interesting, now that I am free to read the history of Latvia as it really was. This proves to me that the Russians change history as it is taught to suit their own needs. We are taught that we are Latvians and Soviet citizens.

Most people in Latvia just don't care about politics or anything else except a place to live and enough food to eat. Now that I am in this country, I feel very different. Here I am no longer afraid to talk to people about how I feel about things, because I know that they will not run to the police. I do not worry about living conditions, and having enough to eat. I think that people here should be very happy, but they don't know how things are in other places. Here they have so many opportunities. Nobody controls you, watches what you are doing, or where you are going. It is almost another world. Here some people have almost too much freedom.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Miss Palena, for your appearance here this morning.

I doubt if you are aware of it, but immediately after the story hit the press concerning your removal from the Russian fishing ship, a young Latvian from my district, whose name is Lynis Bergmanis, called me and asked that I contact the appropriate executive officials to make certain that you did receive asylum in this country. He was very much concerned about what would happen to you if you were not granted asylum. I was very happy to contact the executive officials and very glad to learn that you were granted asylum.

Mr. SMITS. I would like to express my sincere thanks to the United States Government, and also to the doctors who saved my life, for all the efforts they have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bergmanis happened to reside in a village nearby where she lived in Latvia.

Mr. SMITS. That is very pleasant.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is this: What does she think would have happened to her if she had not been granted asylum?

Mr. SMITS. In case I had not been granted asylum, I would immediately have been arrested and given over to trial.

The CHAIRMAN. Trial for what?

Mr. SMITS. A trial that I had been a traitor to my native country and that I had contacted our enemies.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana, do you have any questions?

Mr. ZION. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Miss Palena, thank you so much for your testimony, and we are very pleased to have you here.

You mentioned in your statement that you were forced to join the Komsomol. As I understand, that is the Young Communist League. Is that correct?

Mr. SMITS. Yes.

Mr. ZION. What sort of pressure is put on a young student to join an organization such as that?

Mr. SMITS. When I attended the technical school, the secretary of the Young Communist League came into our class and put a pile of application blanks on the table and said everyone has to fill out these application blanks and sign them up to a certain date. No one is asked whether they believe in the ideology of the league or not.

Mr. ZION. Do you have any idea what might have happened had you not signed the application?

Mr. SMITS. I don't think anything would have happened because some actually did refuse to sign and nothing happened to them.

Mr. ZION. When you were in an American hospital here, you mentioned that you were visited by representatives of the Soviet Union. Was there any implied or any specific pressure put upon you to return to some satellite of the Soviet Union?

(At this point Mr. Drinan left the hearing room.)

Mr. SMITS. Of course, I would have had to return to my own country, and they did try to persuade me to go back.

Mr. ZION. What methods of persuasion did they use?

Mr. SMITS. First of all, they wanted to have me transferred to another hospital where my fellow Latvians could not have attended me, and only members—I would have been completely isolated, and only members of the Soviet Embassy would have been able to visit me.

Mr. ZION. I thank the lady for her cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia.

(At this point Mr. Preyer left the hearing room.)

Mr. THOMPSON. You were speaking of the housing situation in Latvia, and you gave in your statement that one of the reasons that you would not want to return is that you find it difficult to obtain a place to live.

Would it be more difficult because of the fact that you had been taken to a hospital in the United States, or was that just that it would be difficult, period?

Mr. SMITS. That is a problem in general in Latvia, housing.

Mr. THOMPSON. So it relates to just housing in general, and not because of the fact that you had been in the United States?

Mr. SMITS. This is just one of the elements of why I remained here. I would rather explain in detail why I decided to remain.

Mr. THOMPSON. Since you have made the decision to remain here, have you had any communications with your family back in Latvia?

Mr. SMITS. I correspond regularly with them.

Mr. THOMPSON. Does there appear to be any censorship in the correspondence?

Mr. SMITS. Definitely censorship.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know whether or not your family is in a precarious position because of the fact that you have elected to remain here in the United States?

Mr. SMITS. They themselves are not threatened because the decision was mine, purely personally, and I did it without getting in contact with them about it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do they have a radio on which they can tune in the Voice of America or the BBC or Radio Free Europe?

Mr. SMITS. Yes, you can receive that with any radio set there.

Mr. THOMPSON. Would you have any knowledge, since you have elected to remain in the United States, whether there has been any attempt to remove the freedom they have of having a radio?

Mr. SMITS. In the earlier years it was strictly forbidden to listen to broadcasts from abroad. But people disregarded that prohibition and did it on the QT, and even now they do it.

Mr. THOMPSON. The point I am getting around to making is that I recall, of course, the incidents in the news when you were flown by helicopter to the hospital. Did your family hear over the BBC or Radio Free Europe or Radio America that you had been flown to a hospital here, and did they communicate that to you by letter?

Mr. SMITS. I don't really know because it stands to reason we cannot ask or answer such questions in letters. But I assume that they did know about it because if they didn't hear it on the radio, the neighbors would have and would have told them.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In this country we have a youth movement which is marked by perhaps an undue criticism of what they call the repression in the United States and an undue sympathy with the communist systems.

My question is: If you have been here long enough to have observed this, would you care to pass on a message to the young people of this country who fall into that category?

Mr. SMITS. I have not lived here long enough to be able to delve deeply enough into all of these problems. But one thing I can say is that they don't know, the American youth does not know, what communism means and what it means to live under a communist regime. They don't know how the laws there are applied. These slogans and speeches may sound beautiful on the surface, but there is something much deeper below it.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions of Miss Palena?

Thank you again, Miss Palena, for your appearance here today and thank you, Mr. Smits.

Mr. Smits, we did have you identified by name, but I think we should have perhaps some further identifications as to your qualifications to interpret. What is your present position?

Mr. Smits. I am a library information systems specialist in the Library of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to announce that some of the young journalists, the editors of the high school newspapers, have requested the opportunity to meet with me. I will be happy to do so immediately upon adjournment in the room of the chief counsel. I will be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

One further announcement: The Chair announced the meeting would be at 9 o'clock tomorrow. I have been advised we will not be able

to get a quorum because of prior breakfast commitments of Members, so I will amend the time of meeting until 9:15, and the committee hearings will resume as soon as we finish deliberations upon the bills to amend and repeal title II of the Internal Security Act. I would estimate that would be about 10:30, so we will set the hearings to resume tomorrow at 10:30 or as soon thereafter as the committee has completed its action on those bills.

If there will be no further contributions, the Chair will declare the meeting adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., Tuesday, March 23, 1971, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:15 a.m., Wednesday, March 24, 1971.)

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

Part 1-A

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1971

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Richard H. Ichord of Missouri, Richardson Preyer of North Carolina, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Roger H. Zion of Indiana, Fletcher Thompson of Georgia, and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel; Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, legislative counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the purpose of continuing the hearings into the theory and practice of communism.

I understand the staff has two witnesses to present testimony to the committee this morning. Mr. Erich Bley and Mr. Karl Bley, both of whom participated in a very dramatic escape from East Germany, the latter, last year.

Whom do you have scheduled as the first witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Erich Bley, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bley, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee.

Will you first raise your hand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, you are recognized to begin.

TESTIMONY OF ERICH BLEY

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you state your full name for the record?

Mr. BLEY. My name is Erich Bley.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where do you live?

Mr. BLEY. Villa Park in Illinois.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. BLEY. I immigrated to the United States in 1961.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where were you born?

Mr. BLEY. I was born in Bitterfeld, which is now East Germany.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How long did you live in Germany?

Mr. BLEY. In East Germany, up until 1955; 1961 I came to the United States.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe for us briefly the living conditions in East Germany in 1955?

Mr. BLEY. In 1945 we were conquered by the Russians, which was a horror. In 1948 the East German Republic, communist republic, was established with strict laws. There was no private ownership allowed any more. People got arrested. Farmers got arrested. It was actually like a dictatorship and I didn't see any future for myself, and so I left.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What was your occupation at that time?

Mr. BLEY. I was working as a toolmaker.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where did you work?

Mr. BLEY. In a factory which my uncle had still owned at this time. It was confiscated in 1955.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Was it in 1955 that you decided to leave East Germany?

Mr. BLEY. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How did you leave East Germany?

Mr. BLEY. Well, I took a train to East Berlin and crossed over to West Berlin. About 2,000 to 3,000 people just did the same thing every day.

Mr. SCHULTZ. There were no restrictions on travel at that time?

Mr. BLEY. There were checks by the communist police and people got dragged out, got arrested; not too many escaped. Quite a few got through. I was one of the lucky ones.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have to make extensive preparations to leave?

Mr. BLEY. No, not at all. I left one day, just with a small suitcase.

Mr. SCHULTZ. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. BLEY. June 1, 1961.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you describe for us briefly what you have done since you have been in the United States?

Mr. BLEY. I came, my wife, Marlis, and myself, on June 1, 1961. We lived with a friend who was our sponsor for 4 weeks. We got an apartment in Chicago. I started work as a toolmaker. I changed jobs, but I always had one goal, to get my own business started.

Instead of going to luxury, I bought some machine tools and opened up a little shop, a part-time business in a garage, which worked out very good, and through changing jobs, various jobs, I got into a position in 1966 and started in full-time business.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do you have a full-time business today?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is this a successful business?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, we have 17 employees now.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you explain for us how the development of this business came about in the United States and what you perceive it might have been in East Germany?

Mr. BLEY. It would have been impossible in East Germany. There are no new businesses established at all. Everything is Government controlled. The best you can do is get as a manager of a branch of a state-owned factory. That is the best you can do.

Now in this country you just go ahead. Either you succeed or you go under.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, you, the latter part of 1970, assisted your brother Karl in coming to this country. Could you tell us a little about your preparations for this escape of your brother?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, because I lived myself under communism. I had a younger brother left back there who couldn't leave because the Berlin wall was put up in 1961, and I knew how he felt about getting out, being a free man.

So he took a trip to Cuba in 1968, and I knew he was going to Cuba to escape, to try something. So I went to Miami and tried to help him, but there was no way out. I didn't even know which way the boat was going. I couldn't help Karl. Karl couldn't escape.

He went back and wrote a letter which way he was going. It surprised me when I heard he was going right by the American shores, by Miami, by Key West, and I mentioned to him that he might try the same thing again.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you describe for us generally the plans that you set up in Miami to assist your brother?

Mr. BLEY. Yes. The original plan was to have airplane surveillance to spot the *Voelkerfreundschaft*, the ship that Karl would be on, as it was coming through the Bahamas and down to Cuba. Then we were going to get the boats close to the communist ship. Ken Agnew was the pilot of the plane. Then Karl would jump and we would pick him up. That was the original plan.

Mr. SCHULTZ. When did you actually fish your brother out of the ocean?

Mr. BLEY. November 27, 1970, 7:45 a.m.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, I show you a photograph. Would you describe to the committee who the people are and the date or the time interval involved in the photograph?¹

Mr. BLEY. Yes. On the left is myself as we are planning the escape. Bob Lowe is in the center of the picture and the pilot, Ken Agnew, who was taking care of air reconnaissance.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you tell us the circumstances surrounding this second photograph?²

Mr. BLEY. This picture was taken 1 day after the escape with all the people involved, like Ken Agnew, who was piloting one plane; George Butler, another plane; myself; and my wife.

When I picked Karl out of the ocean, three others saw the opportunity and they jumped. They are Dr. Peter Rost, Dr. Manfred Kupfer, and Dr. Reinhold Kupfer.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I understand, Mr. Bley, that the doctors that you just mentioned were not part of the escape plans of your brother Karl?

Mr. BLEY. No, they didn't know anything about it. It is just the urge for freedom of those people, and I think that at least 25 percent on the boat would go if they had the chance.

¹ See appendix I, p. 171.

² See appendix I, p. 172.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, we have a detailed statement for Erich, which I ask be included in the record.

We also have a 2-minute film which was made of the escape. I would like to ask that it be shown at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement has been furnished to the members of the committee, has it not, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no objection, the statement will be included in the record.

(The statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF ERICH BLEY

My name is Erich Bley. I was born June 28, 1934 in Bitterfeld, East Germany. I grew up in Magdeburg, East Germany, which is located approximately 60 miles southwest of Berlin. My occupation was that of toolmaker, and I had also been attending engineering school at the time of my escape from East Germany.

On October 29, 1955, I escaped via Berlin to West Germany. My escape was relatively easy at that time, because there was an almost free flow of traffic between the various sectors.

Walter Ulbricht was already running the East German state with an iron and bloody fist, although Wilhelm Pieck was the official leader of the country.

The standard of living in East Germany during the 50's was much lower than it is now. The economy, however, was controlled in the same manner then as it is at this time. The state had been in the process of taking over private industry since 1948.

All factories, except some very small ones, were owned by the state. They had such high taxes levied on them that the owners were unable to pay them. Consequently, the state took part ownership of the factory as payment for these taxes. This allowed the state to control production and activities. In cases where the state met with opposition, arrests were made.

Unemployment did not exist in East Germany. Private employers had to pay lower wages to their employees and the state lured their employees away. There was no punishment for not working by sending people to forced labor camps in 1955. These camps were reserved for those convicted of other crimes. One who did not work, just didn't eat.

There was and still is a marked difference between labor unions in East Germany and in the United States. For one thing, there was no strike privilege. Also, they were not interested in obtaining wage increases or retirement benefits or such.

In the 50's there were still privately owned farms. However, these were soon consolidated into L.P.G.'s—Landwirtschaftliche Produktions Gemeinschaft (Agricultural Production Combine).

The housing shortage was acute in 1955. New apartments were available to party members only. Private home ownership was difficult, since the cost of repairs and taxes made it a great burden. The home I lived in with my parents and brothers had been in our family for over 200 years. Our quarterly taxes amounted to about 250 Marks, which was very high when one considers that the average monthly wage was 350 to 400 Marks.

Consumer goods at that time were extremely difficult to obtain. Very little was being imported from Eastern European countries, because they did not have anything of their own. Nothing at all came from the West. A skilled worker earned 500 Marks per month. The price of a suit was 1,000 Marks; a bicycle cost 700 Marks; one pound of butter 20 Marks; one pound of coffee 40 marks.

In East Germany the entire economic system was dictated by the party. The party decided what was to be produced, in what quantities, and how the labor force of the country was to be utilized. The party also decided what kind of work a person was to do; this depended on the need for certain kinds of jobs at the time.

Schooling was mandatory for all children in the state from pre-school up to 10 years of grammar school and high school. In the cases of mothers working in industry, there were day care centers for children from 2 to 4 years of age. The factory nurseries and subsequent schools did a thorough job of educating their

charges to Communism. At 4 years of age a child entered kindergarten, which was followed by 10 years of grammar school. Attendance at a university was free for those who could qualify to work toward an education which would be beneficial to the state. The curriculum, all textbooks, as well as research conducted at the universities had to be approved by the state. There was absolutely no intellectual freedom.

Court cases were processed swiftly and the press was not invited to attend any trials, except very important ones which were held in Berlin. Local political hearings, which resulted in numerous jail sentences, were held behind closed doors. Defense attorneys could be retained, and if a defendant did not have the necessary funds, such an attorney was appointed. When the charge was an offense against the state, which the Ministry for State Security brought against the defendant, this was an impossible situation for a lawyer to appeal. Informants for the secret police were planted everywhere: in major railroad stations, factories, clubs, etc.

Everyone in East Germany required an identity document. This had to accompany him everywhere and was, in fact, his passport for travel throughout East Germany.

East Germany had no army in 1955, only the Volkspolizei (People's Police), which was like an army. There was no draft law at that time, and joining was "voluntary." This meant that if you did not join, you could not go to college.

The election process in East Germany was mainly for propaganda. There were several political parties; however, all were dominated by the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the former Communist Party of Germany. In an election, there was one ballot with one person listed for each position. After picking up your ballot, you could go into a booth to mark it. However, persons entering these booths were subject to suspicion, because the ballots were to be dropped into the ballot box unmarked. There was no reason to mark the ballot, because the government had already chosen the candidates they wanted to win.

The East German government considered the church "our most organized enemy." Attending the denomination of one's choice only reaped reprisals, such as depriving a person of job opportunities. Persons who belonged to Jehovah's Witnesses sect were especially persecuted. They were arrested, because that faith is outlawed.

Before the Berlin wall was built, between 2,000 and 3,000 persons escaped from East Germany every day. In 1955 there were no minefields or barbed wire at the border. However, guards did patrol the area constantly. People could move fairly easily from East to West Berlin and vice versa. However, if there was the slightest suspicion that someone was planning to escape from East Germany, that person was arrested.

There were no visiting privileges into eastern countries, but some permits were granted to persons who desired to travel to the West. Most visitors remained in the West.

Since my brother, Karl Heinz, was old enough, I have tried to help him escape from East Germany. In 1968 we tried to arrange his escape, and planned how it actually was to be carried out. Definite plans for the escape were finalized in the summer of 1970.

On November 27, 1970, I fished my brother, Karl Heinz, out of the water after a wild chase. I saw a laughing, happy face, his arms were stretched out to the line I had thrown to him. We also picked up three other men who had taken their chances and jumped to freedom.

I feel that helping my brother escape was my biggest accomplishment. We have defeated Communism in our own private way.

After immigrating to the United States in 1961, I worked for various small companies. I always had one goal in mind, to start my own business. In 1962, my wife and I bought our own home. The lot was big enough to erect a workshop building on it.

While working 2 jobs most of the time and sacrificing our private luxury, building our own furniture, I bought a used 13 x 36" lathe, then a drill press, and later a small milling machine. By this time I was working for Motorola, Inc. in Franklin Park, Illinois, as a toolmaker. After one year I was promoted to foreman for the night shift, which allowed me time during the day to hustle for work.

I wish to point out that all of this would have been impossible under East German dictatorship. Even in West Germany it would have been more difficult, because of economic conditions.

After one year in supervision at Motorola, I was promoted to design work in the Engineering Department. After another year, in 1966, my part time business had increased to a level where I had to quit my job with Motorola in order to concentrate on a promising business.

We expanded and bought more machines and tools. My wife was my salesman. With a sample case she got some more accounts, Continental Can and Borg-Warner.

With business increasing we had to move out of our backyard shop and rented an 1800 foot space in Elk Grove, Illinois. As we moved in with 2 employees and a few machines, the place looked empty. We were building special machinery tools and fixtures. Three years later, in 1969, the place was overcrowded with equipment and employees. We had to move out and I bought the 5000 foot building in which we are now located, at 690 Greenleaf, Elk Grove, Illinois.

As of now, we are a group of 15 working here. In addition to building special machines, I have developed our own product. This is a patented mechanical hydraulic Arbor Press which will be introduced at the Philadelphia SME Show next month.

I would like to point out that credit for the fast growth of our company cannot only be given to our efforts, but also to the tremendous opportunities which this country has to offer.

Our example should be a lesson to those who are denouncing their country.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no objection, you may proceed with the showing of the film.

(At this point the film was shown.)

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, if you would like to make comments while this is on, please do so.

Mr. BLEY. This picture was taken just before the jump. Karl jumped off the second deck in the rear.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us who took the picture, Mr. Bley?

Mr. BLEY. The picture was taken by Ken Agnew, who was piloting the plane. Karl jumped off the second deck on the right side. There are all kinds of people there.

This is right after the pick up. That is Karl in the red shirt in the boat and the three others. It was a most joyous group.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did the ship turn around and come after you?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, it made a turn. That little dot on the right side is us taking off.

Yes, the ship made a turn into a 90-degree turn and, as we were safe over the reefs, it headed toward Havana.

Here is the Coast Guard coming in. We had them alerted before, but they were searching a different place. We didn't want to interfere with any of their action, but right on they came and brought us back to land.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Bley.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Mr. Bley.

I can well imagine the exhilaration you experienced after you had your brother in the boat and the ship had not proceeded to follow you. I can also imagine how fast your heart was beating about the time your brother jumped.

Mr. BLEY. Yes, sir, there was some very tense moments. But the whole thing was over in about 3 minutes, and we had all four in the boat and we took off.

The CHAIRMAN. I am particularly interested in the three persons who jumped, apparently spontaneously, right after your brother jumped. Have you had the opportunity to talk with them since the rescue of those three individuals?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, sir. These people took the trip as one going to escape if there ever was a chance. These are only three. There were many more on the boat taking the trip to look for a hole in the Iron Curtain. They were all prepared and had their papers wrapped up in plastic, microfilm taken of their diplomas, and were actually jumping in swimsuits and sweatshirts on, with everything strapped on their body. They were looking for the chance and they saw the plane. They saw the boat and they didn't know who we were, but they saw a little chance to get to freedom.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no planning or prior communications between you and your brother and the three other people?

Mr. BLEY. Between my brother and me, not the three. They didn't know anything about it. My brother wouldn't dare to talk to anybody, not even his own family.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I thank Mr. Bley for his testimony.

As the witness knows, we are studying the current communism practice and technique. We are most interested in the attitude behind the Iron Curtain in East Germany as it relates to the United States. For instance, the citizens of East Germany are told that the wall they have is not, as we think, to keep the East Germans in, but to keep the Western Powers out.

How is this sold to the people, and do the people behind the Iron Curtain buy this?

Mr. BLEY. No, the people actually don't buy it. They know exactly what is going on. The communists tell the people, "We had to put up the fence in order to keep the American agents out, to preserve freedom for Europe." But, funny enough, their mines, they are towards the inside of the fence, not the outside, and the people actually know that it keeps them from breaking out. It is well known, but you cannot protest it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Some years ago there were a number of East Germans shot and, in many cases, killed for trying to cross into West Berlin. In recent years there have not been as many.

How does the communist leadership sell this to the East German people? Are they supposedly enemies of the State or what line do they use in justifying killing fellow countrymen?

Mr. BLEY. It still happens almost every week that somebody gets killed by the wall, but I don't know why, but it is not published so much any more.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It isn't published so much here either.

Mr. BLEY. It still happens every day. People get shot and are left lying there until—they are not even helped. They let them lie there until they die. This is an example to the other people—See what is happening to you when you escape.

Right away they say these were agents or spies trying to break out with information.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Is it your belief, as an East German, that your countrymen do not swallow this and do not believe it?

Mr. BLEY. No, sir; if they would open the wall, the Berlin Wall, just for 1 day there would be hundreds of thousands of people who would be leaving, spontaneously leaving everything behind.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. DRINAN. I have no questions.

Thank you for your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia?

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bley, you are more or less the old generation now, so far as East Germans are concerned. What do you feel has been the effect of the planned education of those who have been born under the communist regime and grown up under the communist regime?

Mr. BLEY. As of what I hear right now, the people—like if somebody wants to get ahead, he can go through grammar school, and wants to have a career, his future is actually blocked. He couldn't go to any college or nothing any more. So he has to take more liberal communication-type, and then he can go to the college.

But still I would say that the East German youth, I would say about 75 to 80 percent, they are opposing the system, but they have to go along with it. There is no other choice.

Mr. THOMPSON. Perhaps I didn't make myself clear. You mentioned the people in East Germany who had not accepted the theory that the Berlin wall was put up to prevent American agents coming in and they knew what the story was. Are these the older people, such as—and I am not saying you are old, but of course your early schooling was not under the East German communist regime. But now with the younger generation, who from kindergarten on are fed the communist line, do they feel the same way about the wall and so forth?

Mr. BLEY. No, I don't think so. Germany is too close to the rest, and the best German television is a good factor which is educating those people to see the other side of the road, how it looks like, and they are not behind the Government at all.

Some of them, I would say 75 to 80 percent, are opposing it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know of any student movements for more freedom, such as we saw in Czechoslovakia recently, for just the right to freely speak out?

Mr. BLEY. I have been gone for 16 years, but from what I heard from brother Karl there was such a movement, but they don't have a chance.

Mr. THOMPSON. What actions are taken against these people?

Mr. BLEY. It can start with just a disciplinary action, like taking them out of school or college. The next step, if he still didn't learn the lesson, is hard labor camp, concentration camp. If it doesn't help, Siberia is the next step, if he is really hard core.

Mr. THOMPSON. The army in East Germany, I believe you mentioned, is not an army, but it is, in effect, an army. It has some other name, but it is a volunteer force; is that right?

Mr. BLEY. No, it is a draft law right now.

Mr. THOMPSON. When you were there, there was no draft law?

Mr. BLEY. No.

Mr. THOMPSON. If you wanted to attend school, a college, at that time, you must volunteer to the People's Police Force?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, you have to, because they say if we do something for your education, you have to do something for us first.

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. What about the court trials? Do you have any knowledge at all as to how—is it trial by jury, really a free trial?

Mr. BLEY. No, especially what is interesting enough for the committee, political trials are held without public—and there is no jury or nothing. There is just one judge.

Mr. THOMPSON. In other words, there is no right to a public trial so the public can judge for themselves whether or not they are being treated fairly?

Mr. BLEY. No, no chance.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California?

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Bley, you mentioned that one-fourth of the people on the ship, if they had had the chance, would have taken their jump to freedom?

Mr. BLEY. Yes.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I found it interesting, in the light of that testimony, that in the last few years we have had groups of young people from this country skirting our own laws by going to Canada or Mexico or down to Cuba. Do you have any words of wisdom for young people of that type?

(At this point Mr. Preyer entered the hearing room.)

Mr. BLEY. It is good if they go there, but the thing is, if they go to a communist country like Cuba, they will be accepted as American visitors. They get the royal treatment and see the good things.

The best education they can get is to move there and work there just like the average citizens, and this will educate them, straighten them out in no time. They can appreciate everything this country has to offer.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In other words, you feel that to live under communism is to understand it and to dislike it?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, sir; it is a horror.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you self-employed, Mr. Bley?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business?

Mr. BLEY. I am a tooling specialist, machinery tools and fixtures, and have a line of hydraulic presses.

The CHAIRMAN. How large a company do you have?

Mr. BLEY. Seventeen employees right now.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. PREYER. I regret that I missed the early part of your testimony, Mr. Bley, and I am reading your statement with interest, but I have no questions at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Bley, for your appearance this morning.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I have one comment, lest my statements and questions about the students going down to Cuba be misconstrued.

I personally would agree with the witness that if they had an open mind when they went there they would probably learn a lot about communism. I am of the opinion, viewing the background of the people going down there, they are not going down with open minds.

Mr. BLEY. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, the Chair had announced yesterday and notice was given to the members that we would hold a meeting for the purpose of considering certain bills to amend title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as well as to repeal said title.

At the meeting this morning, which was called for 9:15, a quorum was not present. But the motion was made to adjourn the meeting until a quorum was present, with the understanding that as soon as the quorum was present the Chair would declare a recess for the purpose of considering this legislation. So, in accordance with that motion, the Chair will declare a recess, and the next witness, Mr. Karl Bley, will be heard immediately following the action of the committee on the bill.

The Chair will recess and we will retire to the chief counsel's office. (Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the committee recessed, to proceed to the consideration of further business.)

(Short recess.)

(The committee reconvened at 11:30 a.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Ichord, Preyer, Ashbrook, and Schmitz.)

The CHAIRMAN. As the Chair stated before the recess, the committee will resume hearings with the witness, Karl Bley.

It is my understanding, Mr. Counsel, that Mr. Bley will speak through an interpreter?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, Mr. Interpreter, would you identify yourself for the record and state your qualifications to serve as interpreter?

Mr. CHARLICK. My name is Carl Charlick. I was, for over 15 years, interpreter with the Department of State. I am now retired therefrom. I occasionally do this service when asked, on a freelance basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. Would you raise your hand and be sworn?

Mr. Interpreter, do you solemnly swear that you will truly and accurately interpret the questions put to the witness and properly interpret the answers given throughout this testimony?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bley, will you please rise and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BLEY. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated. It is a pleasure to welcome you.

Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF KARL BLEY, AS INTERPRETED BY CARL CHARLICK

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. CHARLICK. My name is Karl Heinz Bley.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where were you born, Mr. Bley?

Mr. CHARLICK. I was born in Roesa, district of Bitterfeld.

Mr. SCHULTZ. For how long did you live in Germany?

Mr. CHARLICK. I have lived in Germany since my birth.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, your brother has described for us your arrival in the United States. I would like to ask you specific questions concerning the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic.

The first specific provision of the 1968 German Democratic Republic Constitution is the freedom of speech. Did you have complete freedom of speech?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Will the staff member please mark "no."
Did you have freedom of the press?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of assembly?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of correspondence?

Mr. CHARLICK. In certain ways.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is mail censored?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then you did not have complete freedom of correspondence?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of religion?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, but under certain circumstances.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of education?

Mr. CHARLICK. Also in a limited way.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have the freedom to engage in cultural pursuits?

Mr. CHARLICK. Again, under limited circumstances.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have the freedom to change residences?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, within the country.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom to select employment?

Mr. CHARLICK. Also in a restricted sense.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of the secret ballot at elections?

Mr. CHARLICK. With this restriction. Whoever exercised a secret ballot was immediately given a black mark.

Mr. SCHULTZ. So you did not have freedom to select the person of your choice?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Bley. With each witness we have, we are marking the specific provisions on the constitution for compilation at the end of our hearing.

Mr. Chairman, we have a detailed statement from Mr. Karl Heinz Bley, and I ask that it be admitted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to the admission of the statement in the record?

Hearing none, the statement will be admitted.

(The statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF KARL HEINZ BLEY

My name is Karl Heinz Bley. I was born April 27, 1946, in Bitterfeld, East Germany. My occupation in Bitterfeld was that of machinist. Bitterfeld is a town of from 50,000 to 55,000 inhabitants, about 30 miles north of Leipzig, in the southwestern section of East Germany.

On November 27, 1970, I defected from East Germany. I was on a cruise ship en route from Rostock, East Germany, to Havana, and off the Florida Keys I jumped over the side and was rescued by my brother Erich with whom I had been corresponding for over 12 years. We had planned this escape over the past two years.

Life in East Germany had been one long nightmare of fear, privation, and rigid state control of everything that one does. I realize that the standard of living in East Germany is probably the highest of any of the so-called Iron Curtain countries. However, even there it had become unbearable for me.

In East Germany everything is controlled by the state in a long-range planned economy. All farms are state property. All factories, with the exception of some very small ones, are also owned by the state. These small factories are partially controlled by the state. They have had taxes placed on them that were so high that the owners are unable to meet the tax and the state then takes part ownership of the factory as payment for these taxes. This enables the state to control the production and activities at these, but still allows the private ownership some incentive and initiative, so that the owner's hard work benefits both himself and the state.

There is no unemployment as such in East Germany, because the German law provides that each person has not only the right but the duty to work. Those who do not work, or who would loaf on the job, or whose work is not sufficient, are sentenced to hard labor, for from six to nine months. These people are confined in prison camps with barbed wire, guards, dogs, etc., and they either work or do not eat—no work—no food. The work is very hard; they are used on the railroad lines laying rails and ties; they are used in the mines and are employed in certain factory details.

There is generally little shortage of housing, at least in my section of East Germany. Private ownership of houses is a very difficult arrangement. The costs of repairs and taxes make it a great burden. The home I lived in with my brothers and mother had been our family home for nearly 200 years. Every three months the taxes came to about 250 marks. The average wage in East Germany is about 350 to 400 marks per month.

The housing situation in East Germany is very interesting. Private ownership of houses is quite a burden because of taxes, and apartments are quite difficult to obtain. East Germany condemned the practice of West Germans requiring the so-called "key tax" or a fee that you must pay in order to obtain an apartment. This may run approximately 3,000 marks. This money is not recoverable. This is in addition to the rent. East Germany does the same thing, now. Rents are not expensive, however. A one-bedroom apartment with kitchen would cost from 60 to 100 marks a month. However, to obtain a new apartment, you must also devote 500 hours of work to maintenance, landscaping, painting, etc. If you are not able to perform this work, or do not desire to perform it, you can pay it off at the rate of about 5 marks an hour.

Consumer goods in East Germany are not too difficult to obtain. Nearly 50% are imported from east European countries. East Germany exports a great amount of its production, and this material in East Germany is graded into three grades: the top grade goes for export, and the next two grades are for home consumption. East Germany does import from both eastern countries as well as those countries in western Europe, such as West Germany, France and Italy.

In East Germany today the entire economic system is dictated by the party. The party decides what will be produced, how much, what will be built, and when, and how the labor force of the country will be employed. If there is a shortage of mechanics, the party can tell you that you will become a mechanic, regardless of your own personal desire. You do have some rights in this respect; if you desire to be a machinist, you could be a machinist if you could find work. Otherwise, you have to do as the state tells you.

Schooling is mandatory for all children in the state from pre-school up to 10 years of grammar school and high school. When mothers work in industry, there are day care centers for children from 2 years of age up to 4 years. At 4 years the child enters a kindergarten, and this is followed by 10 years of grammar school. Attendance at a university is free for those who can qualify to work toward an education which will be of benefit to the state. It is difficult for middle class or farmers to enter the universities, because emphasis is given to the lower income, lower class groups. These groups also receive scholarships which could run from 200 to 300 marks per month. Teachers need not be members of the party; however, being a party member is a big advantage in improving one's economic level in life. All textbooks are approved by the party, and the curriculum presented in the

schools is subject to party approval. Nearly all research is directed by the state. Research which does not contribute to the state is discouraged. If a person is good in a particular field necessary to the government, his schooling is provided for as long as necessary.

There is some student dissent in the universities; however, nothing of the nature that is prevalent in the United States. There are basically two student groups who are involved in dissent: the pro-Maoist group and the pro-West group. Their only demonstrations have involved occasional clandestine distribution of leaflets supporting their point of view. Dissatisfaction with the form of government and the freedom of thought and research has been the major reason for this dissent. Intellectual freedom is almost non-existent as you know it in this country. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are theoretically permitted; however, in actuality do not take place. The government rationalizes it by saying the government is for peace, for prosperity, and for the people. If you criticize the government, you are not for these things, and therefore you are guilty of a crime against humanity. Student dissent is punished by dismissal from school at the very least.

Punishment in the courts is very swift. There is almost no appeal to decisions rendered by these closed courts. The press is not invited to attend any trial except very important ones which are conducted in Berlin. Local political hearings which result in many sentences to jail and to labor camps are closed hearings. You may hire a defense attorney and if you do not have the money a defense attorney will be appointed for you. This is a very difficult job for a defense lawyer, because he cannot justify anything that you have done against the state. The security police under the Ministry for State Security are responsible for the detection of all crimes against the state. The security service presents its information to the state prosecutor who in turn brings it to court. It is possible to appeal a decision; however, very seldom has there been a case of a decision being overturned. I am not personally familiar with the procedures involved in a court case of this type. Since such cases receive very little publicity, I only have the information by word of mouth and public knowledge. The secret police or security service has very wide coverage in East Germany. They have an office in each railroad station and each major factory, as well as informants in all clubs—garden clubs, sports clubs, travel clubs, etc. The use of telephone wire taps is rumored to be very, very widespread. No one even pays any attention to these things; they are expected and no one makes any fuss about it. The secret police do not appear in court themselves. Punishment brought about by these trials can vary from dismissal from school, from your job, to terms in labor camps, to sentences to jail.

Each person in East Germany must have an identity document. This document must accompany him everywhere. It acts as a passport in a sense for travel throughout East Germany. In addition to this, a passport is necessary for travel through other countries. Visiting most eastern European countries requires that you go on invitation from someone in that country or as a member of a tour group. Most trips such as the one I took to Havana are arranged through the labor union at your place of employment.

Labor unions in East Germany do not function as labor unions do here in the United States. There is no strike privilege. The unions are not concerned with obtaining wage increases for employees. The labor unions occasionally do arrange for an increase in, for example, retirement benefits, or things of that nature, and serve as a government office in the plant to arrange rewards for those workers who are outstanding in their service. I have heard questions about the ability to change addresses in East Germany. Any movement from city to city must be based on the availability of work. If you do not have a job in the town you could not move there. If I were to have decided to move to Dresden, I must already have had a position in Dresden. One does not drift around the country looking for work. The state will arrange for work for an individual, not necessarily based upon his desires.

For a long time Berlin acted as a type of safety valve for East Germany. When things got too bad a person could always get to Berlin and somehow escape from the country. Since the Berlin Wall, this has become almost an impossibility. The Berlin Wall has been hailed in East Germany by the government as a great symbol of freedom. It is reported that this wall was built to protect East Germans' freedom from an invasion by West Germany from Berlin. It is interesting to note, however, that the mine fields around this wall are on the East German side of the wall, and that to protect East Germany they build the wall around West Berlin. No one has ever heard of anyone being shot trying to get INTO East Germany; it's always the other way around. Guards who shoot people

attempting to escape over the wall to West Berlin are hailed as heroes by the government. During the Christmas holidays a system has been worked out whereby West Berliners may visit East Berlin to visit relatives. However, East Berliners are never permitted to visit West Berlin. This is a one-way street. To travel outside of East Germany, you must be cleared by the party, by your place of employment, and by the Security police to assure that you have never had political problems. With these clearances it is possible to visit most of the eastern countries. Yugoslavia is considered a western country for travel purposes. East Berliners do not visit the United States. On our ship bound for Havana from Rostock there were approximately 20 security police to prevent anyone from defecting, even though all the passengers had been cleared by the Ministry of State Security. It is interesting to note that when I jumped overboard into the ocean, three others decided on that spur of the moment to jump overboard as well. In East Germany we do not hear of anyone making this type of action to defect to East Germany.

The election process in East Germany is primarily a propaganda show. There are at least five political parties actually led by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) which was the former Communist Party of Germany. The rest of the parties, such as the Christian Democratic Union, the Farmers Party, the Liberal Party, etc., all draw their direction from the SED. In an election there is one ballot with one person listed for each position. In the last election in which I voted you enter a room where you pick up your ballot; there are some booths over along one wall where you can go in to mark your ballot; but if you go into these booths you are subject to suspicion. The question is: What do you have to hide? You are supposed to pick up your ballot and place it unmarked in a ballot box. The candidates have all been chosen by the government and you have no reason to make any mark on your ballot. Anyone who goes to a booth must wish to mark his ballot, and if he wishes to mark his ballot he must not be in favor of the party; therefore, he is subject to suspicion. Since he has given his name in order to receive his ballot he has been identified and can experience difficulties with the government from that point. In 1953, in the uprisings in and around Berlin, one man was attempting to obtain free elections. For this he was given 15 years in jail.

To attend church is not compatible with being a member of the Communist Party. However, since the government feels that the churches are dying in East Germany, they tolerate attendance at church by the various citizens. Attendance at church is about the same today as it was 5 years ago in the cities. However, in the country it has fallen off quite a bit. The churches in East Germany, especially the Lutheran, have had to sever their connections with West German churches. The Catholic Church still maintains its contacts with Rome, however, primarily through West Germany. The West German Catholic church has donated several hospitals to East Germany, and some of the priests in East Germany have received Volkswagens from West German churches.

For 12 years I have been planning somehow to join my brother in the United States. My brother Erich escaped from East Germany in 1955 through Berlin. Two years ago I took a trip to Havana on a vacation tour, and we began our plans as to how I would escape at a later date. Through a code we arranged for my rescue when I jumped off the ship last November.

I felt that the constant fear of doing something wrong and going to jail, the lack of freedom, the feeling that the state was dominating everything I did, caused me to seek every possible way to escape from it. In East Germany each individual is merely a cog in a machine. He does what the state tells him to, he works where they tell him to, he works as hard as they tell him to, and there is no goal in sight. You cannot criticize the government; you merely must accept what they tell you to do. Walter Ulbricht is a one-man leader of the country; he is the head of the department of defense, the head of the army, the chief of the Central Committee, and what he says is what happens. The Central Committee does not vote against him. All his proposals are passed 100%. Recently, they changed the draft law. It was passed 100%. This does not seem to be possible in a country where people can think for themselves.

East Germany does have universal military training; that is, everyone must serve in the Army—every male—and unless he is excused for physical disability or because he is a conscientious objector. If he is a conscientious objector, and there are some, then he is given another task to perform—usually much more difficult than if he were in the military. The term of service is for 1½ years.

I jumped off the ship last November. My watch stopped as I hit the water. I am having that watch preserved, stopped at that time, as a reminder that my life

began at that moment—the moment I escaped from East Germany. In this country you can do anything; the opportunities are endless.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have other questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes. We have an exhibit here which I would like the witness to explain.

Mr. Bley, I have in my hand a watch that is rusted and corroded somewhat, that stopped at approximately 7:50.¹ Would you describe for the committee what this watch represents?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes. I wore this watch at the time I jumped, and the sea water caused it to stop. So this would be the time I jumped, and I consider it as a souvenir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. This must be very meaningful. Do you intend to keep it, Mr. Bley?

Mr. CHARLICK. Oh, yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have here, Mr. Bley, what appears to be some tickets that you furnished to us. Would you describe for the committee what these tickets are?

Mr. CHARLICK. These are round-trip tickets from Bitterfeld via Rostock, and back via Rostock to Bitterfeld. I bought round-trip tickets in order not to cause any suspicion to arise.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, I have here what appears to be an identification booklet bearing your picture and, I assume, identifying data.² Would you explain to the committee what this booklet is?

Mr. CHARLICK. This is my Free German Youth identification pass, issued in 1960, which is issued more or less compulsorily, although I had never paid any membership dues.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You state this is the Free German Youth. Would you comment on that for us, please?

Mr. CHARLICK. It is an association sponsored by our party, the Socialist Unity Party, SED, in an effort to mobilize youth for the party's objectives.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is this the communist party you are talking about?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes. There is an obligation to belong to the Free German Youth.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is the membership in the Free German Youth a prerequisite to joining the communist party, or is this, in fact, membership in the communist party?

Mr. CHARLICK. No, this is the preliminary stage to joining the communist party.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I hold in my hand a booklet furnished to us bearing stamps.³ On three or more of the stamps, it appears it says "Vietnam" on here. Would you describe for the committee what this booklet is and what the stamps represent?

Mr. CHARLICK. This is my membership booklet in the Free German Labor Union, and the stamps represent membership dues and also a special solidarity contribution on behalf of Vietnam.

In order to make this trip to Cuba, I had to belong to the labor union and had to have purchased the solidarity Vietnam stamps. Otherwise I would not have been allowed to go.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

¹ See appendix I, p. 173.

² See appendix I, p. 174.

³ See appendix I, pp. 175, 176.

Mr. SCHULTZ. These stamps, the money from them is then directed toward helping North Vietnam?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, it is used to procure weapons, ammunition, and medicine for Vietnam.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Who would check to see if you had purchased these stamps, Mr. Bley?

Mr. CHARLICK. The office of the labor union.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How often do you have to buy these stamps to be current?

Mr. CHARLICK. Once a month.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What do they cost?

Mr. CHARLICK. From 50 pfennigs to 5 marks.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you estimate for us how many of the German youth are required to participate in this program?

Mr. CHARLICK. I would say about half, under duress.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I asked about the youth, but are the adults required to purchase these stamps?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, although some try to get out of it.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do they have a choice?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have here what I recognize is money, but would you describe for us the denomination and also the pictures on the German marks?

Mr. CHARLICK. Friedrich Engels appears on the 50-mark note and Karl Marx on the 100-mark note. Friedrich Engels is considered the historian of the communist movement and Karl Marx is Engels' intellectual follower.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do other individuals' pictures appear on German money outside of Marx and Engels?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, leading German poets like Goethe and Schiller and historical structures and buildings.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Are the other individuals communist party members?

Mr. CHARLICK. Excuse me, counsel, the other persons who appear on the money?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes. Let me rephrase the question.

Would any individual appear on the German money who was not a communist party member?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, like Goethe and Schiller.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I am sorry. I didn't understand.

Mr. Bley, I have another exhibit here you furnished to us. Would you describe for the committee what this exhibit is?

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. CHARLICK. In 1968 I made an application to the Seereederei Shipping Combine for a job as engineer assistant, machinist.¹ And the questions that were asked of my then existing employer were the following:

Technical efficiency, loyalty to the GDR, my draft status, my relation to party and Government, a detailed account of my past activity in connection with the mass organizations in my employment and in my residential area, and other remarks which included relationship to

¹ See appendix I, pp. 177, 178.

West Germany or West Berlin, prospects of leaving the Republic, and then something about use of alcohol and moral conduct.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, if you were to succeed in obtaining employment as a seaman, this, of course, would be an excellent opportunity or method of escaping. Do you find or do you know from your own experience that people who have applied for this seamanship application and subsequently obtained employment have used this as a method of escaping?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, the German shipping combine has about 20,000 to 30,000 applications each year, of which 1,000 are selected for employment. Of these 1,000 each year some 200 to 250 defect. That is, they try to make use of their employment to get into a Western country.

Mr. SCHULTZ. You stated that you made this application in 1968. Was your application turned down?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, I was turned down.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did they give you a reason?

Mr. CHARLICK. No, no reason was given, but there was an examination done by the secret service, and what they say goes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would the fact that your brother lives in the United States have precluded your obtaining employment as a seaman?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Bley, why did you come to the United States?

Mr. CHARLICK. I know America to be the center of freedom and of prosperity and especially, I mean, political freedom.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, the statement that the members have of Mr. Bley contains details concerning the economy, elections, education, and employment and human rights.

I would conclude my questioning at this point, unless you want to go into detailed questioning in these areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Counsel, and thank you again, Mr. Bley.

May I say that I hope that you always have the freedom and attain the happiness for which you risked so much in coming to our country. I appreciate your cooperation.

Mr. CHARLICK. I would like to do something in return.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one other question.

I was very interested, Mr. Bley, in your account of the operation of labor unions within East Germany. Apparently, as I understand your statement, the labor unions are operated about the same as they are in Red China and also in the Soviet Union. That is, the unions operate as an agent of the Government to communicate and negotiate with the workers, rather than the workers using the unions to communicate with the employers and the Government. Is that a correct assessment of the operations of the labor unions in East Germany?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, that is the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in regard to voting, is it true—first of all, did you participate in voting in East Germany? Did you ever vote at the polls?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, in 1968 on the new Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that there is only one name for each office that appears on the ballot that is handed to you?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you can vote for the person whose name is on the ballot by merely placing your ballot unmarked in the ballot box?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes. You just drop it in the ballot box.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you do have the right to write in another name, do you not?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that ever tried in East Germany to your knowledge, writing in the name of another person?

Mr. CHARLICK. In our electoral district in 1968, 98 percent voted yes, but 2 percent destroyed their ballots.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you theoretically vote "no" by crossing the name out?

Mr. CHARLICK. That would be a "no."

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, was that ever tried by any of the voting citizens?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes, I know a few cases in my locality where that was done.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have no questions to ask, Mr. Chairman. But I couldn't help but think of something on which the witness might share his observations.

In listening to the two brothers, what they have gone through, the fact that they have some basis for comparison, I can't help but wonder what reaction they had and what they think when they hear people in our country allege that this is not a free country, that there is repression of minorities and dissent is stifled. What must you think when you hear these allegations regarding our country, when you have lived under those situations?

Mr. CHARLICK. My reaction to that is that these people, these dissenters, should go to some of the countries where no freedom exists, like the Soviet Union, and taste it in person.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I appreciate the comment. I would say that that reasonably parallels my thoughts too. We have never claimed a perfect society, but I guess everything is relevant and, relevantly speaking, there is a great amount of freedom in this country.

Mr. CHARLICK. There is ample freedom here, and radical elements should be shoved off to the Soviet Union to see how it is like. These radical elements should not be allowed to remain in this country.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Of course, in this country we exercise a free ballot and have free opinions, and I think the two brothers are living witnesses to the fact that behind the Iron Curtain you best express your dissent by using your feet and walking out of the country or jumping ship and leaving the country, because you really have little that you can do to affect its destiny. Dissent is best expressed behind the Iron Curtain by physically leaving. In our country it is best expressed by operating within the democratic process.

I thank the witnesses and I myself will always think of them when I hear some of the protests that we have such a repressive society.

I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

I have one more question, Mr. Bley. Did you have occasion to observe the three people who jumped apparently spontaneously when

you jumped off the ship? Had you observed them before they jumped or had a chance to get acquainted with them?

Mr. CHARLICK. I certainly would have had the opportunity but I was very cautious. I was aware of the fact that there were some 25 secret service agents making the trip and I was not going to put out any suspicious feelers in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there were 25 secret service agents aboard the ship?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was their purpose?

Mr. CHARLICK. These agents, their mission is to prevent any unofficial defections. They circulate among the passengers and try to start conversations and initiate remarks in order to smoke out any possible intentions to defect.

The CHAIRMAN. Were all four, Mr. Bley and the three others, able to jump without any interference from the agents, or was an effort made to stop them from jumping?

Mr. CHARLICK. We succeeded, at least I succeeded and the other three, solely by the element of surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Element of what?

Mr. CHARLICK. Surprise. If there is any suspicion that such a plan or project is being hatched, immediately general quarters is ordered and the ship's crew occupies all exits, doorways, and line up at the railing to prevent any such attempt.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. PREYER. I don't want to take the time at this stage to ask a lot of questions, but I do want to say how impressive Mr. Bley's statement is and how helpful it is.

I don't want you to have to translate all of this to him.

One point I think his statement makes plain, and all of these statements, if we read them, make clear—his brother's statement—how little play there is in these systems of Eastern Europe and Russia for individual freedom.

For example, Mr. Bley says on page 5 of his statement something like this: You don't drift around the country in East Germany looking for jobs. If you want to go to another city, you have to have a job in another city.

This is so different from our country where our system has so much play in it, where people drift around. They can do nothing if they want to. They can loaf. They can travel from city to city. This kind of freedom is totally unknown over there.

One other aspect, and I may ask one question on this. Last summer I visited in Warsaw in Poland, and in the hotel there, there were a number of Russians who were on a tour. They would come into the dining room in a group. They never ate singularly or individually. They marched in and out.

We were told they were there as a reward as workers for having done well on their production. They regarded Warsaw as the Paris of Eastern Europe, and the greatest thing that could happen to them in Russia was to visit Warsaw.

If you could see Warsaw and the drabness of life there, it would shake you considerably to know that was regarded as a Paris.

But the point I wonder about is, he talked of his trip to Havana and he said how he had qualified for making the trip. He had to purchase the stamps and he had to be a member of the labor union. But having done that, did he have a choice to take a tour to Havana, or was he assigned, so to speak, as a part of his doing well in his job? Was it a volunteer sort of thing or did he just go along with the group that was picked?

Mr. CHARLICK. No, sir, it was Havana. There was no other choice.

Mr. PREYER. But the workers do have the right to choose to go on a tour and pay money to go on it, or is it a regular thing that the labor unions take this group 1 year and next year it is another group's turn?

Mr. CHARLICK. He could have said no. This is not a compulsory travel project. There is the element of extreme gratefulness to be able to go on any trip.

Mr. PREYER. He could have traveled in Eastern Europe, but Eastern Europe does not include Yugoslavia?

Mr. CHARLICK. That is correct, not Yugoslavia.

Mr. PREYER. And Albania.

Thank you, Mr Bley, for your very interesting and helpful statement

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California?

Mr. SCHMITZ. Yes, sir. First a question of the chairman.

Mr. Chairman, is it the committee's intention to publish these projections on these rights?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, they will be a part of the record.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I think some clarification, then, should be made. For example, your own questioning, Mr. Chairman, on the freedom of the secret ballot. I noticed the "yes" was not crossed off, and yet in a one-party system even the secret ballot is somewhat of a meaningless gesture or at best a cruel hoax.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio—I would say to the gentleman from California—and I were talking about the questions of the counsel in this respect. I think the counsel should perhaps reexamine the language used in putting some of these questions, and particularly I noticed—I didn't make the correction at the time because I knew what both gentlemen were talking about—but I was particularly referring to the language of "complete freedom."

He was using the term, "Do you have complete freedom of the press?" Well, there is no nation that has complete freedom of the press. We don't have that in this country. Certainly there are laws against libel. And the same thing would be true; there is no such thing as complete freedom of speech.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In that light, let me ask a question of our witness here, because in many of our questions it is "yes, partially," for example, freedom of education.

The question I would like to ask is, Can a group of people start a private school as an alternative to the state school system?

Mr. CHARLICK. No.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In other words—and I think this is the way Miss Palena answered yesterday on the same question, when she answered "yes" to freedom of education, and our witness today answered "partially" to freedom of education—what they meant was that each person

can go to the schools, but I think what is more important is that there is no choice of various educational systems.

In other words, my question here would be, Does the state run the school system, and do you have any choice of any other school system?

Mr. CHARLICK. Yes. Education is a state monopoly. There is no other choice. And when it comes to the university stage, you have to, in addition, be politically cleared.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Is there a compulsory education law? Do you have to go to school and, if so, what age do you start and what age do you finish?

Mr. CHARLICK. From the 6th year of life to the 18th, which would include a vocational school.

Mr. SCHMITZ. This is compulsory?

Mr. CHARLICK. That is compulsory.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Would the witness consider this education or indoctrination?

Mr. CHARLICK. I would call it indoctrination.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Chairman, I think I have made my point here and I think in preparing our document we should be very careful in listing "yes," because what partial educational freedom comes out to be is really a compulsory indoctrination, and the fact that everyone is allowed to go to it, in fact, required to go to it, should not at all be compared to a system that we have, at least have remnants remaining of.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would say the point is well made by the gentleman from California.

Are there any further questions of the witness? If not, Mr. Bley, thank you, and thank you, Mr. Interpreter. Good luck to you.

The meeting will be adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., Wednesday, March 24, 1971, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, March 25, 1971.)

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

Part 1-A

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1971

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to recess, at 9:30 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Richard H. Ichord of Missouri, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Roger H. Zion of Indiana, Fletcher Thompson of Georgia and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel.

THE CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The hearings of the committee today are a continuation of the investigation of the committee into the theory and practice of communism. Mr. Counsel, are you ready to begin?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we begin I have a statement that I wish to make which will greatly concern the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Drinan, who is not here at the present time. Before I make that statement I would ask that the committee be in recess for 5 minutes and counsel is instructed to call Mr. Drinan's office and advise him I am about to make this statement—it does concern him—so that the gentleman might be here. The committee will be in recess for 5 minutes while that is being done.

(Whereupon, a 5-minute recess was taken.)

THE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is here. The committee will go back into session.

Father Drinan, at the opening of the meeting I made the announcement that I was going to make a statement which would affect the gentleman from Massachusetts. I asked the staff to notify you before I made this statement so you would have the opportunity to be present. I will now proceed to make the statement.

With the indulgence of the committee the Chair intends to proceed in a little different manner today in view of what happened Tues-

day when the witness, Professor Diao, was before the committee and also in view of the broadcast of the proceedings by ABC.

The Chair has not had the opportunity to view that broadcast, but it has been related to me that the only thing carried by ABC was the exchange between Father Drinan and myself in addition to an interview of Father Drinan after the proceedings that were televised.

Professor Diao appeared before the committee Tuesday. An agreement had been made with Professor Diao—and I make this statement also in view of press inquiries which I received after the meeting—agreement had been made with Professor Diao that he would not be asked to disclose his present employment. That agreement was also made with Professor Diao's employer.

The staff checked the same with me. I thought there were good and sufficient reasons for Mr. Diao not to disclose his present employment and I instructed the staff to inform each member of the committee and ask each of them not to ask the question. A notice—and if you will give that to me, Mr. Counsel—was placed in the folder of each and every member of the committee. I would ask that that notice be placed in the record at this point.

(The notice referred to follows:)

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 23, 1971.

Memo.

Re: questioning of witnesses.

To: Members of House Committee on Internal Security.

From: Richard L. Schultz, Associate Chief Counsel.

Please do not ask questions of Mr. Diao concerning his place of employment (VOA).

Please do not ask questions of Miss Palena concerning her reason for taking sleeping pills (personal).

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Drinan proceeded to ask the question, what was the witness' present employment. He then asked a question which I considered outside the competence of the witness to answer.

I advised Father Drinan to that effect. He did not choose to proceed with the questioning.

As I stated before, ABC carried that exchange upon the television tube. Either intentionally or unintentionally the gentleman from Massachusetts and ABC have left some doubt as to the credibility of the witness, Professor Diao.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is a distinguished lawyer, a former dean of the Boston Law School, and I am sure he well understands what I am talking about, particularly when he proceeded not to ask additional questions.

Today we have the great pleasure of having before the committee a very distinguished witness. As a matter of fact he is one of the outstanding artists of this century. His name is Professor Ma Sitson. He was born in Canton, China, on March 21, 1912. He permanently resides, Father Drinan, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

He held several offices in Red China. He was director of the Central Conservatory of Music in Peking; vice chairman of the All-China Union of Musical Workers; conductor of the China Symphony Orchestra; director of China Music Institute, professor at Sun Yat-sen University; director of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, di-

rector of Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association, director of China-Latin American Friendship Association, vice president of the Chinese-East German Friendship Association. For several years, Father Drinan, he was a deputy at the National People's Congress. He escaped from China, from Red China in 1967.

The statement has been furnished the gentleman from Massachusetts and the other members of the committee. And the statement, I would say, is one of the most moving accounts of the degradation, the suffering, of an individual under totalitarian communism that I have ever read. It contains a message which should be brought, in my opinion, to the attention of every artist and intellectual who might believe that totalitarian socialism is a possible answer to the problems of our society. It depicts most vividly what happens to human freedom under a philosophy of government which holds that the interest of the state is supreme.

For this reason, Father Drinan, I have asked that you be notified to be present. I am going to proceed somewhat out of order. In view of ABC's commentary, I want ABC also to be notified.

I am going to ask that this meeting be adjourned over until 2 o'clock this afternoon and I will direct the staff to notify ABC and I direct that you also send a telegram to that effect stating the facts. And Father Drinan, you will be offered the opportunity, in view of the misimpression, the inference that was left by your questioning and by the way ABC handled the same, you will be given the opportunity to proceed out of order and given all of the time you need, with the indulgence of the other members of the committee, to question Dr. Ma Sitson on everything except one thing, and that is the details of his escape from Red China, because I think, as we can well understand, that Dr. Sitson cannot put those individuals who participated in the escape in the jeopardy to which they would be exposed.

So at this time, with that understanding, I will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for any statement that he wishes to make. It is my intention to adjourn the meeting over until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. DRINAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When we received a notice that we were not to inquire of Mr. Diao of his present occupation, there was no indication whatsoever on that notice that the chairman had in fact acquiesced in an agreement made with the witness and with his employer that he would not disclose his present employment.

I raise that question because I think it is very relevant since the agency or the employer was in fact designated on the notice given to the members of the committee. I think that frankly is very relevant that we should know, and that the public should know, that he is a full-time employee of this particular unit. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that should be brought up. I think it is very relevant and I would like to know frankly the reasons why counsel and the chairman acquiesced in an agreement to keep that bit of information from the public.

When a witness comes here I think he should make full disclosure of all his present activities, and if he wants to withhold them I think then that is a decision, not for counsel, not for the chairman, but for the entire committee. And I have in fact revealed that to the press and I will do it again unless the committee meets and agrees that we should

not do that and that I am not bound by an agreement of the counsel of this committee that his present employment is not to be disclosed to the public.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman finished with his statement?

Mr. DRINAN. No. I say further that I did not know until this moment about the meeting this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite true.

Mr. DRINAN. And I am really uncertain about the reasons for it frankly. I will try to be here. I will try to rearrange things. It is not called on my account. I will listen to the distinguished gentleman before us. I know he has wisdom to give us. Please don't change the order of events for me.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope I expressed adequately the reasons for proceeding in this manner. Let me put in the record at this time the notice which was placed upon Father Drinan's desk which reads:

March 23, 1971. TO: Members of House Committee on Internal Security, FROM: Richard L. Schultz, Associate Chief Counsel. RE: QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES.

Please do not ask questions of Mr. Diao concerning his place of employment (VOA).

Please do not ask questions of Miss Palena concerning her reasons for taking sleeping pills (personal).

That in regard to Miss Palena was brought out in the public hearing.

This notice was placed on Father Drinan's desk. As he indicated in his statement he was aware of the notice. However, I would point out that Father Drinan did not ask the Chair anything about the reasons for not pursuing this line of questioning. He proceeded to ask the question.

I received a call from a member of the press after the hearing, stating he had done some checking and found out that Professor Diao was employed at a certain place. Without telling the member of the press whether he was right or wrong, I proceeded to give him the reasons why the Chair—the same that I stated previously—that it had been stated and I could not go into it, and that I am sure Father Drinan does know where he was employed. He was so advised by Richard Schultz.

I would make the announcement that I considered the reasons were good and sufficient and the gentleman from Massachusetts did not choose to ask me further before asking the question.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is a member of the committee. He is a duly elected Member of the Congress. All Congressmen have considerable independence. He can proceed as he so desires, but in view of what has happened, in view of this line of questioning, in view of the way ABC handled the matter, I am going to adjourn the meeting over until 2 o'clock, at which time Father Drinan will be recognized, because the gentleman well knows that his line of questions did cast—and the way he stopped—did cast some inference upon the credibility of Professor Diao.

This is a witness who escaped from China in 1967. If Father Drinan has any question about what is going on in Red China, I would ask permission to let Father Drinan question and use as much time as he desires in order to expel the inference and the misimpression that has been created.

I recognize the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ZION. In keeping with Father Drinan's request I move the members of the committee refrain from asking Professor Sitson any questions relating to his escape from Red China.

Mr. DRINAN. I agree with that. I agree fully with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further statements or questions before I adjourn the meeting?

Mr. THOMPSON. If I may say so, I think frankly that Mr. Drinan is accomplishing the purpose he intended to accomplish, that is to attract attention. He was very obvious, he would not have asked these questions if he did not want attention focused on it. I, for one, do not favor the granting of this special privilege to him at 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be a matter, of course, for the committee to decide. The gentleman from Georgia has his rights to object to the unanimous request. It may well be that I will move that motion, and we will let the committee decide as to whether to proceed out of order. I will decide that after consultation with other members.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I know I can speak for the minority when I say the fact is that we want this committee to operate in the best manner possible. If we have any questions, if we feel something is being done arbitrarily, if we had any objections to the memo from the staff investigator, I assure the chairman we would have asked the chairman directly rather than make this a subject of public inquiry.

Everybody's idea of common courtesy is different, but a significant fact is the member from Massachusetts knew this was a request, knew there had been obviously some agreement entered into, and while I do not chastise anyone else, I would have thought the better part of wisdom would have been to raise objection to the chairman and work it out at that point, rather than make it the subject of the very first question asked. To the extent we do not agree with your operation of the committee, we will bring it to you directly and not take it to television.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for that contribution.

Mr. DRINAN. You have now made a matter of public record which will be in the transcript that this man is an employee of VOA, Voice of America, apparently a full-time employee of Voice of America. I think the record now says, by your own admission, that this gentleman has come here and has testified and that his superiors and he have entered into an agreement ratified by counsel and the chairman of this committee that we won't tell the public that he is a full-time employee of the Voice of America. There may well be good reason for that, and I would like to know the reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the gentleman hear the Chair say that he was employed by the Voice of America?

Mr. DRINAN. You read—

The CHAIRMAN. Did I read the Voice of America? The record has been made, and with that understanding the committee will be in adjournment until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

We thank the witness and we will look forward to hearing you at 2 o'clock this afternoon. Counsel will so advise ABC.

(Whereupon, at 10 a.m., Thursday, March 25, 1971, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1971

(The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Ichord, Drinan, Ashbrook, Zion, Thompson, and Schmitz.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, a quorum being present.

First of all gentlemen, with full knowledge that I may be repeating myself, in view of the exchange this morning and in view of what happened last Tuesday and a subsequent reporting of ABC-TV News as reported to me, I think it is necessary to do so.

Last Tuesday the committee had appear before it one Professor Diao, a refugee from communist Red China. An agreement had been made between the members of the staff and Professor Diao that he would not be called upon to tell his present employment.

In the hearings this morning it was divulged, according to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Drinan, that Professor Diao was employed with the Voice of America.

Mr. DRINAN. You divulged that, Mr. Chairman, and not I.

The CHAIRMAN. I would state to the gentleman and I will recognize him—if the gentleman will let me proceed I will recognize him for a further explanation, but I shall recount what happened the best I can.

The gentleman from Massachusetts and the members of the committee had been advised not to ask the question, and a notice had been placed on the desk of each member of the committee.

It was my thinking there were good and sufficient reasons not to divulge his present employment. The reasons should be obvious. The most pressing reason for the making of the request anonymous is for the personal safety of these witnesses themselves.

We have many instances where it is necessary not to divulge the present employment of the particular witness.

Thereupon, after this notice was given, the members of the committee did not ask Professor Diao a question of his employment, but the gentleman from Massachusetts asked the question as to what was his present employment.

He then proceeded to ask a question which the Chair considered outside the competence of the witness. The Chair did not rule the question out of order, but I advised the gentleman from Massachusetts that I thought it was outside the competence of the witness, whereupon the gentleman from Massachusetts declined to ask any further questions.

In view of that happening and in view of the subsequent reportage on ABC-TV News—and I might state I did not see the news item, but I am advised that ABC-TV News reported the exchange between Father Drinan and me—and the commentator ended up with the statement, "The same old tactics but new faces," or something to that effect.

In view of the exchange and in view of the reporting I think that there have been left suspect the procedures of this committee as well as the credibility of the witness. Therefore I made this announcement this morning and I asked permission that we be permitted to proceed in a very unorthodox manner because of the witness whom the committee has before it at this time.

I stated that I would ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of this witness's testimony the gentleman from Massachusetts would first be given the opportunity to question the witness fully and completely, which I think the gentleman can do, being a former dean of the Boston Law College.

I would state again to the members of the committee that we do have with us a very distinguished witness. He is one of the outstanding artists of this century. His name is Professor Ma Sitson, who was born in 1912 in Canton, China. He was director of the Central Conservatory of Music in Peking; vice chairman of the All-China Union of Musical Workers, member of Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, member of Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association, member of China-Latin American Friendship Association, vice president of Chinese-East Germany Friendship Association. He was a deputy at National People's Congress, and I might point out he was also graduated from the Music Conservatory in Paris, France.

Gentlemen of the committee, a statement of Dr. Ma Sitson has been furnished to all of the members. I had the opportunity of reading the same early this morning.

The statement I think is one of the most moving accounts of the degradation, the suffering, the humiliation of the individual under totalitarian communism in one of our most ancient and honorable civilizations that I have ever read in my life.

It contains a message which I think should be brought to the attention of every artist and intellectual who might believe that totalitarian socialism is a possible answer to the problems of this society. It depicts, I think most vividly, what happens to human freedom under a philosophy of government which holds that the interest of the state is supreme.

Therefore, I am going to make the unanimous consent request—and the gentleman from Georgia indicated this morning that he might object—that we proceed in this manner. That would be first to let the interpreter read the statement for Dr. Ma Sitson and then the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for the purpose of interrogating the doctor in any way that he sees fit.

The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Since under the rules I would be the first person to be recognized after the chairman has interrogated the witness, I would gladly yield my normal position to the gentleman from Massachusetts to ask questions.

First, at this time, I defer to the gentleman from Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do object to the procedure for the simple reason that I am personally convinced that Mr. Drinan was seeking publicity. He was aware of where Professor Diao was employed at the time he asked the question. The question obviously would serve no constructive purpose, and I feel that by following these procedures we are in effect yielding to the position he prefers, which would in effect give him the additional publicity. When a person knows the answer to a question and has been asked not to ask the question and then does ask it, I think

it pretty well speaks for his motives. For those reasons I do object to the proceeding of granting him first time.

The CHAIRMAN. I will advise the gentleman from Georgia that I have not as yet asked unanimous consent, but I will proceed to do so. The gentleman from Georgia, if he so desires, can make his objection.

Gentlemen, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be permitted to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for the purpose of interrogating Dr. Ma Sitson after the statement is read. I assume the objection of the gentleman does not go to the reading of the statement.

Mr. THOMPSON. It does not. And I so object.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia objects.

Mr. ZION. I move that the gentleman from Massachusetts be permitted to interrogate the witness immediately following the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is seeking recognition. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, I neither have sought, nor do I accept, the out-of-order suggestion that I question the witness first. I did not seek that. I did not know this was going to be offered to me or foisted on me and I decline it; we should go in the normal procedures.

There is no reason for that, and for the record may I clarify several items. First I did not reveal the fact that the witness worked for the Voice of America. It was the chairman who read what was given to each of the members of the committee containing the words, "He is now employed at the VOA," namely Voice of America.

Secondly, the chairman indicates that the reasons should be obvious why a person who is an agent, who is an employee of a Federal agency should come here and refuse to disclose to us or at least to the public the fact that he is working for an arm of the Federal Government. Mr. Chairman says that the reason should be obvious, but he has given only one. He said the reason is "for personal safety of the witness."

If any suggestion can be made that in fact his life or his family might be jeopardized by his appearing here, I would be the first one to make any sensible arrangement. But he comes before a televised hearing of a committee of the Congress—does it make any sense to say that the mere failure to disclose the fact that he works for an arm of the American Government can in fact protect his family?

Third, the chairman suggested that the question I asked was beyond the competence of the witness. This is the House Internal Security Committee, and anyone who is subpoenaed, as this man was, to come before this committee should have very good knowledge and wisdom to contribute to the precise and only purpose of the committee, to protect internal security of this country.

I therefore assume that this man had a good deal to offer and I asked him the simple question, "What would you do, sir, if"—"what would you suggest to this committee to enact laws or modify laws to protect the internal security of the country?"

The chairman suggested that is "outside the competence of the witness." If that is in fact outside the competence of the witness, he should not be subpoenaed here because that is for the precise purpose of the committee.

Fourthly, Mr. Chairman admits he did not see ABC News, and I did not see it either, and we are going therefore on hearsay report which

the chairman has. And he is saying uncomplimentary things or he is saying ABC slanted the news, and I have no knowledge that that is so.

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman will yield at that point.

Did I say that ABC slanted the news coverage?

Mr. DRINAN. No, sir, but you raise a basic question, however.

The CHAIRMAN. I did raise the question, gentleman from Massachusetts, in this regard. I think the way the gentleman from Massachusetts handled the questioning, the way that it was reported on TV, does leave suspect—and the gentleman is a lawyer and he well knows what I am talking about—does leave suspect the procedures of this committee. They also leave suspect the credibility of the witness.

Let me say to the gentleman that I am going to put this before the committee and, whether the gentleman wants it or not, he is going to have the opportunity to examine this witness if he so desires to explain, to refute, because what happened did attack the credibility of the witness last Tuesday. If this motion carries the gentleman will have that opportunity, whether he refuses to accept it or not.

With that statement out of the way I will recognize the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Chairman, I think it is quite obvious as to the purpose of the gentleman from Massachusetts in questioning Dr. Diao the other day. As has already been pointed out he knew where he worked. He did not have to ask the question. But in asking the question he was telling not only that witness, but all future witnesses, that there was at least one member of this committee who was not going to abide by an agreement made by the staff of the committee in arranging their presentation here.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is on record—in fact he has put in legislation to abolish this committee. He is on record in opposition to it. If he cannot abolish the committee he is at least going to make sure that we are hamstrung as far as our ability to deal with witnesses and get witnesses to come before us is concerned. I think it is obvious that was the purpose of his questioning, simply to let witnesses know that there were no agreements. This, of course, would cut down the number of witnesses which this committee could get to appear before it and it would also cut down the type of testimony that we are going to get from witnesses.

I think it is obvious that if the committee cannot be destroyed, it is at least going to be hamstrung by the one member who is going to do everything he can to cut down its effectiveness.

I would like to let future witnesses know that at least this member of this committee is going to try to make their appearances here as hospitable as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one observation. This is concerning the coverage that is being given to hearings by ABC. It is apparent to me that the statement of the gentleman from California was a very worthwhile and interesting statement. It was also very apparent the camera was turned off while that statement was being made. Yet, when Mr. Drinan was making his statement, the camera is on. And I think people can draw their own conclusions as to what you would like to call it, whether you would like to call it censorship or presenting only half the story.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to the gentleman from Georgia, I am not going to get into the business of editing what is reported to the people of this Nation. I will state quite frankly that I do feel, in view of what happened in this regard, that there is more credibility gap than there is with CBS but that is a matter for ABC-TV news to decide.

Let me further state, as a matter of clarification, that the gentleman from Massachusetts did not extend the Chair the courtesy of asking about the necessity for this agreement before the question was asked. So at this time I am going to put the question, the motion made by the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Zion.

All in favor of the motion will say "aye."

(Chorus of "ayes.")

The CHAIRMAN. Those opposed will say "no."

(Messrs. Thompson and Drinan opposed.)

The CHAIRMAN. There are two "noes." Is there a rollcall request? If there be a rollcall requested I will give it.

Mr. DRINAN. What precisely is the motion again and does it apply only to the next witness?

The CHAIRMAN. The motion that was made applied to the witness, Dr. Ma Sitson. Does the gentleman request the rollcall?

Mr. DRINAN. Is this in violation of the rules of the Committee on Internal Security?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has read the rules, and if he thinks this is in violation of the rules he is assured that the majority will rule in this committee. I assume the gentleman does not request a rollcall.

Gentleman from Massachusetts, I certainly want to give you every opportunity to make your views known before this committee. That will be given to you, but the gentleman is out of order. Does the gentleman request a rollcall?

Mr. DRINAN. No, but I request—

The CHAIRMAN. Then the "ayes" have it. The motion is adopted. Now Mr. Counsel, will you call Dr. Ma Sitson.

It is my understanding that Dr. Sitson will be speaking through an interpreter.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would the interpreter first arise and be sworn. State your name for the record and your qualifications.

Mr. WANG. Laihsing Wang, interpreter, Chinese Mandarin language.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and accurately interpret the questions put to the witness and answers given by the witness before this committee?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Ma Sitson, would you raise your hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MA SITSON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MA SITSON (MA SZU-TSUNG) AS INTERPRETED
BY LAHSING WANG

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the interpreter for the purpose of reading the statement of Dr. Sitson.

Mr. WANG. I was born on March 21, 1912, Chinese lunar calendar. Actually it is May 7, in Canton, China, and presently reside in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I now use the surname "Sitson," which is the anglicized version of my name. I held the following offices in communist China: director of the Central Conservatory of Music in Peking, vice chairman of the All-China Union of Art and Literature, vice chairman of the All-China Union of Musical Workers, member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, member of Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association, member of China-Latin American Friendship Association, vice president of the Chinese-East Germany Friendship Association. I was also a deputy at the National People's Congress. I graduated from the Music Conservatory in Paris, France, in 1930.

My wife, my son, my daughter, and I escaped from Red China in January 1967 and came to the United States. The main reason for leaving mainland China was to survive the so-called "Cultural Revolution," the aim of which is to destroy anything in opposition to the new slavery regime that the Mao-Lin [Piao] clique is going to build up in modern China. During those months of the "Cultural Revolution" before our escape, the reign of terror was complete. But even before that, people under Mao's regime lived in a world of fear, especially during each movement.

There were so many movements during the 17 years I lived in mainland China. There were: The Land Reform, 1949; The Repression of Counter Revolutionaries, 1950; The Rectification of Thinking of the Intellectuals, 1951; the Three-Anti and the Five-Anti, 1952; The Liquidation of Hu Feng's Anti-Parti Bloc, 1955; The Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Struggle, 1957; The [Great] Leap Forward and the Three Red Banners, 1958; then after 3 years of famine, 1960-1963, the purges.

These finally were culminated in 1966 by the "Cultural Revolution." People are kept busy with all these movements. They took about one-half to two-thirds of their working time, even the evenings are filled with those endless "Cheu-Chee" (Learning) meetings, when criticizing, self-criticizing, struggling, confession, and sentencing took place. These sessions would end very late at night. The 8 working hours become 10, 12, 14, or even more hours. You feel exhausted and have no more time to think about anything else but sleep. I think it's a good way to keep people quiet.

With each movement, one is more and more aware of the danger of speech, of behavior, and learns to be careful, extremely careful. Each person voluntarily isolates himself from the others for fear of articulating some "bad" thoughts. One lives like a bee in a honeycomb, confined to his own cell by the fear of being denounced by someone for something.

With the advent of the Red Guards all the intellectual groups in China came under sharp attack—actors, musicians, artists, dancers;

all of the cultural groups for which China had been noted came under attack as nonproductive elements of society. The treatment of all of these persons at the hands of the Red Guards, many of whom had been former students, was too horrible to think about. Actors were disfigured, dancers were crippled, musicians had their hands damaged.

China under Mao Tse-tung has had many programs which were difficult to understand. The "Great Leap Forward" which was a national disaster. The "Hundred Flower Movement" was a trick and ended with the antirightist movement which sent many innocent people to their deaths in labor camps, and the "Cultural Revolution" was the most devastating. The constant change and threat to any free expression of ideas was more than one could stand. Because of the many official positions which I occupied as a musician and well-known composer in China I perhaps was spared much of the suffering that was visited upon the average Chinese citizen. Even so, the part that I experienced left me a physical wreck and only now, 4 years after I left China, do I feel sufficiently recovered to recapture the quietness of mind which I have long lost. The hatred and suspicion which has become a way of life in China is a terrible thing.

China today is a cult of one person, Mao Tse-tung. He is supposed to be god to all Chinese. Every time you go out of doors you must wear a button with a picture of Chairman Mao on it. On your bicycle you have a small placard on which you must write a quotation of Chairman Mao or some form of praise for Chairman Mao. The only freedom that people have in China today is the freedom to praise Chairman Mao, as it is emphatically put in the new Constitution.

I have been to Russia six times. I was there in 1949, in 1951, 1955, 1957, 1958, and 1962 as delegate or as member of the jury to the music competition in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. I can tell you this, conditions in Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are much, much better than they are today in Red China. I have traveled all over China. I gave concerts until my last one in 1962. I was privileged to be able to tour nearly all of the farthest provinces.

The factory worker, for example, could also travel if he had the money and the time; however, he has neither. The farmers on the other hand are tied to their commune. They are treated like cattle, and probably live and die without ever having left their commune, except for a party display or two, during their lives. The Chinese have lived under so much cruelty and sorrow for so many years that they have become adaptable to much of this. Life in China has varied considerably since the end of World War II. However, until 1957 most of the people had enough to eat and a place to live.

After 1958 it began to change. After Mao's "Great Leap Forward" it became very difficult. By the end of 1958 we had to line up a whole night to buy meat.

From 1960 to 1963 there were 3 years of famine. During that period the state control over people relaxed a little and we had more freedom. I can say that we were even more happy with our empty stomach. In the communes thousands and thousands of people starved to death. Each village and each commune were supposed to pledge a certain percentage of their production to the state. Many commune leaders became carried away with trying to outdo one another and pledged more

food than they could provide. This left the people with nothing at all, and they died.

From 1963 on, the control of the state became more and more severe. They used personnel from the army as models. The slogan was, "First, we don't fear hardships. Secondly, we don't fear death." Everyone was encouraged to follow their example. Those who died trying to work for the state were hailed as heroes. Because of my position at this time, I perhaps did not suffer as did most of the citizens. I recall one time in 1960, my family and I went out to a restaurant. The bill for our family came to \$80 which for most people was more than 1 month's pay. Because of the shortage of food the black market grew up whereby farmers and others who had small plots of land would grow some items for sale. Eggs sold on the black market for \$2 each. I recall I once bought a pound of peanuts for \$6. If the eggs could have been bought in the store they would only have cost 10 cents each. During this period of time cabbage was plentiful; however, it cost about \$2 to \$3 for a hundred pounds. People dried it and stored it away for future use. Most of the food was locally produced in China. The only import that we saw during this time was wheat from Canada. Food continues to be in short supply in China.

The problem of education in China has been one of long duration. Today, children in China go to school through the first six grades. If you must work, however, because of your family situation, I think that you can be excused. A person who is free to attend school can complete up through high school or 12 grades and also go on to the university provided he has a good political background. By good political background I mean that you must be from the family of workers, military, or poor farmers. The children from the family of a former landowner or one deemed to be an enemy of the state can never go to the university. The only charges for the children attending school are their food and clothing. All the rest of the expenses are paid by the state.

In the Conservatory of Music where I was director, most of the students were the children of intellectuals. These students were hand-picked from all over China to attend the conservatory to study music. We looked for those individuals with the most musical talent. At one time the conservatory was criticized because they only had students from a bourgeois background and had shut the doors to children of soldiers, workers, and farmers. A musician in China today has no problem finding a job. There are not too many musicians in China, and the government will, of course, assign the job.

When a student graduates from the conservatory usually the school assigns him to work somewhere. The job may not be of his own choosing. However, he will have a place to work as a teacher or he may play in an orchestra somewhere or he may even go into the army and work in a band. Usually the ministries of education or culture decide the future of a graduate student. A student can write down his choice of an assignment, but he is sent where he is needed. This is true of any occupation. If you decide not to go to that assignment then you are in great trouble. You are jobless and become a "society youth." It means "society parasite." Those who show outstanding talent are frequently sent to the Soviet Union to compete in music competition. Frequently they went to Russia several years ahead of time in order to study with better teachers.

Communist China has a Constitution; it stresses the rights of the citizens such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom to assemble, freedom to express your thoughts, and so forth. It's all a lie. I can say that the only right a person in China has is to work and to praise Mao Tse-tung.

Of course you could say, "The weather is good," or "The sky is blue," but you could not say, for example, "I would like to go to America." A statement such as this would cause you a great deal of difficulty. You would then be called in to examine the root of your thinking. Questions would arise about where your education broke down and allowed such a bad thought. Perhaps they may think the individual might be a spy or perhaps he has contact with spies. The individual should have been taught all of his life that America is the number one enemy of China, and of the people of China. The individual would be called upon to confess to what prompted him to make such a statement. This confession would lead to more confessions. You must confess for the good of your soul and the good of your thought. You must completely understand why you made these statements. The more detailed your confession, the better you would understand why you were wrong. After you have confessed sufficiently you may be set free. It would be the best of luck, or you may be sent off to a labor camp for reeducation.

Most trials in China today do not take place in a courtroom. They are held in the schools, in the factories, or in any group to which you belong. You may be interested to know that China does not have capital punishment. People are not executed. They are sent to labor camps, where they are worked to death. This way the state has the good reputation of being merciful and in the meantime derives some benefit from their work.

In China today, the most casual comment to a friend, to a relative, or even to members of your own family can often bring you before such a tribunal. Everyone lives in a state of fear. Fear is everywhere. Everyone is isolated from everyone else by this fear. Allegations made by anyone can bring you before a people's tribunal and there is no defense. Any of these groups that I have mentioned can send you away to a labor camp.

In America I have found that everyone has so many rights that it seems to me at times that one cannot be punished for anything. Here one cannot walk the streets after dark in safety. In China we do not seem to have this problem, but I cannot be sure of this, however, because one never looks around to see what is happening to others.

In China you live your own life. You do not question what happens to anyone else and you evidence no interest in what others are doing. The newspapers in China are only media for carrying the praises of Chairman Mao with his thoughts. A person in my position in China could have a radio. I, for example, was permitted to purchase a large radio and could listen to radio stations outside of China: BBC, Voice of America, Japanese radio, etc. To listen to these programs, of course, was illegal, but we still did it nevertheless.

Elections in China are another example of this system which has enslaved a very old and very honorable people. Elections are only a play. Every 4 years we have what are called local-level elections. They put, for example, 10 names on a ballot. Everybody must vote for these names. You may never have heard of these people before and probably

never will again. There are 10 positions, there are 10 names, they are elected, and that is it. It is possible to put down another name—to write it in below the others—but this means nothing. The elections are decided long before the ballots are counted. For example, I was appointed to the People's Congress. I was a representative of the cultural group. The representatives in the People's Congress represent all of the occupations of the population, economics, the army, and so forth.

We numbered in the thousands and we elected the chairman of the state and the congressional positions. They only put down the number of names that there were positions open. One man for chairman, Chairman Mao, and so on. Such balloting as you have in the United States is not even heard of in China today. What it amounts to is each individual must show up and approve what the state has done by approving the people it has selected. There is no alternative. You do not vote against anyone.

I should like to mention religion in China. There is none. According to the Constitution freedom of religion is permitted, but this is not true. A person who goes to church is always in trouble. All the churches must adapt to Maoism. It makes no difference which religion you are referring to, if you are a Buddhist you are accused of being superstitious. If you are Christian you have ties with imperialist countries. Members of the communist party cannot belong to any religion. Mao Tse-tung is god. His word, his teachings, are to the modern Chinese what the Bible is to a Westerner.

China has a number of political parties unlike many communist countries. However, these parties are all controlled by the communist party. Their sole purpose is to say yes to Chairman Mao and all of them must follow the wishes of Chairman Mao. I know for a fact that the communist party sends personnel into each of the other parties to control them. There is never any question about which is the party in China.

In China under Chairman Mao there are so many changes that a person who is in favor today may be in a labor camp tomorrow. Personnel who are friends of Mao today may be his enemies tomorrow. No one knows from day to day whether he will be doing what is considered right or whether he will be accused of doing something that is wrong. You must not think. You must not plan. You must do nothing but live from day to day only to do what is right each day in conformance with the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

I notice that in this country there are many people who are very proud of the fact that China now has the atomic bomb and is thus one of the major powers in the world. They apparently never think of the price that was paid by the Chinese people so that this was possible. I think that those in this country who are so proud of China should be sent to live there for a few years. They would then know the truth and in all probability would have a decided change of thought.

All my life I have lived for China and for my music. Because of my prominence in music I was appointed to many positions involving contacts with foreigners, such as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society, the Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Society, and others. I was never a party member. My music was known all over China. One of my compositions, "Longing for Home," prefaced each Radio Peking propa-

ganda broadcast to Taiwan. I had concert tours all over mainland China up to 1963.

While the "Great Leap Forward" program in China in 1958 was a national disaster and reduced the people of China to starvation, my family and I managed to keep our hope that some day things would work out and China would recover. In the fall of 1966 the full impact of the latest program, the "Cultural Revolution," hit us. This was as close to anarchy as I ever wish to come. All intellectuals, artists, actors, dancers, musicians, and members of any cultural group were singled out as useless members of the privileged class.

I was among 500 who were rounded up and sent to a sort of concentration camp at the Socialist Institute to undergo thought reform. We were there 50 days while I was accused of following a capitalist line in my music. After this I was suddenly returned, together with 18 others, to the Central Academy of Music where I had been chairman and immediately felt the wrath of the student nucleus of what became the Red Guard. They greeted me by pouring a bucket of paste over my head and stuck abusive slogans to the paste. I was called a devil, a demon, an authority on the reactionary capitalist class. I was confined to a small room where I was forced to write confessions to all sorts of crimes against the state, crimes which I had never committed nor even thought of.

Each morning I was forced to do hard labor with the result that my health began to fail. The tragic part of it all is that the Red Guards were mostly students who themselves had been somewhat of a privileged class, but were now given free rein to do whatever they wished. The excesses they carried out against those who fell into their disfavor were difficult to imagine. I was beaten with belt buckles many times. Other artists, musicians, and dancers were beaten so badly that their careers were finished. By the time I left China my right arm had been so badly injured that I could not raise it. I remained at the Central Academy of Music for 103 days as a prisoner before my release. At this time in China no one could be sure that he would not be the next to be accused. Those who initiated many of the purges found that they themselves eventually became the victims.

As time went on the excesses of violence and confusion among the groups began to tell upon the way we were treated. By September 1966 I was permitted to spend my evenings at home. My house in the meantime had become a sleeping place for Red Guards. Sixty of them were sleeping in our former sitting room. My family was gone, and all of my records and books were smashed or confiscated. My daughter, Celia, returned one evening, and we spoke of leaving China. At last one bitter cold night in November we boarded a train and left Peking for good.

I cannot discuss the details of my reunion with my family and our escape from China for fear of endangering others who are still in China and who took great risks on our behalf. To these will go our eternal thanks.

It is interesting to note that the Chinese communists used to play my music in their propaganda broadcasts beamed to Taiwan. After my escape this stopped, and now the Nationalists play my music in their programs beamed to the mainland. All China now knows of my

decision to leave and my escape from what has become the worst, most inhuman slave camp on earth.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Interpreter.

Gentleman from Massachusetts, one of my former law professors once said, "The truth is very rarely pure and never, never simple, and the purpose of cross-examination is to bring out the truth."

Here is your witness, under oath, under the pains of the penalties of perjury. We can now see how you proceed to cross-examine.

I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sitson, I have no cross-examination. I want to tell you how profoundly moved I was by your statement. It is painful to me and, I know, everyone here to learn once again about the sorrows and the oppression of one-fourth of humanity that lives in mainland China.

I do hope that you were not inconvenienced by the change in the hours and I thank you for your patience.

My only consolation, considering the oppression of the magnificent Chinese people, is that you are now residing in the United States for some 4 years and 2 months and you, sir, are a magnificent asset to this country.

I have a profound compassion for the immense suffering which you have personally undergone and I am sure that you have understated everything that you have endured. I know that since you have been to Russia on six occasions that you have a great deal to contribute to us, that you understand the intimidation of citizens in a totalitarian state.

Our purpose here, as you know, in this committee is not to do something about the terrible agonizing questions that you raise or how to react to this domination, but simply to investigate, really, the question, the objectives, and activities within the United States, the forces which seek to establish totalitarian dictatorship here by force, by violence, by insurrection, or by those means that oppose lawful authority.

I wonder, Mr. Sitson, whether you would like to talk to the objectives of this Committee on Internal Security as to what things you have learned since you came here, or have you wisdom that you gained before you came to America about these objectives and activities of anyone in the United States that seeks by force, by violence, or insurrection to oppose lawful government?

Mr. WANG. We find this country is infiltrated with many communists and communist sympathizers. In order to preserve the United States Government, Congress should legislate stiffer legislation to control it rather than having too much freedom to operate underground.

Mr. DRINAN. Would you like to elaborate, sir? When you say this country is infiltrated by communists, are you suggesting that they are of Chinese origin?

Mr. WANG. Chinese origin; yes, sir.

Mr. DRINAN. I really think that is a broad statement and I would not be prepared to accept that. The Chinese people that I know would not fit into that category at all, and I really think that you should bring forth evidence before you make a statement which, frankly, I feel is a calumny on the Chinese people in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the interpreter replies I might caution the gentleman from Massachusetts that his reply might call for a violation of rule 27 (m).

If he proceeds to name any person without that person having the benefit of having the opportunity to refute the same, the gentleman could very well call for an answer that could result in a violation of the rule. With that understanding let the interpreter reply.

Mr. DRINAN. I am not calling for any names; simply I want you to elaborate on what you said, that alleged communists have infiltrated; that as a result we need tighter laws and, I understand you to say, that these infiltrators or, at least, some of them are of Chinese origin.

Mr. WANG. Many of them are communist sympathizers who are exploited by the agents in disguise. They may be in one form of occupation or another.

Mr. DRINAN. Would you elaborate now on who is a communist sympathizer, and I think, sir, that that term is rather difficult to interpret. I would suggest that a person who is sympathetic with communism is not necessarily within the jurisdiction of this committee because we are authorized by the Congress of the United States to investigate only those who seek to overthrow this Government by force, violence, espionage, and so forth.

Would you elaborate on these alleged sympathizers with communism?

Mr. WANG. I can only say from my personal experience like in 1949 the broad communist takeover in China.

The communists worked out the network, underground connections all over and intimidating and using every conceivable means to overthrow a legitimate government into communism. I can give similar comparison. Such a danger might apply to this country.

Mr. DRINAN. If I understand you, you are saying that the communists in 1949 used these methods of infiltration in Peking. And are you telling us that 22 years later that you just assume they are still using the techniques, same techniques, and that, therefore, you said that there are many people who are communist sympathizers or communists who are infiltrating our institutions?

Mr. WANG. Yes; I believe they were. They would still use the same methods like they used before.

Mr. DRINAN. I may suggest this then. You assume that they would in fact use the same methods. We are here as Members of the Congress to find out if in fact certain people are using these particular methods which you assert were used in Peking. We are not here to operate upon or to have an assumption, but we are looking for people or numbers—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me correct the gentleman there if I may intervene, if the gentleman will yield.

I think the gentleman as a new member of this committee may well be misinterpreting the function of this committee. This committee is not for the purpose of trying anyone or filtering out a specific individual. We are a legislative committee, investigative committee, and an oversight committee; but it is not our function as such, as a legis-

lative body, to ferret out and punish individual communists, and the gentleman would seem to leave that impression. He said "we" rather than himself. Now he may think that that is his obligation, but certainly that does not dovetail with the conclusions of the Chair.

Mr. DRINAN. I am certain it is not my function and I concur fully that the three-fold objective of the committee is investigative, legislative, and oversight. But since this gentleman who came to this country from China has so much background and information, I would want to have from him some information beyond a mere assumption based upon 1949 as to what this committee can do in investigative, legislative, and oversight function to curtail the people that he alleges are infiltrators.

Mr. WANG. Communist China applies the type of technique to get to the heart of the Americans, such as the war in Vietnam, whereby they just drag and drag and drag and you can kill 200 today, they send 400 tomorrow. They just drag until such a day that American people will be tired of this war, and this is one front that is part of the communist technique, to destroy capitalist society.

Mr. DRINAN. That is an entirely different subject, is it not? You are just saying that what you claim are the techniques of 1949 have, in your judgment, persisted to this date.

Let us transmute that for the moment, and I, sir, don't have to leave by clear implication the impression on this record that the distinguished person residing in America of Chinese ancestry has said that there are, and I quote "many people of Chinese origin who are sympathizers of communism; that if they do not do this consciously that they are misled or duped."

I don't want that impression to be left because in my own judgment that is not correct. I am not proud of the record of America toward—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts—if I may be permitted to intervene—the Chair has been very indulgent in permitting you to ask questions. It was moved and accepted by the committee, but I think the gentleman should use his opportunity to question the witness at this particular time. The record will stand as made. I would have hoped, in view of what happened, that the gentleman from Massachusetts would have questioned Dr. Sitson very intensively upon the statements made in the record.

Now am I to understand since the gentleman has no questions in regard to the veracity, the truthfulness of these statements, that the gentleman accepts them as true?

Mr. DRINAN. There is no reason to deny that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then my point is made, and I hope that ABC-TV and the gentleman from Massachusetts have learned something from this exchange.

Has the gentleman from Massachusetts concluded?

Mr. DRINAN. I would like to say I learned from this exchange that Dr. Sitson is a very distinguished person but that the evidence which you have given to me is not helpful to me as a member of this committee because it is not very specific, and, frankly, I hope it is erroneous in your judgment, and I would like to see you reflect upon the testimony when you see it typed up and at a future time tell us and try to help us, as I know you want to, about these people who are allegedly sympathizers or advocates of communism.

Now I am through, sir.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Doctor.

I think my point as chairman of this committee has been made.

The Chair will now proceed in regular order and recognize the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ASHBROOK. First, I hope you would convey to Professor Sitson our profound appreciation of his statement, of what he has done, and the inspiration he stands for to all of us who recognize the dangers of communism. And our hearts go out to the people who have to live under that tyranny.

I only have one question.

I am most interested in the "Hundred Flowers Movement" or period in China. Could Professor Sitson tell us if, during that period of time, he was led into a position of making criticism? Does he recall that particular time? Did he enter into this supposed criticism that was to be allowed and, if so, could he expand the record on that particular area?

Mr. WANG. In 1956 began the "One Hundred Flower Movement." At the beginning many intellectuals were suspicious of that type of thing. Then they were persuaded by Chairman Mao's force to divulge confessions in order to improve each individual.

At that time I was vice chairman of the Association of Artists and Writers. I was invited together with about 10 other persons to criticize the regime. Each one of us had to speak in turn, it happened that Mr. Wu Tsu-kung, who was a most distinguished writer, spoke before my turn. I believe that he was most sincere to contribute for the better of the regime, his opinion was that arts and literature was on the way to collapsing, because of the lack of self-expression—whereby many talents would be hit.

During that time I, too, had many complaints about the system. I was skeptical whether I should air them out, so I have only two suggestions to the party. My suggestions were: (1) Some bureaucrats will, though they have the title actually, have no power but that it is a good thing for me personally, because as a composer, I have more time to spare for my writing and (2) the center of talent was too concentrated in Peking. My suggestion was to diversify the talent throughout the country rather than congregate in one city in order to inspire the populous.

Mr. ASHBROOK. That seems like the same thing a lot of us are doing in this country.

Mr. WANG. The communist party apparatus constantly was in fear of the power being taken away by some politically unreliable individuals, any outside party members. They want to keep everything to the party members. Mr. Wu Tsu-kung was the man who gave the most suggestions; shortly after the "Hundred Flowers" was the "Anti-rightists" movement, and as a rightist, Mr. Wu wound up in the labor camp for hard labor.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I thank Professor Sitson and I yield the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentleman from Ohio.

The gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ZION. Tell Professor Sitson that we understand and appreciate the circumstances he has endured and we appreciate particularly his

coming here and testifying today. Professor Sitson, are you aware, of your own knowledge, of anyone of any nationality who has traveled to Red China and returned to this country with a specific purpose of undermining the Constitution or the Government of this country?

Mr. WANG. I don't know, sir.

Mr. ZION. You don't know any specific individuals?

Mr. WANG. No, sir.

Mr. ZION. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Sitson, may I also thank you very much for coming before this committee and giving us your testimony and the benefit of your experience. I think if it is made known to people throughout America and the free world then certainly you will have served a very useful purpose.

May I ask a few questions concerning the "Cultural Revolution." What was the purpose, so far as the Government is concerned, behind the "Cultural Revolution"?

Mr. WANG. The primary objective of the "Cultural Revolution" was to eliminate the so-called slogan "The Four O's." That means "old habit," "old custom," "old thinking," and "old habits," so to set the individual into a path of pure socialism.

Mr. THOMPSON. If I may preface my next question with a statement, when I first entered Congress I hired a young man who was a graduate of one of the leading black colleges in Atlanta. He attended a number of meetings, with some of the people who were of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, commonly called SNCC. [Stokely] Carmichael and [H.] Rap Brown are two of the most predominant known people that were in that organization. He reported to me in general conversation that, as he saw it, the purpose was only to destroy. They did not care whether they hurt Democrats or Republicans, but they wanted to destroy.

I was wondering if the purpose of the Red Guard in China during the "Cultural Revolution" had any real constructive purpose or was it simply to tear down and destroy?

Mr. WANG. The Red Guard's primary purpose actually is working only as an apparatus for the Mao Tse-tung regime, to eliminate what he considered their enemies.

Mr. THOMPSON. So the purpose of the Red Guard was not a constructive purpose, but was simply one to eliminate and destroy what Mao considered to be bad for the state. Would that be correct?

Mr. WANG. That is correct, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Then am I correct in thinking that Chairman Mao felt it was bad to have intellectuals, people with great skill and ability who appreciated music and art, travel throughout China, because certainly these people were abused greatly during the "Cultural Revolution."

Mr. WANG. That is because the elimination of the intellectuals was wanted because the artists had received an education from capitalist society. Therefore, they were considered impure.

Mr. THOMPSON. In other words, they needed to destroy or eliminate those who had had contact with capital society, capitalistic society, if

they were going to have the pure Maoist form of socialism. Would that be correct?

Mr. WANG. Mao Tse-tung wants to purify the entire society. Anyone who had anything to do with West, the bourgeois and feudal background, should be totally eliminated to its roots and branches. In this way they would enter into a society that would be reliable.

Mr. THOMPSON. In trying to relate the experiences China had with the "Cultural Revolution" and some events in this country, approximately April 17 last year ABC News had a documentary on an hour or a 30-minute program. During this 30-minute program they had on film American citizens stating—and this is as close as I can quote without having the text before me—that Western civilization has so interfered with the right of real freedom in Latin America or true democracy in Africa or Asia that it may take the destruction of Western civilization in order to allow these areas to evolve as truly free nations.

In your opinion would that in any way relate to the theory as proposed in the Maoist teachings that you must first destroy Western civilization in order to allow these areas to be truly liberated and free?

Mr. WANG. Yes. To elaborate on that there were posters, in Peking, with the words saying literally that movies should begin at the beginning, from zero.

Mr. THOMPSON. Going to, of course, the theory behind basic power, the Government in China has such tremendous power and they exercise in such an authoritarian manner that the individual apparently has very few rights. Is this correct?

Mr. WANG. That is correct, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. And the abuse of the individual in China comes about primarily because of a misuse of power by the Government.

Mr. WANG. In China the people's life means nothing. Individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Say that again sir.

Mr. WANG. The individual's life means nothing.

Mr. THOMPSON. The individual's life means nothing. In your statement you mention that on the commune the farmers are, in effect, tied to their land. What would happen if a student, for example, were sent from a city to a farm and he decided he did not want to work on a farm or commune and he were to come back to the city without having permission?

Mr. WANG. He cannot go back.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you have any idea of what the penalty would be if he did, in fact, return without authority to return?

Mr. WANG. Each member of the commune was issued food coupons and they are held at the commune office so if he should run away he would not have the coupons to buy food.

Mr. THOMPSON. Does that mean, in effect, that an individual on a commune must, in effect, live and die in that area and he cannot go to other areas?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. So he may spend his entire life in a very small geographical area?

Mr. WANG. In the commune the commune secretary is like a king in that he calls the shots and he gives the orders. I recall the period of four purges, a commune secretary who was misusing his power, he

called a meeting and as people were gathering for the meeting in a field somewhere, they would have trucks to pick up their belongings in their quarters. This would be an exception rather than the rule, but from that you can realize how unlimited is their control of the people, how completely powerful are they, the party secretary.

Now, getting back to the commune secretary. He controls virtually every move of its members. He decides who does what, when, and so forth, and nobody can put up an argument.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you have any knowledge of any type of underground newspaper or communication whereby one individual in China could communicate some of his thoughts to another individual in China through a means that is not approved by the Government, but may be of critical nature to the Government?

Mr. WANG. There are occasionally leaflets which are anti-Mao and are distributed, as well as radio stations, occasionally. Abruptly they may just go off the air.

Mr. THOMPSON. Are these radio stations on mainland China?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. And they will occasionally criticize the Government?

Mr. WANG. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. But they appear to go off the air after a very short period of time.

Mr. WANG. They may be hiding in the mountains and occasionally you can hear them. Maybe just about once a week.

Mr. THOMPSON. In this country, of course, as you know and as you have witnessed in this committee here, there is oftentimes a discussion between the press and Government officials. We may feel at times that the press is, in effect, censoring the news by failing to report to the people the full story, whereas the press may well feel that perhaps we in Government are not presenting the entire story.

So I simply make that statement to point out what I consider one of the great differences between a free society and a communist society, wherein if you do have news media that do criticize the government there then they would have to stay in hiding or else be eliminated.

I thank you very much. You have been most kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I, too, would like to thank Professor Sitson and I hope that your testimony here, your story, is told over and over again on college campuses. I hope that it is by the method of print rather than by personal speeches by yourself because you have suffered enough in this life without going to college campuses at this stage. That is from my own experience.

Are you familiar with the Progressive Labor Party in this country?

Mr. WANG. I don't know anything about it.

Mr. SCHMITZ. From your 4 years in this country and your observations, would you be of the opinion that the Communist Party of this country should be outlawed?

Mr. WANG. I believe basically we should eliminate the Communist Party because according to Mao Tse-tung there are two kinds of contradictions. One is from within, one is from without. And if it is from

without, we should have strong legislation to forbid any participation activity in this country, namely, the Communist Party.

Mr. SCHMITZ. One other question.

You are familiar with the activities of Anna Strong.¹ Was she active in China?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir; I met her.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Did the witness know if she had any contacts or what group she was in contact with here in the United States?

Mr. WANG. I don't know her well, I just saw her once, but I know she is pro-Mao.

Mr. SCHMITZ. But he is not aware of any groups that prior to her death she was in contact with in this country?

Mr. WANG. I do not know that.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Regarding the suggestion to outlaw the Communist Party here, there is an objection. We sometimes hear that this would simply drive them underground, and if we allowed the Communist Party to operate openly, we can keep a better watch on them. Would he have any comment on that?

Mr. WANG. I have no comment to make.

Mr. SCHMITZ. But I gather he does not agree with that argument.

Mr. WANG. He believes elimination is better. Now they operate in two ways, openly and undergroundly, is it not worse.

Mr. SCHMITZ. He believes it would be better to outlaw the Communist Party?

Mr. WANG. If it is according to Chairman Mao, he would just eliminate. I think it is reasonable to eliminate what is jeopardizing the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, if there are no further questions, the Chair will recognize the counsel, Mr. Schultz, for the purpose of completing the record.

I am sure you have questions which should be asked of Dr. Sitson, do you not, Mr. Schultz?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed at this time.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I would like to discuss the Constitution of China with you just a minute or so.

Could you tell us what has happened to the Chinese self-image? The "Cultural Revolution"? The "Hundred Flowers" program? What effect has this had on the Chinese self-image, and particularly the young people?

Mr. WANG. The "One Hundred Flowers Movement" the intellectuals were very happy with. They feel it is an act of liberation. So during the "Hundred Flowers Movement" there were many writings which contributed culturally to China.

Mr. SCHULTZ. How is this going to affect the youth growing up, the "Cultural Revolution"?

Mr. WANG. I feel personally that the "Cultural Revolution" came very parallel to a period in China about 2000 years ago in the Ch'ing dynasty, by the elimination of the old and rebirth of a new life. Many victims of the "Cultural Revolution" were the youth also. Also to

¹ See House Report No. 92-14, 92d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 104, 105.

cleanse the old that has bourgeois backgrounds in Western influence. Then there is a group that follows the line of Liu Shao-ch'i who was bordering on the "revisionism" line.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is this youth group in competition with Mao?

Mr. WANG. There was a time when the Red Guards balance was on the side of Liu Shao-chi.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Ma.

I would like to go over some of the specific provisions which are found in the Constitution, 1954, of the People's Republic of China. I recognize of course that there is currently a new constitution, but I would like to ask these items as you experienced them in China.

The first question is, Did you have freedom of speech?

Mr. WANG. They have all kinds of freedoms, but actually have nothing.

Mr. SCHULTZ. The answer, then, is "no"?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of the press?

Mr. WANG. No, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of assembly?

Mr. WANG. No, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you experience freedom of correspondence?

Mr. WANG. If it is not censored. You are taking a chance.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you experience freedom of religion?

Mr. WANG. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you experience freedom of education?

Mr. WANG. Yes. Everyone can go to school.

Mr. SCHULTZ. But was the school controlled?

Mr. WANG. Yes; controlled under the Government.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were the books controlled by the state?

Mr. WANG. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Were the teachers controlled by the state?

Mr. WANG. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Then would you say you had freedom of education?

Mr. WANG. In that sense it would be "no."

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom to engage in cultural pursuits?

Mr. WANG. No, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom to travel?

Mr. WANG. Yes. Travel in China?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Freedom to travel in China. Did you have to have permission to travel?

Mr. WANG. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have to carry an identification card?

Mr. WANG. No.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, Mr. Counsel, Dr. Sitson did occupy, I would think, a very privileged position. At least a great part of the time. In his career in China he was member of the China-Latin American Friendship Association, president of the Chinese-East German Friendship Association, and director of China Musicians Institute, member of Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Some of these positions were Government positions, were they not?

Mr. WANG. In Red China it is very difficult to distinguish whether an organization is Government controlled or not because in reality everything is under the eyes of Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he occupy a position—my point is did you occupy, Dr. Sitson, a position different from the ordinary citizen? Were you speaking personally or are you speaking generally? Is there complete freedom to travel in China as there is in this country? You have experienced life in both nations.

Mr. WANG. Basically, everyone has that right to travel provided he has money and time. Generally they don't have either.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer to the question would be "yes," then. Proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have the freedom to change residence?

Mr. WANG. Yes.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you have freedom of the secret ballot?

Mr. WANG. No.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, this chart now contains the comparisons between the rights spelled out in the constitutions of the countries whose former citizens have testified this week and the rights they actually had. In each case we have tried to mark the experiences of the witness, not necessarily to indicate that this is true for the whole country, though it may well be.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will stand as made, Mr. Counsel.

Let's proceed. That is a good graphic demonstration, but I would quibble with the form of the questioning. The record will stand.

Would the employees please remove the screen?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I would like to offer this chart as an exhibit and point out that the norms for the various freedoms listed in the chart should be understood to be the freedoms we ourselves enjoy in the United States, taking into consideration that none of these freedoms is an absolute right in any society.

Mr. Ma, in your statement you pointed out that you had written a song entitled "Longing for Home," and that this song was played, beamed from Taiwan toward the mainland. Did you bring along a recording of that for us today?

Mr. WANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you play just a little of it.
(Recording.)

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions of Dr. Sitson?

Mr. DRINAN. No, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

The question was not asked whether Dr. Sitson had the right to strike. As we understand the right to strike in America it is to withhold your labor, if you do not feel you are receiving a high enough wage, a high enough pay. Does that right exist in China?

Mr. WANG. It cannot be done.

Mr. THOMPSON. So there is no right to strike in China.

A young man in China, does he have complete right and freedom to choose which occupation he would like to enter?

Mr. WANG. Since the education is furnished by the state from elementary school, so when he graduates the Government would decide whatever job they think that he should be well fitted for.

Mr. THOMPSON. So he does not have the choice himself.

In America, of course, we have free schooling all the way through the 12th grade, but an individual can go into any field that he so desires at that time, but in China the state would make the decision as to what line of work he should follow.

Mr. WANG. He can choose his field of specialization in college.

Mr. THOMPSON. In college; but once he completes his education either at the high school level or at the college level, is he free to enter any particular field or is he told that his services are needed in this area and you must work in this particular occupation?

Mr. WANG. After graduation they will have a form to fill out as regards to occupation and the location and the different pertinent information. However, he is generally assigned to where the state feels he is most greatly needed or qualified.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. One quick question: Mr. Ma, do you have any estimate of the number of people who have died in China as a result of the present regime in China who would not have died otherwise?

Mr. WANG. Within China?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman include in that question those perhaps who may have died from starvation? They do have a tremendous food problem which would have brought about death, as well as extermination.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is exactly what I mean.

Mr. WANG. It is difficult to give any accurate figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand how it would be extremely difficult.

There being no further questions, Dr. Sitson, I want to express my personal gratitude for your appearance today, sir.

I did mention that Dr. Sitson is a world-famous artist. More specifically, I would say that Dr. Sitson is recognized as one of the best violinists in the world.

Dr. Sitson, the violin happens to be my favorite musical instrument. I hope some time I will have the opportunity to see and hear you play. May I again thank you, sir. You now have the freedom that is offered in this society. I express the wish that we can keep it for you. Thank you again, sir.

The witness is excused.

Now the gentleman from Massachusetts. I am satisfied with the record that has been made. As stated to the gentleman, I thought that what happened Tuesday and how ABC reported the exchange did cast some suspicion on the credibility of the witnesses. I believe that now nothing should be suspect in view of what has happened. As a matter of fact, the gentleman from Massachusetts stated that he had no reason not to believe the testimony of the witness in the chair at the present time, and he testified substantially the same thing that Professor Diao testified to. The gentleman was offered ample opportunity to cross-examine and bring out the truth if he disagreed with the gentleman.

Counsel has related to me that he had a telephone conversation with the employers of the previous witness. Mr. Schultz, I did not understand the full content of the telephone conversation. Would you relay that to me at this time?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, on February 11, I was in contact with Mr. Kopp of the General Counsel's office of VOA. He asked if we would avoid mentioning the employment of Mr. Diao. His reason given was they have had employees in the past who have suffered personal harassment when they have been publicly identified. Today, this afternoon at 1:40, he called again to be sure that this was not made of any great moment, and stated that they were most proud to have Mr. Diao with them at Voice of America. They were happy to acknowledge he was an employee. This was not to be denied in any way. They were merely concerned about employees who in the past have suffered personal harassment by phone calls at the Voice of America, and it has materially affected their work.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the Chair sees Professor Diao in the audience at this time. The gentleman from Massachusetts may call Professor Diao if he wishes to do so.

Mr. DRINAN. I do not wish to unless Mr. Diao wishes to be recalled.

The CHAIRMAN. As chairman of this committee, may I say he is under subpoena. The chairman can call him.

The gentleman has no request. Then I see no need to call him at this time.

The meeting will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m. Thursday, March 25, 1971, the committee was recessed subject to call of the Chair.)

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

Part 1-A

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1971

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee Members present: Representatives Richard H. Ichord of Missouri, Richardson Preyer of North Carolina, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff Members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The hearing will continue today into the theory and practice of communism. Today is the fourth day of hearings on this investigation.

The first witness this morning is Dr. Peter Toma, professor at the University of Arizona, who is on a year's leave and is currently teaching at the National War College in Washington, D.C.

Professor Toma, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee. I have your biographical information before me, and the Chair at this time, if there be no objection, will direct the same to be placed in the record.

(The biographical sketch follows:)

DR. PETER A. TOMA

Date of Birth: February 23, 1925, Czechoslovakia.

Present Position:

Director, Europe and the U.S.S.R. The National War College, Washington, D.C. Professor of Government, University of Arizona (on leave).

Education:

B.A., Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa.

M.A., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.

Ph.D., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.

Experience:

Fourteen years of teaching: research analyst, U.S. Department of State, International Broadcasting System; research fellow, Social Science Foundation; member of Research Mapping Team, Agency for International Development, Food for Peace; member of U.S. Peace Corps training program; Director, EPDA Institute in International Affairs.

Publication (books):

The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1970);
The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona, 1967);
Basic Issues in International Relations, ed. with A. Gyorgy (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1967);

Chapters in:

Czechoslovakia, Past and Present, ed. by M. Rechcigl, Jr. (Hague: Mouton, 1968);
Bohemia (Munich: R. Lerche Verlag, 1966);
Issues of World Communism, ed. by A. Gyorgy (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966);
A Program of Research on Food for Peace, ed. by L. Witt (East Lansing: Economic and Agricultural Development Institute, 1966);
Problems in International Relations, ed. by A. Gyorgy and H. Gibbs (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962 and 1970).

Articles in:

American Journal of International Law
Journal of Politics
Western Political Quarterly
American Slavic and East European Review
Journal of Central European Affairs
East European Quarterly
Osteuropa
International Relations
The Progressive
Ukrainian Quarterly
World Affairs Quarterly
East Europe
Journal of Comparative Communism

Lecturer:

Boston University
University of Denver
Stanford University
University of Oregon
Foreign Service Institute (U.S. Department of State)
Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies (George Washington Univ.)
University of Nebraska
University of Washington
The National War College
Inter-American Defense College

Professional Associations:

Secretary-treasurer, Western Slavic Association
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
American Political Science Association
Western Political Science Association
Rocky Mountain Social Science Association
MUN Alumni Association
Tucson Committee on Foreign Relations

The CHAIRMAN. It is customary, Doctor, at an appearance before the committee for the witness to first be sworn. Will you please rise? Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. TOMA. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated, sir.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Dr. Toma.

TESTIMONY OF PETER A. TOMA

Mr. TOMA. Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege for me to appear before this distinguished committee.

First of all, I would like to start with certain assumptions about the world we live in which may shed light on the present problems of Eastern Europe and the way they affect the interests of the United States.

First, let me say that there is an international system which is multi-polar with an alliance subsystem in it; therefore, no nation or political system is an island unto itself. Alliances tend to be continuously in flux, and therefore the manifestations of imbalances are recorded in terms of international political crises.

There are two paradoxical trends manifested in the present international system. There is a greater interdependence of nations—the world is getting smaller, distances shorter, and communications faster.

On the other hand, there is greater desire towards independence, sovereignty, and the observance of national characteristics of organized societies, which can be labeled as the growth of nationalism. This development is not necessarily in contradiction to communism's.

What is communism?

In my opinion, communism today is a label attached to a complex movement encompassing 87 communist parties and almost as many national interests, goals, tactics, and organizational directorates.

Since the demise of the Communist Information Bureau in 1956, there has been no institutionalized association of the communist parties in the world, and currently more than half of the 87 communist parties are at odds with the Kremlin.

In spite of the change from monolithic to what we generally refer to as polycentric communism—later on I shall try to explain this—I submit that the power, and therefore the threat, of communism under different labels is greater today than ever before.

Today, however, the threat is not from an international revolutionary working class, as it was around the period of World War I, or even to some extent during the period of World War II, but from Soviet communism, from Chinese communism, Cuban communism, Korean communism, Vietnamese communism, and so on.

With your permission, I would like to demonstrate this by showing you a slide which will indicate the world strength of communist parties.

When Stalin launched his first 5-year plan in 1928, there were 46 communist parties in the world, with a little over a million and a half members. Forty years later, there were 87 communist parties, with close to 46 million members.

Of the approximately million and a half members in 1928, most of them were in the Soviet Union. Only 443,000 communists registered in 45 parties throughout the world. Even so, they represented 27 percent of the world communist movement.

Today, almost 95 percent of the world communists are in the 14 communist states, and only about 5 percent, or 2.6 million, in the rest of the world.

Let me point out the strength of the nonruling communist parties. The bulk of these nonruling communists has always been in Western Europe. Since communism prior to WWII was associated primarily with a proletarian movement, with a class struggle, Europe, the developed area of the world, encompassed the bulk of the members of the movement.

The greatest gains in communist strength were achieved after World War II. In 1947 Western Europe registered almost 4 million communists. Since then, the trend has been on the down side. The same trend prevailed in the Near East, South America, and Africa. The only place where there was a reversal in this trend, namely, an increase, was in Asia.

Although the general trend of communist strength in the nonruling party states has been down, territorial acquisition by Soviet power and the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence has been up. Let me illustrate that again by a slide, which shows the communist expansion since 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may intervene at that point, Doctor, go back to the slide previously showing the communist party membership in Red China.

Mr. TOMA. In Red China, in 1939, it was very minimal. About that time, China had in the neighborhood of twenty to sixty thousand members.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go back to the slide showing the membership.

Mr. TOMA. This is the territorial expansion of communism since 1939.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you get that figure? Do you get that from Chinese estimation?

Mr. TOMA. These are estimates. The Chinese Communist Party, of course, published some of its records, including the party strength, which was made available, but the most reliable source is the publication of the party strengths by the Comintern, the Communist International, which was established in 1919, and which published some of its records during the party congresses. In some cases these figures were simply estimates, and in others they were accurate reflections of party membership.

So when we turn to the slide showing communist expansion since 1939, we can observe that during the war years the Soviet Union incorporated quite a bit of territory and population.

I have enumerated 10 items, starting with sections of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Baltic States, part of East Prussia, Poland, and eastern Czechoslovakia, also eastern Poland, part of Finland, then Tannu Tuva in Asia, and the former Japanese possessions.

We can also notice a drastic change after World War II, which is the establishment of the communist regimes, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in other parts of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, I am rather interested in No. 10, Japanese possessions, for 1945, 17,800 square miles. We are now involved in the process of negotiations leading toward the restoration of Okinawa to the rule of Japan. Are there any negotiations, to your knowledge,

going on between Russia and Japan as to the restoration of those former possessions?

Mr. TOMA. To my knowledge, parts of the former Japanese territory are not significant to the Japanese economic interests; however, they do have a military importance, but Japan at this time is not interested in restoring her military might. Consequently, Japan appears to be more interested in Okinawa than the northern islands that were occupied by the Soviet Union. These are barren islands with very limited populations, of no visible economic value other than fisheries.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they off the eastern coast of Russia?

Mr. TOMA. Yes, indeed, they are.

The next point I want to make is that Eastern Europe, before anything else, is part of the Soviet empire. Therefore, communist doctrine in Eastern Europe, or the Eastern European countries, is identical with the communist doctrine of the Soviet Union.

This doctrine is a perversion of Marxist ideas by such leaders as Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Therefore, communist ideology became a symbolic means of communication among the members of the international proletarian movement, and as such it was dynamic enough to accommodate new realities based upon old myths, which very often appeared to be contradictions in values.

There is another underlying assumption, that if communist parties in Eastern Europe play roles influenced by their national history, they also play roles that are communist.

Later on, if you are interested, I may very well explain the intricacies and complexities of what communism as an ideology means today.

The communist role is exhibited in terms of the position the party occupies or the role the party plays in the society, which must go unchallenged.

Furthermore, there is an unwritten law that the governments of these one-party states must belong to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, or the Warsaw Pact, and that their foreign policy must be coordinated under Soviet domination.

Thus, the Soviet Union imposes its limitations and restrictions which, despite the national characteristics or differences of these Eastern European countries, labels them communist.

What is tolerated by the Soviet Union under its domination includes, first of all, the party's mode of coming into power. In some cases it was strictly military intervention by the Soviet power. In other cases it was a peaceful transition, such as in Czechoslovakia, and in still other cases it was a combination of civil war with guerrilla warfare during and immediately following WWII.

A second variation that the Soviets permit or tolerate is the individual country's political and economic heritage.

Here it is important to keep in mind that the actions by Nazi Germany enabled the communist elites to mobilize their societies towards utopian and maintenance goals. These variations encouraged from the very beginning, in my opinion, diverse developments in Eastern Europe. Thus we speak of a heritage of diversity ever since World War II. Although all communist systems in Eastern Europe professed to have one identical objective with that of the Soviet Union, namely, to create a new socialist man, today there are greater differences among the communist systems than 18 years ago, when Stalin died.

This raises a basic question: How do communist systems change, and why do they change?

There are many theories and paradigms dealing with this issue, which many of us think is the key issue for understanding communism in Eastern Europe.

I personally subscribe to the following theory: I start with the assumption that the communist party newly in power adopts a transfer culture, a transfer culture that approximates the process of developments setting up two types of goals, first, the utopian goals which reflect the ambitions and the teachings of the international communist movement, with the final aim of establishing the classless society, Paradise on earth, with perfect equality, justice for all and, secondly, the intermediary or immediate goals, which encompass such prerequisites as the preservation of communist power, the maintenance of the system established by this power, or the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the elimination of the enemy classes.

The basic requirements for this goal achievement are the mobilization of the toilers. The result of which is totalitarianism crowned by a trinity of despotism, terror, and utopia. This is what we have seen in the process of sovietization or Stalinization in Eastern Europe since 1944, or in some cases as late as 1948.

Since not all communist regimes came to power under uniform rules and not all systems inherited the same type of political and economic development, there is a diverse effect on the process of development in these Eastern European countries, which is justified under the status of nation-states, or people's democracies, with independent, namely, national roles of development.

Once terror began to decline, at different times in different countries, the parties lost in their importance, the dictators were absorbed into elites, the populations were provided with increased material incentives, namely, more consumer goods, and political socialization was extended to a larger stratum.

The regimes now needed the loyalty and support of the masses to make the new system of economic efficiency work. Consequently, the de-Stalinizing regimes of Eastern Europe appealed to national feelings, promised greater material rewards, an increase in the living standards, made concessions in the field of individual rights, offered greater freedom of expression and travel, and permitted more non-party people to take part in the political process.

However, as I mentioned earlier, the limits were always present. The party dictatorship had to be maintained, and the system as identified within the limits of this dictatorship had to be observed.

Ever since social mobilization came into being in Eastern Europe, there has been an expansion of the relevant stratum of the population which has brought about mounting pressures for economic and political changes.

Since the regimes want to modernize without pluralization, and the people desire modernization without totalitarianism, political tension between the two groups has become unavoidable.

Similarly, it can be hypothesized that the greater the success of modernization without totalitarianism in an Eastern European country, the greater the likelihood of Soviet intervention. Thus, it is possible that there is a designated, established limit by the ruling elites

for modernization with pluralization beyond which a Soviet satellite cannot venture.

The character and extent of Soviet domination in communist Eastern Europe vary according to pressures exerted on the Kremlin by domestic issues or by relations with the United States and China.

In the international system, as I explained earlier, the other major power, besides the United States—and the closest potential competitor or enemy in ideological and other terms—is China.

From the tragic experience of Hungary in 1956, it is evident that the Soviet Union could tolerate an independent road in domestic, but not in foreign, affairs.

Judging from the Czechoslovak experience in 1968, we have learned that the limits imposed by the Soviet Union upon her satellites include the maintenance of the Leninist party structure and the role it plays in the society.

Romania respected both and, therefore, she seemed to have carried enough credibility with the Kremlin and was able to survive the independent road she has followed since about 1965.

Whether or not the Soviet Union will tolerate future liberal trends in an Eastern European satellite will depend on many factors, such as the available restraints, other problems the Soviet Union is facing, and the possible reactions inside the Soviet Union, reactions in other satellites, and in the United States.

Each case is different and therefore must be judged on its own merits. The limits of Soviet toleration of any independence in Eastern Europe must, therefore, also be found in the peculiar situation of each state in relation to a given phase of the international political system, for example, East-West relations and the world communist movement.

In 1965 and 1966 the Vietnam war and French opposition to NATO enabled the Soviet Union to launch a diplomatic offensive against the West. In 1967 and 1968, however, the West German effort to initiate a more active detente and the "Spring of Prague" in 1968 were pushing the Soviet Union to a defensive. Consequently, by 1970, the Soviet offensive was revived on the basis: "What is mine is mine—what is yours is negotiable." The basic guideline for this Soviet tactic is the old Roman maxim, "Divide and conquer."

Thus, we must recognize the dynamism of Soviet foreign policy. It is no longer the clumsy monolithic, outspoken, revolutionary force with one center trying to operate only in a clandestine manner. Soviet foreign policy is very skillful in using the United States simultaneously as friend and foe.

Therefore, it seems to me that our policy towards Eastern Europe, which can be summarized in a maxim, "As long as Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe does not appear to be a threat to Western Europe, a policy of spheres of influence will be tolerated" is antiquated and inadequate for a superpower.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. TOMA. It seems to me that this policy, although it is a conservative and useful policy from a distance, is not adequate, because if there is no overt military threat to Western Europe, let's say by the Warsaw Pact forces, it does not mean that there is no threat to Western Europe or, for that matter, the United States, at all.

The simplistic question, whether there is a military threat to Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact forces, can be answered with a resounding "No." However, there is a continuous threat of Soviet military power, which can be demonstrated by some slides I have. While the United States and other Western Powers are engrossed in a detente, the Soviet Union has gradually built up its military might throughout the world.

During the latter part of the 1960's, the Soviets had undertaken a broad range of military activities in many of the less developed areas of the free world. Soviet military aid in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia outnumbered U.S. military aid by 3 to 1.

As you can see from this illustration, the Soviet Union is very much interested in economic penetration into Western Europe, primarily in such areas where gas and oil exports are feasible. This covers practically all of Western Europe, from the northern tier of Finland through Sweden, all the way down to Italy and Greece, including Spain.

In the Middle East, 50 years ago the Soviet Union barely had a foothold. Today, growing Soviet influence can be seen from Morocco in the west to the republics at the southern tip of the African Peninsula. Five of the radical Arab states are almost entirely equipped with Soviet weapons, U.A.R. [United Arab Republic], Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and north Yemen.

Knowing that communist parties are outlawed in most Arab countries, obviously, it is not communist ideology, but military and economic power that the Soviets are selling to the Arabs. In addition to military aid, the Soviets have also extended economic and trade on a massive scale over the past 2 years.

(At this point Mr. Schmitz entered the hearing room.)

Mr. TOMA. The Soviets claim their technical and economic aid is aimed first and foremost at developing the key branches of the foreign economies; namely, iron and steel, chemical energy, and construction industries.

In Africa, the major thrust is, of course, oil exploration, and in North Africa the establishment of several Soviet military outposts, the buildup of Soviet military power in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

As far as economic penetration is concerned, in the Middle East the Russians are engaged in drilling for crude oil in Egypt, in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Iran, and South Yemen.

Soviet oil exploration pacts have been signed with numerous countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Brazil, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Syria, Iraq, India, Tanzania, and South Yemen. In addition to those countries already mentioned, Russian military and economic aid has been extended to Nigeria, Somalia, Chad, Nepal, Burma, Sudan, Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Guinea.

Perhaps one additional factor should be mentioned here in terms of Soviet penetration. One thing the Soviet Union wants most today is to reopen the Suez Canal, to relieve the burden its closure has imposed on Soviet Far East trade, and to enable her to facilitate her contracts with the 41 countries to whom she has made overtures. This trend of Soviet influence in the noncommunist world is the outcome of long-standing programs of military buildup, primarily naval, that have now begun to have an international impact.

Again let me emphasize that it is not Marxism-Leninism, but Soviet weapons, tools, and machinery, as well as Soviet know-how that appeal to the recipient countries in the less developed areas of the world, and the business opportunities that appeal to the developed countries of Europe.

Let me make a final observation: that the Soviets have reached a state of strategic nuclear parity with the United States, which enables them to make new probes, to expand Soviet political, economic, and military influence all over the world, with one specific objective in mind, to weaken the position of its competitor, the other superpower, the United States.

Thus, negotiation must be considered as only one of the many weapons Soviets are using in these probes. The Soviets seem to believe that they can achieve their objectives without risking a nuclear war with the United States and therefore they have decided to revive the diplomatic offensive against the United States. There is, of course, a danger that an exclusive dialogue with the Russians could lead to consolidation of Soviet power and also to the betrayal of both the peoples and the governments of Eastern Europe.

One of the greatest obstacles to any improved relations in Europe is, of course, the Brezhnev doctrine, the doctrine which imposes restrictions on the basis of class struggle, the laws of class struggle, which are superior to the laws and legal norms of the state. But, for that matter, this is nothing new, because from the very beginning of the communist movement the laws of class struggle were always superior to the norms of the nation-state. As a matter of fact, law according to the Soviet concept, is always in the service of the class in power.

Let me also mention that it would be in the interests of all noncommunist nations, especially the United States, to make the renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine by the Kremlin a precondition to any East-West detente.

If there is a genuine interest in negotiations for peace, for better relations, then the conditions for such an improved environment must be shown also in practice, and, I think, the Brezhnev doctrine does not create such an environment. Thus I believe it would be appropriate for the Western Powers to require a denunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine.

In conclusion, let me say that I personally subscribe to the idea of the "Era of Negotiations." This is an opportunity as well as a challenge for all of us. This is consistent with American foreign policy ever since its inception, and therefore the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the Soviet Union rather than the West.

Let the Soviet Union show its good will by permitting the East European countries to turn from a vassal to a client status. The United States is willing to go more than halfway to meet this challenge of detente in Europe and elsewhere. The next move is up to the Kremlin.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Dr. Toma.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Let me ask you one question.

One great mystery to the Western World is: Who is going to take over after Brezhnev and Kosygin pass away? Both of them are among the last of the old revolutionaries, and this always seems to be a great mystery to the Western World. If I understand it, one of the glaring

weaknesses of the Soviet system is that they have not worked out any orderly methods of succession.

Has the Soviet Union been looking into this matter, to your knowledge, recently? Have they devised any ways of transferring power?

Mr. TOMA. To my knowledge, there is no orderly procedure for transition or succession to power. Therefore, it is still part of the inner workings of the struggle for power within the ruling elite. Speculations as to future leaders vary from people such as Shelepin and Kirilenko to Mazurov and Voronov.

On the other hand, there seems to be a consensus among scholars in this field that Brezhnev for the time being will continue as the party boss, and if Kosygin for some reason should be denounced for the lack of the achievement of certain objectives in the managerial area, especially economics, then perhaps a successor would be named, again from these ranks of the Politburo members; perhaps Kirilenko would be a good replacement.

There is always room for speculation on this subject. There is no way of pinpointing the future outcome of the inner workings in the Kremlin. This is as unknown to us as it is to the communists in the bloc or outside of it. Therefore, all we can do is to surmise about the situation.

It has been rumored, for example, that Kosygin is suffering from some kind of illness. My understanding is that on several occasions he submitted his resignation, which was rejected by the party, particularly by Brezhnev.

Kosygin is viewed in Eastern European countries as, strictly speaking, a cold personality of a managerial type. He lacks the charisma of a Khrushchev. The same is true with Brezhnev, the party leader, who is also viewed as an icy individual, calculating but skillful. These are typical characteristics of the new Soviet citizens, trained under Stalinism, who now enjoy leadership positions in the party or the government.

Again, if I may be repetitious, I would like to remind this distinguished committee that the primary objective of the Soviet Union, ever since its establishment, was to build up Soviet power; and, consequently, ideology was used only as a tool for achieving this objective. Where this power is most pronounced, today, is in the military area.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I have often marveled at. I marvel at the fact that the military has not played even a greater part in succession. I realize the party keeps a pretty tight control over the military, but that power must be pretty well dispersed among the party members, among the decentralized power in the military, or it would be playing a great part, where you don't have any orderly machinery set up for succession.

Mr. TOMA. I think you have already alluded to the fact that in terms of the party dictatorship every organized, stratified unit in the society is under party control. It cannot be any other way. This is the Leninist principle, which, to a great extent, is different from Marxism.

The whole success of Soviet power seems to rest with Leninism, and for this reason alone it would be a mistake for us to assume that any effort of pluralization of the Soviet society will automatically lead to a military succession of power, or a military dictatorship.

This is unlikely for the simple reason that party control of the military is overwhelming. The party has honeycombed every layer of the military establishment. Not only with the youth organization and party members, but also with military organizations controlled by the party secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I apologize for coming late.

Perhaps this was covered earlier. I did not get Dr. Toma's background.

Mr. TOMA. I am a university professor from Arizona. My specialization is political science, with an area interest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Presently I am at the National War College, on leave from the University of Arizona.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Thank you very much.

Let me comment, in phrasing a question here, that in my observation as to those who study communism, or the Soviet Union in particular, there seem to be two general schools of thought regarding the relationship of the ideology versus the power.

One group perhaps best is characterized by Dr. Fred Schwartz, who says they really believe their ideology, and all else follows upon belief in their ideology. The other school of thought seems to feel that the ideology is used as a mask or a facade, or I think you used the term a "tool" of traditional power play. Apparently in your study you would align yourself with the second group that feels that their ideology is only used to the extent that it is a useful tool.

Mr. TOMA. Yes. Today Soviet communism is quite different from what it was 54, or even 24, years ago. It is not a Marxist, but a Soviet Russian philosophy. It is not a secular religion with a scripture that only the Russian elite is qualified to interpret, but it is a myth keeping the Soviet dictators in power and forcing their captives to pay lip-service to it.

Soviet communism is not a monolithic world revolutionary movement, but a polycentric one with different goals and different means of operation. The Soviet Union is not a model multinational socialist state on which the future world union of Soviet socialist nations will develop.

To understand the process of development and the role of ideology in the Soviet Union, one has to go back to the early days of the establishment of the Soviet state.

Let me explain what Soviet communism is by surveying the changes in Soviet ideology and the manifestations of Soviet power in both the Soviet Union and in the areas of Soviet hegemony.

When the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917, communists everywhere followed a belief system called Marxism-Leninism, which went like this: Man is a greedy, jealous, social animal, accumulating wealth and exploiting others. Men are not created equal. Therefore, only political institutions controlling the economic mode of production can guarantee equality to all men.

Under capitalism, they asserted, the control of the economic mode of production is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, its ownership class, which derives its main livelihood from surplus value, that is rent, profits, or interest. The other class, the proletariat, derives its main livelihood from the sale of its labor. Thus, the injustice which exists in

capitalism is the exploitation of the labor class by the ownership class. In other words, the proletariat is not fully compensated for its labor.

As a result, the two class interests cannot be mediated or pacified, because they represent a class struggle for life and death. In ancient times, this struggle existed between the master and the slave, in the Middle Ages between the landlord and the serf, and in the industrial era between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The only way to eliminate this injustice of exploitation was to abolish surplus value, that is, profitmaking, or, in other words, private ownership of production. Since the bourgeoisie was unwilling to give up the ownership voluntarily, the formula was a revolutionary one, which begins with the concept of capitalistic degeneration. Because of profit motive, the argument goes, capitalism will degenerate and fall of its own weight. The capitalists are their own gravediggers. This was the epigram devised by Marx himself.

Competition leads to the development of cartels, monopolies, and, finally, world imperialism—the search for new market places. Competition is intensified and, as a result, there is a rise in unemployment, strikes, demonstrations, and other manifestations of social disorder, which brings about a world revolutionary situation.

Since the bourgeois class is much smaller than the world proletariat, it is only a question of organization in order to tip the scales in favor of the working class.

That time, according to this philosophy, is ripe when the bourgeoisie engages in imperialistic wars. It is then that the international proletariat, equipped with arms and in uniforms of national armies, will turn their bayonets against their own exploiters instead of their comrades and, through a world revolution, will establish the dictatorship of the world proletariat.

It was this Marxist philosophy that Lenin rewrote to fit the Russian conditions around World War I. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was fought in the name of Karl Marx and his world revolution.

Because Marx's prophecy of world revolution never materialized, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev augmented Marx's ideas so as to resemble more and more Soviet and less and less Marx's realities.

All of this was done, of course, under the label of creative Marxism, which means that the changing forces of contradiction must be every so often identified and a new strategy and tactics designated for charting the course to success for communism. Thus, Lenin revised Marxism, Stalin changed Leninism, Khrushchev changed Stalinism, and now Brezhnev, of course, is changing Khrushchevism.

The question is: What are some of these changes? The Marxist concept of one world revolution, which failed to materialize after World War I, was replaced with the concept of protracted revolution, and consequently the prerequisite for such revolution is the vanguard of the proletariat. In other words, according to Lenin and his followers, there was no equality among the proletariat. The masses of the working class had to be led by an elite. That elite, of course, was the communist party.

Another change, involving a rationalization, was the concept of socialism in one country. Since the revolutionary attempts failed everywhere except in Russia, Stalin had to rationalize that socialism

is also possible in one country, regardless of what happens to the rest of the world.

One rationalization led to another, and so Stalin prophesied the inevitability of world communism through a long, protracted process of revolutions which would eventually shift the balance of power from capitalist encirclement over socialism to socialist encirclement of capitalism.

To this end, the Soviet Union would enforce the rule of proletarian internationalism. That is to say the first obligation of every true internationalist is to support the Soviet Union in its policies, to promote revolutionary efforts wherever possible, and at the same time adhere to the concept of peaceful coexistence, which meant, under Stalin, a period of respite in a cycle from war to revolution, depression, fascism, and then again war, revolution, and so on, until such time that the balance of power had shifted in favor of the world communist movement.

What changed this great utopianism is actually the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and their delivery system. Thus, world war, as a continuation of policy to weaken the world capitalist system and thus to strengthen the communist system, had become obsolete, because it also involved the possibility of annihilation of mankind or, in other words, no final victory for communism.

Therefore, Khrushchev changed the concept of violent revolution to peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, as a period of respite between wars, to competitive coexistence, and the inevitability of world communism to communist development only as a possibility.

Khrushchev also changed the concept of labor value. Since most of the wealth now is achieved by brain and automation, and not by brawn and shovel, Khrushchev further reduced the significance of the old idol, the manual laborer, the proletarian.

Because Khrushchev's de-Stalinization process set in motion demands for further liberalization, Khrushchev lost his power in 1964, and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, put a stop to further liberalization by invoking the hard line. The hard line is, of course, the Brezhnev doctrine.

As I have already pointed out, ideology in the Soviet Union is a useful tool of communication which is used by the leaders to set the norms and rules by which the Soviet citizen must live.

Ideology in Russia started out with Marxist norms, which were gradually replaced by Leninist, Stalinist, Khrushchevist, and now Brezhnevist. Therefore, it may be argued that true Marxism in Soviet Russia never existed.

For this reason the national interests of the 14 communist states in the world today find no concurrence with the ideological norms expressed by the Kremlin alone. The more ideologically oriented the Russian leaders become, the greater become the ideological differences between the Russian and non-Russian communists.

This is well reflected in the present makeup of the world communist party organizations. All of them, as I mentioned before, are realigned in at least three major categories: the pro-Chinese, the independent, or the neutral faction.

I am sorry I took up so much time to answer your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman have any further questions?
The gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you.

Dr. Toma, recently we have been seeing the developments in Poland, which have been described as the first consumers' revolt in the Eastern European countries. There, the revolt was triggered not so much by students and intellectuals as by the workingman, who just said, "I have had it." They have actually obtained some benefits from the revolts. The price increases have been rescinded, and so forth. Gierek is trying to steer a middle line between the hardliners on his right and the pressure from the consumers.

Do you foresee at all that Poland might move into more of a Yugoslavian situation?

One thing about the Poles, and the difference from the Czechs that we hear, is that the Poles are extremely nationalistic and they will fight if the Russians bring troops in there, while the Czechs would not.

Do you foresee that their actions may add a different type of country to Eastern Europe?

Mr. TOMA. Congressman Preyer, there are several questions in your statement. Let me answer them one by one.

First about the Polish upheavals of December-January, and I doubt that we have seen the last of them, this is a continuous process reflecting the dissatisfaction in the societies under the communist party rule. The dissatisfaction is, first of all, with the lack of achievements under socialism.

I think it is very important to remember that the movement which led to the establishment of the so-called socialist states of Eastern Europe was supported by many workers who for logical reasons felt that this was a state created for their benefit, that this was a state which would soon bring about justice and equality for all and the betterment of the working class. Now, after so many years, since World War II, these workers are still asking the question, "When?" And this is the core of the problem in Poland—a problem of making good the promises made during the early utopian years. The party elite is still trying to sell utopia to the workers.

As I pointed out, after the takeover of power by the party, the dictatorship advances two goals: the utopian goal and the immediate goal of making the transition towards the new system workable.

However, socialist utopianism cannot be postponed forever, and consequently, after the early mobilization period, which involves putting to work every man, woman, and child for achieving an increased total economic output, the demands for the fulfillment of promises must be reckoned with by the dictatorship.

While the expectations of the workers are increasing, the ability of the elite to keep these promises is decreasing. The communist prophecy that capitalism will deteriorate, that it will fall of its own weight, through hunger and depression, has not come true.

Instead of disintegration, we have seen an integration, a revitalization of capitalism in Western Europe, and due to the impact of communication technology, people in Eastern Europe could not continue to be kept in the dark. The Iron Curtain has melted down and the information about the achievements in the West has penetrated behind the former Iron Curtain. Consequently, the workers, who supposedly

became the backbone of the new society, kept asking the question, "When will our lot improve?"

In Poland, you had a change in the early days after Stalin's death in 1953 and again in 1956. In 1956 one of the victims of Stalinism was brought back to power, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka. He made more promises than changes. He fulfilled some of the promises, which helped to alleviate some early tensions, but it was only a short-term achievement, because Gomulka himself, after he usurped the power through the mandate of the discontented workers, failed to fulfill the expectations of the workers later on.

After 15 years of disenchantment, the Poles in the areas of industrial development, formerly a German territory which is now settled by many Poles belonging to the party and whose history, background, and character are not tarnished by the ideological accusations of the bourgeois class, kept demanding improvements there.

Thus what we have seen in Szczecin [Stettin] and Gdynia last December was really a showdown within the party. It was sporadic, to some extent. It was not spontaneous throughout Poland, because this was the area first affected by the economic mismanagement of the party.

Poland, under Gomulka, neglected to make the changes that were promised in 1956. By 1970 and 1971 the events caught up with Gomulka, and since there is an unwritten law among the communist elites that they are responsible for the management of the society, and hence vulnerable to purges, Gomulka knew that the upshot of the events of 1970 and early 1971 would lead to his downfall.

So what we have seen here is a typical example of workers' ambitions first raised through ideological pronouncements and then frustrated through every day's realities of failure.

In December 1970 there were many young Polish workers, not intellectuals, not scientists, but skilled and unskilled workers, who dared to oppose, who dared to demonstrate, and even to burn down the headquarters of the party as a sign of their frustration.

The question of military intervention in Poland or, for that matter, elsewhere, is a very, very sensitive area for Soviet foreign policy. I think that the Soviets will use it only as a final resort.

As it was demonstrated in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Hungary, and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, military power is always available, and the Soviets will not hesitate to use it. The Soviets will publicize their military determination, directly or indirectly, so that everybody is aware of it. The use of Soviet military power is not a new phenomenon.

Only to us it comes as a shock when the Soviets use force, because of our expectations, especially during the 1960's when we thought that under Khrushchev we had reached some sort of a gentleman's agreement with the Soviet Union, especially on the issue of war due to the development of the thermonuclear weapons and the consequences of a possible annihilation of mankind.

It was our idealism that let us believe that the Soviet Union will behave more in a gentlemanly manner, which is not the case. Therefore, I would urge all of us to become more realistic about the limits imposed upon states that are in alliance with the Soviet Union, especially the states linked to the Soviet Union on an ideological basis such as the Eastern European countries.

Mr. PREYER. I would agree with you that, in the last resort, the Soviets will use armed force to keep Poland under control. They are just not going to let Poland go.

I think our idealism should be tempered also with the understanding that the consumer revolt in Poland, as the revolt in Czechoslovakia, is not a pro-American revolt. When you travel in Eastern Europe, you don't find any of those countries that want to be like America.

They, as you indicated, want to retain their socialist goals, but they don't want Russia to run them. They want to be like Yugoslavia.

This is going to be a terrific fight, I think, if the Russians try to occupy Poland, because the Poles are tough and their feelings are strong, as indicated by hanging 10 or 12 policemen during this uprising. They are tough.

Let me just ask you one other question, which is related to what you have been saying.

We heard it said that the only hope for these Eastern European countries comes from Russia, that Russia may moderate her attitude toward these countries and release them to some extent, that really there is not much we can do, other than through liberalizing the trade and something of that sort, perhaps, but their real hope is to look to Russia.

Do you agree with that, or do you think that there is anything this country could be doing as far as its relations to Eastern Europe go?

Mr. TOMA. Yes. First of all, Congressman Preyer, I agree with your statement that it will depend primarily upon the Soviet Union to what extent Eastern European countries will become more and more independent, will be able to satisfy their own needs, demands, and also their own destiny.

At the same time, I also feel that it depends on the United States and other major powers, especially European powers, to what extent this leverage of political manipulation can be utilized by the individual countries of Eastern Europe to gain their objectives. Consequently, I would urge our policymakers to take a more positive view, not to neglect the role that a superpower has to maintain anywhere in the world, including Eastern Europe.

What options we can exercise will depend upon the situation. We have been successful during the last few years to enable countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania to follow a line of independence. It came as a great encouragement to the two countries. Unfortunately, this was not the case with Czechoslovakia.

Let me just add a footnote to your statement by arguing the point that the United States interests in Eastern Europe have never been identified with interests of direct involvement. On the other hand, I would like to mention the event that happened during the crisis of 1968, when the Soviet delegate to the U.N. made an assertion that there is an understanding between the two superpowers about the spheres of influence and that Eastern Europe is clearly in the Soviet's sphere of influence, and therefore we must follow a hands-off policy in that area.

This, of course, was denied by the former Secretary of State, and I think it is very important to make it clear again and again that there is no such agreement, there has never been such an agreement in the past, and therefore our policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe is one of sup-

porting independence, freedom of development, and the achievement of the national interests of the individual Eastern European countries. We are not to hinder the development of this objective, and we are not interested in creating problems there, because these problems may spread like fire all over Europe.

Therefore, we must emphasize a point, that we are interested in the peaceful development and the independent role of these countries and that our interests are tied to a client relationship with Eastern European countries, where it involves cultural and economic relations. We must never take the stand that Eastern Europe is outside our interests.

Mr. PREYER. I think that is a good statement of the delicate balance we must have there, because we can understand that the countries of Eastern Europe are vitally important to the Soviet Union, at least they feel that they are, because they are all plains, flat countries, and historically every military invasion that rolled went through those flat countries, Poland into Russia. So they regard it as strategically vital to them to keep them, just as we would regard it as entirely inimical for a foreign power to move into Cuba. So we do have to recognize a certain interest there, but at the same time try to support any moves toward flexibility in these countries in any Yugoslavization.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Toma, for your presentation. In view of your truly comprehensive knowledge of the entire background of world communism, and your particular knowledge of the eight satellites or states of Eastern Europe, I wonder would you give us some wisdom of what you think is happening in the communist parties outside Russia and the satellites. In other words, in your opinion, particularly in the United States, how do you think that our policy should react to communist activity, particularly in the United States? Do you feel that American policy in this regard at this time is satisfactory, or not?

Mr. TOMA. To be candid with you, Congressman Drinan, I don't follow very closely the American policy with regard to the American communist movement.

I am concerned with the domestic scene that perhaps reflects on this problem, or is part of this problem, and I would like to answer it in the following way. We are dedicated to the principles of freedom and democracy, justice, and the goals of attaining the highest value of the individual in the society. Within this framework, I think it is appropriate to raise certain questions pertaining to the safety of these values of the individual in the society as the developments have indicated during the last 5 years.

There is a tremendous pressure on the individual who tries to follow the traditional values of individualism, individual freedom, that is, noninvolvement, not as a sign of apathy, but rather as a manifestation of the fulfillment of his own desires and aspirations within the heritage of the American culture.

This has been the case in all instances where the situation has become polarized, including party politics. We have lost a great deal of credibility in terms of our institutions, vis-a-vis the acceptance of the wisdom and judgment of the representatives in our political institutions, whether it involves Congress, the executive, or the judiciary. We have seen turmoil on the streets, upheavals on the campuses, and the rest.

There are some oversimplifications about these problems by those who are ignorant or naive about the situation and therefore see it only in two dimensions, black and white.

My feeling is that the elements working against the interests of the American heritage, the freedoms I have alluded to, especially of the individual, the respect towards the institutions, this threat, whether it associated with communism or not, and, consequently, the problem is whether it stems from a source of communist ideologists in the United States who may be loyal to the Kremlin, or somebody who considers himself a loyal American and is trying to destroy the vestiges of this heritage through other revolutionary ideas, and therefore what I see is a correlation between the two. The problem, as I see it, is not one of labeling, but a problem of maintaining the wisdom, security, and progress of our country.

Unfortunately, it has happened very often that irresponsible elements in our society, unknowingly, have become prey to the various interests of the clandestine movements that can be identified also with the communist movement. Whether it is the extreme on the left or right, the efforts to weaken the vestiges of the American heritage are dangerous and, consequently, a threat.

So to answer your question, Congressman Drinan, in a simple way, I see a threat, a threat that does not stem from one source only, but I see a threat to our heritage from many sources, whether they are associated with communism or not, and, consequently, the problem is much broader and it has to be phrased within a larger scope: What are the immediate threats to our aspirations, to our values, to our future from within, and what is the impact of communism on this movement?

Mr. DRINAN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Do you have further questions, the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. DRINAN. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, I am sure you have some more questions.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have just a few questions.

Dr. Toma, we have had some defectors from various countries, and those we had last year from Russia and this year from East Berlin have told us about the lack of consumer goods.

Has Russia attempted to impose a form of division of labor upon these Eastern European countries to specialize in the production, and, if so, how effective has this been?

As I mentioned, the defectors that we have had have noted a great lack of quantity, quality, and availability of goods.

Mr. TOMA. I think to answer this question, we must first of all think of the socialist principle of the division of labor. It goes back to the early days of the utilization of manpower, the socialist aspirations and goals. Let me just mention very briefly, the Soviet Union never sought a consumer economy. Since 1918 the proportion of Soviet industrial investment in producer-goods and consumer-goods industries is as follows: The producer goods were 88.3 percent from 1918 to 1958; from 1959 to 1964, 86.9 percent; from 1966 to 1970, 88.1 percent. Consumer goods, on the other hand, remained static: 1.7 percent from 1918 to 1958; 13.1 percent from 1959 to 1964, which reflects to some extent the liberalization period under Khrushchev; and from 1966 to 1970, back to 11.9 percent.

So, as you can see, the Soviet Union was always interested in keeping a control over the consumer production, to allow only small and gradual improvement.

With reference to the Soviet Union, we can generalize that from the time of the Bolshevik revolution there has been a steady, gradual, but very slow improvement in the standard of living, with some interruptions during the early 1920's and the war period. Nevertheless, it is not a consumer-oriented state. Neither are the satellites of Eastern Europe.

When the Comecon was created, the purpose of the Comecon was to bring about a larger division of labor within the orbit or the bloc. Consequently, states like Bulgaria and, by the way, Romania were told from the very beginning to become garden states of the Comecon area.

This, of course, was met with opposition from the Romanian leaders, and consequently, after Stalin, while the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries began to de-Stalinize, Romania just started to Stalinize, namely, placing greater emphasis on heavy industry, which was denied to them by the Russians and tightening party controls over the society. So that we have a reversal in trends here.

Again, the consumer-goods industry suffered greatly. It suffered more in Eastern Europe because there the consumer goods were more readily available before communist takeover. There was a larger consumer type of market orientation before the war, and this was still remembered by most of the people living in that area. Therefore, the frustrations in Eastern Europe are much greater today than in the Soviet Union.

Actually we can speak of a paradox here. In the Soviet Union consumer goods have been on an increase and therefore the standard of living has been gradually improving. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe the consumer has suffered tremendously because of ideology. Yet those who dare to express their views on the subject or even take more drastic measures such as demonstrations, combined with violence, are the rank-and-file party members, especially the younger ones.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is not Russia sitting on a tinderbox, hoping for betterment? Is this not a very explosive situation?

Mr. TOMA. Yes, it is; and therefore, I think, to understand the sensitivity of the problem, one must raise this question: How much freedom of economic reforms will the Soviet Union permit in Eastern European countries?

There is a natural demand, the demand or desire on the part of the party elites, the managers of the societies of Eastern Europe, for their own survival, to bring about improvements so that they can stay in power.

These elites have two loyalties, one to the Kremlin that is pressuring them for certain policies that are inconsistent with the demands of their societies, and the other to the rank and file of the party, thus the skillful manager-politician is trying to please both. In some cases it works, in other cases it does not, and consequently this clash of loyalties produces crises. The last one, of course, was in Poland.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Does the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe have anything other than an image of brute force?

Mr. TOMA. The alienation of the Soviets started with the noncommunists at the time of the so-called liberation of Eastern European countries from nazism.

We remember the consequences of repression, persecution, plundering, rape, and so on, even in countries that were known to be allies of the Soviet Union.

Alienation was widespread, especially among the noncommunists; but at that time the Soviet Union could not care less. The Russians were going to teach the Eastern European people a lesson, and they did. They intimidated them to the extent that they broke their will and as a result many opportunists joined the communist party organizations. They were joined by many careerists and bureaucrats.

With time and experience new attitudes and relationships developed between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. and therefore a new alienation set in. Now the alienation is from those who favored the transition to a socialist system, namely, the rank and file of the communist parties.

We have seen examples of this immediately after Stalin's death. Therefore, de-Stalinization was a natural course of policy aimed at alleviating tension and pent-up emotions in Russia and in countries of Eastern Europe. It was not something desired by Khrushchev because it would please his ego; it was a response to this new alienation, which was manifested in terms of frustrations of the members of the communist parties, the rank-and-file members, many of them workers.

Again, this process is closely tied to the lack of the fulfillment of promises made by communist utopianism, especially in the economic area.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What is your feeling about the concept of the brute force, or the return to Stalinism? Do you think it is inevitable in order to keep control of the Eastern European countries?

Mr. TOMA. I think, as a last resort, brute force is the accepted formula, and it is recognized so by both the party elites and also the peoples of Eastern Europe. In other words, the club over the heads of the Eastern European countries is manifested through a distribution of Soviet forces from East Germany through Poland, Hungary, to Czechoslovakia, and as such, these units, although not visible from day to day, because they keep the Soviet contingents in remote areas and they don't mix with the population at large, are there to crush any opposition to the satellite status of these countries.

The Soviets can reinforce these units in a very short time and, consequently, be able to suppress any kind of demonstrations or rebellion in the bloc area. Thus the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe must be construed as a psychological phenomenon designed to place a certain restriction on the activities of the dissidents in Eastern European countries.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Dr. Toma.

Would you tell us, or give us some scope of the factors which led up to the satellitization of Eastern Europe? Of course, the Soviet military was one factor, but what other factors were involved, any naive approach on the existing coalition of government leaders, what actually brought it about?

Mr. TOMA. The factors of—

Mr. SCHULTZ. The factors leading up to the Soviet satellitization of Eastern Europe.

(At this point Mr. Drinan left the hearing room.)

Mr. TOMA. I don't think there is any question about the use of skillful tactics by the communists. However, the thrust of satellitization came primarily through military conquest of Eastern Europe following World War II.

In 1945, half of Europe was occupied by the Soviet Army, which also established a potential source of power for the mushrooming communist parties of Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the transition to the Stalinist system of states was primarily due to the role of the Soviet military in the occupied territories of Europe. Only in a few places, such as Yugoslavia, where the partisans fought the Nazis from the very first day, Soviet military force was of no consequence because the Yugoslavs liberated themselves.

In Czechoslovakia, in 1948, satellitization came through peaceful means—without Soviet military conquest or military intervention.

So, again, satellitization varies from country to country. Yet everywhere at one time or another the Soviet military played a role in the satellitization process.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I was just curious as to whether there was any naivete on the part of the people themselves that let their past political and social structures be broken, that worked in concert with the military structure.

I would like to ask a question concerning the treaty entered into in Czechoslovakia. I will give you a copy.

This treaty was entered into on May 6, 1970, a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia.

Perhaps it is an academic question, but I am wondering why we find the name of Brezhnev signing this treaty. What is the significance of this, when he was not in fact a member of the Government?

Mr. TOMA. First of all, the relationships between the party-states are carried out on different levels from relationships between the nation-states. In all cases where it involves the party-states, it is an agreement on both levels, party and state. Consequently, this treaty carries the signatures of both party and state leaders.

What is important here, if I may add this observation to your inquiry about the treaty, is the comparison between the Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and the treaty that was signed a little later in 1970 with Romania, which is a similar treaty. The new Romanian treaty differs very much from the one signed by Prague.

The Romanians, unlike the Czechs, have not been tinkering with their party machinery or loosening the supreme authority of the party in any way, so there are no explicit references, as they are spelled out in the treaty with the Czechs, especially in article 4, if you notice, to cooperation and direct contacts between the organs of state power and between social organizations and working people, which is a clause that gives the Russians broad powers over the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, particularly in the activities of the Ministry of the Interior and its security apparatus.

In the Romanian treaty, we don't find such a provision. The only provision in the Romanian treaty is that there will be an observance of national sovereignty and independence, equal rights, and mutual

noninterference in internal affairs and also, of course, a provision of economic cooperation, whereas with the Czechs you have almost specific involvement of economic integration and the interference, as I said, in the domestic affairs.

Also, I think that the Czechoslovaks are committed via this new treaty to assist the Soviet Union in case of aggression in other parts of the world than Europe, which is not so with the Romanians. The Romanians are specifically charged with this cooperation only in case of a so-called aggression from the NATO forces.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Is this more a directive from the Soviet Union than a treaty? It seems more one-sided.

Mr. TOMA. I think this is typical. Again, what is important to keep in mind here is that with Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have reached a new relationship in August of 1968, a relationship with a conquered nation, and therefore they were in a position to dictate their own terms. The Czechoslovaks had no leverage whatsoever when it came to the renewal of this treaty of friendship.

"Friendship." What a beautiful word.

Whereas the Romanians had enough leverage and therefore were not at the mercy of the Soviet dictum.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have one final question.

You mentioned that the Soviet Union was giving military and economic aid and providing business opportunities, but this was not necessarily identical with ideological beliefs, or that ideology was second.

My question is this: Would they provide military or economic aid to any country which did not accept some ideological direction?

Mr. TOMA. Yes, indeed. This is normal behavior for Soviet foreign policy with regard to the Arab countries.

The Arab countries have outlawed the communist parties very early after the war. The communists have made several efforts to organize themselves, but they have never succeeded—not before or after the Soviet penetration into the Middle East.

Mr. SCHULTZ. When you say "outlawed," do you mean literally outlawed?

Mr. TOMA. Literally outlawed, yes.

On the other hand, and this is something we must keep in mind, let's not search for ideological formulas or some sort of magic in the labels of ideology. The Kremlin could not care less whether their allies in the Middle East accept the doctrines of so-called Marxism-Leninism or reject it, as long as they are allies and contribute to the weakening position of the Soviet's archenemy, the United States. Just to take away the potential allies from the United States is an accomplishment in itself.

Therefore, we must not expect Soviet foreign policy to work in the old-fashioned way of selling ideology, of trying to convert people to create a class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeois class, or of trying to bring about a world revolution that Marx was dreaming about. That is old stuff.

The Soviet policymaker today is a skillful, modern, gray-flannel-suit type businessman who will travel abroad and sell his goods without ideological sales talk. He will be interested in engaging in business with any country in Western Europe or Africa, and his objective is always the national interests of the Soviet Union, which coincide with the interests known to communists as ideological ones.

Therefore, I think it would be a mistake to search for any rigid clues or codes of the dogma through which the Soviet policymakers operate. Ideology plays some role in this behavior, because present policymakers were saturated with dogma while they went through party schooling and, consequently, their thinking process reflects it to a great extent. But very few of them are believers and therefore they are much more subtle in their ideological behavior today than they were in the past. That is why I said earlier the threat, the danger, is there; it has perhaps increased rather than decreased, but in new forms.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Dr. Toma.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Doctor, for your very scholarly and informative presentation. We are truly appreciative.

May I direct the counsel, as soon as the transcript is available, to furnish me with a copy of the same.

I may have additional questions to submit in writing to you, Dr. Toma, to complete our record. I think that we should reap all of the benefits we possibly can from a scholar of Dr. Toma's standing.

I do have one additional question, Dr. Toma. I am sure that this is probably outside your area of specialization, but I also feel that the recent ascendance to power of a communist regime in Chile would be indeed fascinating to a scholar of your specialization.

Are you watching the Chilean situation very closely?

Mr. TOMA. Not very closely. I follow it with great interest. I am exposed to the information that most of us are through the media, but I have made no special effort to examine the developments in Chile.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the first time that a communist regime has ever been voted in at the ballot box; is it not?

Mr. TOMA. Not the first time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there another time that was done?

Mr. TOMA. There were a few examples of through-the-ballot-box succession to power in India, a small state called Kerala, then again in one of the smallest states in the world, San Marino, where the regimes moved from communist to noncommunist, depending on the election results.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure it would be fascinating to a scholar like you to watch the adaptation of communist ideology to the realities of actually administering the reins of government in Chile. I have heard some say this might give rise to a new brand of Marxism-Leninism.

Mr. TOMA. I would agree with this assessment. As a matter of fact, as I tried to point out in my remarks earlier, the transition to power with different national, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds is something that is acceptable to the Kremlin.

Consequently, we speak of a Cuban brand of communism from 1961 on, when Fidel Castro decided overnight, perhaps, to become a Marxist and made the declaration that he had been a Marxist all his life and that, from here on, Cuba will be a socialist state.

What is significant in the Cuban case is not so much the declaration by Fidel Castro that he is and always has been a Marxist, but the decision to ally Cuba with the Kremlin. Thus he was able to remove Cuba from one sphere of influence and place it under another—the Soviet sphere.

The same thing is true with the Arab countries. It really does not matter whether the U.A.R. has a legal communist party or not, as long as the U.A.R. is gradually becoming a vassal of the Kremlin.

Therefore, the key question is whether Chile will go as far as becoming a vassal of the Soviet Union. I think that Dr. [Salvador] Allende is trying hard to coin a Chilean brand of what he calls Marxism. Whether he will succeed in maintaining a balance and therefore nonalignment with the U.S.S.R., only time will tell.

There were similar efforts of convergence made in the past by others, including Eastern European statesmen, in Czechoslovakia from 1945 to 1948, but without success.

Efforts were made to build bridges between the East and West by a skillful politician, Dr. Eduard Benes¹, who was convinced long before the war ended that he could achieve this goal. As a matter of fact, he derived some of his experiences from the wartime alliance between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, and he thought that in Central Europe he could create bridges, but then in 1948 he discovered, of course, that it was an impossible task. It was a tragic mistake on his part and others who supported him, because it led to complete failure by February 1948. Shortly after that, the man, of course, was so affected by this defeat that mentally and emotionally it destroyed him completely. A few months after the coup he died as a broken and ill person.

Whether Allende will be more successful in this respect than Benes was, only time will tell. The question is: What are the forces in operation in Chile that he will be able to control, will he have complete control over the demands, let's say, of the radical elements that would like to see Chile associated with the Kremlin? Will he be able to satisfy the popular demands in terms of economic reforms and social improvements?

There are reports that actually in some areas he was unable to control the land distribution and that some of the peasants were aroused, which is again very similar to past experiences where the landless peasants were agitated by the communists to take possession of the land and not to wait for the regime to act.

The hungry, impatient, and ignorant peasants fall easily into a trap set by the revolutionaries, and the consequences are such that soon a revolutionary mood develops in the society which cannot be controlled, not even by a Marxist regime.

Perhaps a usurpation of power by the revolutionaries will follow. It is too early to say just what is the fate of Chile. A great deal will depend on the military.

I think that we have done the right thing, of permitting this development, because we have no claim over Chile or mandate over Chile. Chile is not our dominion and, consequently, as a sovereign nation, Chile has to follow its own destiny. Whether Chile will eventually become another satellite of the Kremlin like Cuba, only time will tell.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Doctor.

Are there any further questions of Dr. Toma?

If not, the Chair will declare the meeting adjourned until 9:30 a.m., tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, Monday, March 29, 1971, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, March 30, 1971.)

¹ President of Czechoslovakia, 1935-38, in exile 1939-45; 1946-48; died in 1948.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1971

Part 1-A

TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to recess, at 9:40 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Richard H. Ichord of Missouri, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

The committee meets today for the purpose of continuing its hearings into the practice and theory of communism, both on the domestic front and international front.

It is my understanding, Mr. Counsel, that a part of the first witness' testimony will be taken publicly and it will be necessary to take part of his testimony in executive session because of the application of rule 27 (m).

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call your first witness.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Gerard Connolly.¹

* * * * *

(At this point Mr. Drinan left the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is Dr. Walker present, Counsel?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Walker, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee. Dr. Walker is the director of the School of International Studies at the University of South Carolina. It is the understanding of the Chair that Dr. Walker does particularly specialize in the aspects of Leninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung and the Red Chinese Government.

Mr. Counsel, let me inquire of you, Will Dr. Walker be testifying strictly as an academician?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir.

¹ Mr. Connolly's testimony will be printed in part 2 of the hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure he will be testifying to facts which will assist our knowledge. I feel there is really no necessity to administer the oath. However, if a member of the committee feels it is desirable, I will proceed to administer the oath. Proceed.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, let me say I consider it a privilege and pleasure to be here with this committee. I have prepared a brief statement which I would like to read to you, and then perhaps we can explore some of the aspects of Marxism and Leninism.

When the Chinese communists celebrate the golden anniversary of the founding of their party this coming July 1, 1971, a fair number of first generation "true believers" who have played leadership roles through most of that period will be present.

Few people in the United States or in the West seem to take adequately into account the extent to which people like Mao Tse-tung, a real Stalinist, and Chou En-lai, a genuine Bolshevik, take their ideology seriously.

In a half a century they have invested a great amount of time and sacrifice, including tremendous sacrifice for their nation and people, in their religion. They are set in their ways and in their interpretations, and while some of the romantic aspects of the initial conversion may linger, there can be no gainsaying the intensity of their commitment.

As first-generation Marxist-Leninists in China, today's leaders in Peking understandably have the grandiose world view and world interpretations which colored the activities of the early days of the Comintern and their affiliation with the Moscow-led "future of humanity."

It is understandable also that they have a sense of international mission, and much of their rather heated exchange with the Soviet leaders must be understood in terms of an original act of faith which has lent a missionary ardor to their interpretation of the communist cause.

It is this ardor and the world mission which accompanies it that have led to some of the oversimplified interpretations of our complex world that have emanated from Peking since the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic more than 2 decades ago.

Whereas some of the leaders of communist parties elsewhere in the world may have waked up to the fact that Lenin was a preatomic man, Stalin was a precomputer man, and Mao is a prespace-age man, Peking still sees the world and its development in terms which belong to the bygone age of Western domination.

As Chinese and as communists, the leaders in Peking have projected their own experiences, particularly in their drive to power, as having a universal relevance for the "third world." They project their own successes in revolutionary warfare, together with their communist convictions of infallibility and inevitability, into a future in which they have their own manifest destiny.

It is in this sense that we must understand such cosmic sounding geopolitical schemes as the proposal to use the countryside of the world to surround the cities of the world.

The fervent conviction of the leaders of communist China has lent to their movement and their rule some characteristics which all too often we tend to play down in our hope that they will not be just what their words and actions make plain they are—convinced Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries who will make any sacrifice for their faith. This means sacrifice of lives, theirs and others, and national sacrifices for an international cause. As they reiterate, "We have our international duty."

It seems to me, five characteristics of the Chinese communist movement and of its leadership today must be constantly kept in mind if we are to understand the internal and foreign policies of the Mao Tse-tung rule:

First is the two-camp world view. Peking takes the Leninist dictum of the final conflict between two worlds with utmost seriousness. In this conflict, the United States must of ineluctable necessity be the enemy to be destroyed and the prime target for hate. Never in international history has such a sustained national hate campaign been pursued with such consistency and through so many channels as communist China has conducted against the United States.

Secondly, commitment to violence and war. Here, too, we find it difficult to accept the Maoists at their word. Even the Soviets and fellow communists have been dismayed at Peking's belief, expressed so frequently and fully in the past few years, that, to quote Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung, "war is a great school."

Thirdly, personality cult. Just as for almost three decades the Soviet Union could not be understood apart from the Stalin personality cult and some of the irrationalities connected with it, so too, until Chairman Mao joins his ancestors, communist China will have its ethos and its politics determined in terms of a Hunanese peasant who remains supremely ignorant of the modern world.

Fourth, the totalitarian mode. Communist China has operated as a modern totalitarian state—despite its economic backwardness. Doctrine penetrates all aspects of society; a police system predominates; rules are arbitrary and there are few restraints upon arbitrary authority; all communications and organizations are official; and the insecurities of the system lead to a constant need for enemies and pariahs, internal and external. The language of the totalitarians is emotional and frequently unrelated to reality.

Finally, there is the Chinese base. As with leaders of China in by-gone ages, the communists have to work within the framework of a number of given Chinese conditions. These include the problems of the Chinese scene—population, minorities, agrarian poverty—and the need to justify an infallible "mandate of heaven."

Even Mao Tse-tung is forced to use some of the very expressions of Confucius, the sage whose teachings he seeks to destroy.

All five of these characteristics have tended to bring the Chinese communists within the confines of an intellectual straitjacket and have prevented them from appreciating the vast changes which have been taking place in the world outside of China. They do not understand growing interdependence being a more important value for some of the leaders of the less developed countries than the autarky or self-sufficiency which they seek.

They do not appreciate that the vitality of the new Japan and of a Europe shed of its colonies has laid to rest the Leninist theory of imperialism which is one of their major intellectual stocks in trade. They cannot admit what the world has known for so long: collectivization is the worst approach to China's serious farm problem.

Thus, in many respects, because of the nature of the Chinese communist regime itself, the world has passed Mao Tse-tung by, and it is now faintly possible that as the "bright red sun of the hearts of the revolutionary people of the world," which is what Peking likes to call Mao, sets in the east, Chinese leaders will realize that they must move into the world mainstream or they will be caught, as were the last of the Manchus before them, unprepared for the new world of a new century that looms on the horizon.

This is part of the reason why Mao's last years resemble more and more a sort of combination of the last years of the Empress Dowager combined with Stalin. Surely the Chinese people deserved a fate better than this.

It seems to me, I should add a few additional points about communist power in China. These are items, and I advance a few propositions, Mr. Chairman, on which you may wish to explore a bit further with me.

Communist power in China remains one of the most disruptive forces on the world scene. Secondly, their threats against the United States must be taken seriously. In that same piece, for example, on the "Victory for People's War" that Lin Piao issued on September 30, 1965, he said:

Everything is divisible and so is this colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet. That is why the greatest fear of U.S. imperialism is that people's war will be launched in different parts of the world and particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America and why it regards people's war as a mortal danger.

A third proposition—I think it is important that we understand that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues are part of the Marxist-Leninist mode and mold. They speak a language that Moscow understands and they interpret the world and its events within a Leninist framework.

They are firmly convinced. As a fourth proposition, I would suggest that their strategy of people's wars and their training of the cadre to carry out this strategy is the correct path for the eventual destruction of the United States.

They regard the destruction of the power, the unity, the economic strength of the United States as an item of first priority. Finally, I think we should understand that as far as Peking is concerned, they do take a long view.

They are not as impatient as sometimes the Americans are and they are today training the cadres from target countries of Southeast Asia and elsewhere whom they feel they can influence toward their very formidable goals, the first of which is the destruction of the power of the United States.

Their propaganda, as one reads it—and I follow it very closely from day to day—attempts a number of items. First, to encourage the isolationism and the futilism which they perceive in the United States today.

Second, they attempt to prey upon what might be called America's undeserved guilt complex, the fact that all too frequently we tend

to blame ourselves for events around the world in which we had no part.

Thirdly, they emphasize that any of our foreign relations are, from their point of view, imperialism and the rather strident denunciations of the United States are couched in such a manner as to try to discourage any either neutral nations or our allies from supporting us or our policies too openly.

Fourthly, they have attempted and continued to attempt to prove in their propaganda that the United States (or what they call American imperialism)—our society—is corrupt, degenerate, and uncreative in many respects.

Since the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949, more than 21 years ago, we have been the enemy to be isolated and destroyed and if in any way they can participate internally in the United States through propaganda or through encouragement of disruption, this is certainly one of Peking's goals.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that is all I want to say to begin with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Walker. Your testimony and conclusions are certainly substantiated by Dr. Sitson, who recently escaped from communist China. Gentlemen of the committee, Dr. Walker has a very distinguished academic background. If there will be no objection, I will place this entire biographical sketch in the record at this point.

(The biographical sketch follows:)

RICHARD L. WALKER

Richard L. Walker is the James F. Byrnes professor of international relations and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina. Born in Bellefonte, Pa. (1922), he received his B.A. from Drew University, Certificate in Chinese Language and Area from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in Far Eastern and Russian Studies from Yale University (1947), and Ph. D. in International Relations from Yale (1950).

Professor Walker is a specialist in the history, politics, and military strategy of the Far East and has been connected with affairs in that area since World War II when he served with the U.S. Army Intelligence in the Pacific theater. He has traveled to Asia on numerous occasions to gather source materials on the present regime on the Chinese mainland, and has also acted as a Government consultant on matters relating to the Far East. He has visited in the Far East more than a dozen times since World War II, and his most recent trips (including three in 1970) have taken him to Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia.

While assistant professor of history at Yale University (1950-1957), he was visiting associate professor of history at National Taiwan University (Formosa) for a year, and in November 1957 he was a U.S. representative and State Department keynote speaker for the U.S. delegation at a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization seminar in the Philippines.

Professor Walker has been associated with the University of South Carolina since 1957 and was named to the James F. Byrnes chair in August 1959. During the academic year 1960-61 he was granted leave to serve on the faculty of The National War College and he has lectured at the Foreign Service Institute and various service schools. During the academic year 1965-1966 he was in the Far East as a Fulbright research scholar. He is a consultant and member of numerous organizations concerned with world affairs and foreign policy problems.

Professor Walker has written extensively on the Far East for all information media. Among his books are *China Under Communism, the First Five Years* (1955); *The Multi-State System of Ancient China; China and the West: Cultural Collision* (1956); *The Continuing Struggle* (1959); *Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* series (1965); and *The China Danger* (1966). He has been a contributor to numerous

other volumes including: *National Security* (1963); *The Strategy of Deception* (1963); *Peace and War in the Modern Age* (1965); *The Nations of Asia* (1966); *Aspects of Modern Communism* (1968), and *Communist China, 1949-1969* (1970).

Professor Walker resides at 700 Spring Lake Road, Columbia, S.C. He is married and has three children.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a number of questions, Dr. Walker, that come to mind at the present time. I think, if the committee does not object, it would facilitate the compilation of the record to let the counsel go ahead and complete the record, then the Chair will recognize the members of the committee. Proceed.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Dr. Walker, I wonder if you would discuss for us the tactics involved in the Chinese attaining their goal. You mentioned that they worked on the guilt complex of the country, attack the foreign relations as an imperialistic propaganda.

Would you discuss with us a little bit the tactics involved.

Mr. WALKER. I think we could look at this on two levels. First, there is the matter of the overt propaganda and organized activities carried on by Peking. This includes the dissemination of very interesting propaganda literature, very much of which is freely available here in the United States; the *Peking Review*, the *China Reconstructs*, *China Pictorial*, *China's Literature*.

These are English-language magazines distributed here in the United States and distributed in many foreign languages abroad overtly.

As long as I followed these, and that has been since before the communists came to power, the themes have been essentially the same, that the power of the United States needs to be isolated and destroyed.

Overtly, they have attempted to play upon the United States as a force for evil and, indeed, to accuse the United States and its agents of being involved in any kind of activity which they feel takes on a bad look on the world scene.

Overtly, they have also utilized their military power to stress Mao's belief that the imperialists, and particularly the United States, are paper tigers. They have played up their aid to Vietnam and played up the Vietnam war, particularly in the last few years, a showing that, as Mao recently put it in one of his statements, "Even a small power can defeat a big imperialist power."

So there is this whole level of official activity. I think perhaps the most interesting of these official activities, and perhaps one that gives us the correct understanding of their operational goal, has been the recent series last year and this year of their trade negotiations with the Japanese.

This is known as the "memorandum trade" and, although it constitutes a very small portion—less than 10 percent of Japan's official trade with communist China—they have, in a way, humiliated Japanese trade delegates who go to Peking and sign a joint agreement in which they can ask their own government to join in denouncing their government's cooperation with the United States, and then they agree to join terms whereby the trade agreement will be carried out.

Among those terms are that they will not deal with any Japanese firms that have any relations with American firms or are joint stock companies or joint enterprises with American firms.

They will not deal with any Japanese firms who trade with or deal with either Taiwan or the Republic of Korea. This is the kind of overt

tactics that are involved. Then there are what one might talk about as the covert propaganda and organizational tactics.

Burmese, Indian, Thai, Malaysian, and other natives are taken to south China for cadre training and taught the techniques of people's war. Again, Peking, when [Kwame] Nkrumah was overthrown, was involved in a training school outside the capital of Ghana in Africa.

Linked to this kind of covert activity has been the support, certainly in propaganda, and I can't document it any other way, of the kind of extremist activities in the United States which tend to undermine any of our foreign policy commitments.

It is quite remarkable to find how quickly Peking has access to the statements of our various protesters, or how Peking will reprint and claim credit for some of the protests which have gone on here in the United States.

They find themselves, for the most part, on the same wavelength with those who are determined to disengage the U.S. from its responsibilities. Here is where this guilt complex you asked about comes in, because they tend to gain and one finds, once again, many of our left-wing leaders repeating what comes from Peking blaming the United States for many of the ills that exist abroad, particularly in Asia.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, Dr. Walker. Would you comment and give us some explanation of the significance to the United States of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Mr. WALKER. I can attempt that. That is a subject for a rather long book, I would think, Mr. Schultz. At the height of the dispute, when the Soviets had delivered, in 1963, a so-called letter to the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in that letter there is a passage that reads:

It is legitimate to ask the Chinese comrades what means they propose for the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We fully stand for the destruction of imperialism and capitalism and are doing everything to see that this is accomplished and in the shortest possible time.

Now, this statement by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a way, pointed to what the danger is.

In many respects, both the Soviet Union through its modern technology and building up military power and through its pattern of training the cadres in communist leadership and the Chinese communists through their emphasis on cultural diplomacy, people's wars, and emphasis on the "third world," each feels it has the magic formula for the destruction of what they call imperialists, and I think we have to read that, "United States power."

The CHAIRMAN. Then you emphasize the disagreement is over tactics, not a disagreement over objectives?

Mr. WALKER. I think the objective, they both say so, is obviously the same. The trouble is, from their point of view it is an argument within the church, within the church of this great secular faith, and they take their faith seriously and the argument is a deadly serious one.

So, I suppose, from their point of view or maybe from our point of view, it is like two undertakers arguing. They claim we are a sick society, arguing beside our sickbed as to which one can get up 6 feet underground faster. There is little comfort to be drawn from this sort of argument taking place beside our sickbed.

Now actually there is much more to it than just the strategy for the world communist movement. There are a whole number of other dangers. For example—and it really did come in 1957—beginning in 1957 Mao Tse-tung, with his world views, said now is the time; let's go get the imperialist. That is when Mr. Khrushchev said hold on, it may be a paper—the U.S. may be a paper tiger, but it has nuclear teeth. And so, in terms of strategy for dealing with the U.S., there was a great difference.

There also is a difference in interpretation of what is the significant part of the world. The Soviets, a modern industrial nation, realized that a resurgent Western Europe, the United States, and Canada and, let's say, the new Japan, these are the real competitors on the world scene.

Peking is still committed to the Leninist view of imperialism and this, the "third world," is where the ultimate fate will be decided. There is a difference in the assessment of nuclear weapons and this is a particularly dangerous one for the United States.

This is one I think we should pay much closer attention to. When the Chinese completed their third nuclear explosion they produced a film entitled "The Great Victory for Mao Tse-tung," in which they tried to demonstrate that Chou En-lai was right in saying that the atom bomb is a paper tiger. And the film showed, after the third nuclear Chinese test, enlisted men of the People's Liberation Army rushing into the center of radioactivity to prove that the atom bomb was a paper tiger.

Now this sort of approach to the superweapon is the sort of approach that not only worries the Soviets, but leaves us to wonder are they capable, under Chairman Mao, of committing irrational decisions.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Dr. Walker, you mentioned, in your opening statement, being realistic. How realistic is China? Do the Chinese intend to export the revolution as one of their goals? What is their physical strength? How realistic are they?

Mr. WALKER. In many respects, communist China is a greatly over-rated power. In many respects, there are problems. Their internal problems are so great that they are grasped up in those far more than we realize.

Therefore, very likely if they are going to export revolution, and they are attempting to do it, they are likely to do it on the cheap, and one of the cheapest methods of exporting revolution lies in the training of the cadres who can carry on the people's wars.

One finds Peking getting all sorts of encouragement in terms of small arms or in terms of cadre training to what they regard as the revolutionary force of the world. For example, it didn't cost them—as an economically relatively weak power, it didn't cost them much to supply, first, diplomatic recognition—and they were the first major country to give full major diplomatic recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organization while it was still an embarrassment to President Nasser—and to supply weapons and to take young Palestinian Arabs to Peking and give them training in guerrilla warfare, people's war, and so forth.

In that same way, Thakin Than Tun, who was leader of the Burmese Communist Party until one of his underlings apparently assassinated him, was said to have boasted, just give him a hundred well-trained revolutionary cadre leaders and he would eventually take over Burma.

The Chinese communists were indeed supplying those idealistic youthful Burmese leaders who they hoped would overthrow the reactionary Ne Win government. So I think one can see, whether it is in the assistance that they gave to Fidel Castro's Cuba for training the insurgents for Latin America or whether it is in Africa or the Middle East, that the Chinese communists are going to utilize this as a way, and this is what Lin Piao meant by the people's war statement I read, a way of arriving at great power status with relatively little expenditure of funds.

I think we tend to underestimate the importance of the training mission that the Chinese communists have.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Dr. Walker, I know that you have traveled a great deal. Have you had an opportunity to interview any of the men who had this cadre training?

Mr. WALKER. Yes, I have, as a matter of fact. One of my first books on communist China dealt with intensive interviews of Chinese cadres who had been trained, and subsequently I have talked in Malaysia, Australia, and Hong Kong with people who have had this kind of training, been taken to Peking or into the southern province of China for this kind of training.

We are hoping, fairly soon, to publish from our university a rather detailed series of volumes on the cadre training process, and I think that will give you many more details than I could give you here.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Let me ask just one general question. Have they been successful?

Mr. WALKER. This is a very important point as regards the world communist movement. Maybe if I only make this point and make it here this morning, this may be one of the most important reasons for my coming here and being with you.

Of the thousands, literally thousands of French communists who were trained in Moscow or East European cadre training schools, probably, according to one of the leading experts on the world communist movement, probably better than 90 percent have defected, became disillusioned.

But the 10 percent are the people who have not only run the French Communist Party, but were the dedicated corps, the priesthood, that kept the faith alive during some of the most miserable times for French communists, during the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact or during the period of de-Stalinization and the Khrushchev secret speech or during some of the other times when Moscow was being nasty to its fraternal parties.

The point is simply this. If you succeed with only 5 percent of your trainees you, nevertheless, have a disciplined corps who have made an act of faith and are going to keep that act of faith.

How successful has it been? When the Chinese communists, if one examined their central committee, I think roughly 57 percent of them had been Moscow trained. This is an aspect of the movement that we have given far too little attention.

I can't assess how successful the Chinese are being, but let me make just a couple of points. The guerrilla insurgency on the Thai-Malaysia border, which draws many of its inspirations from Peking broadcasts and is a real source of drain of energy and stability and manpower for both the Thai and the Malaysian Governments, continues.

The guerrilla insurgency, mostly composed of Chinese, continues in north Kelantan or in that part of the Malaysian Government on the island of Borneo in such a way as to prevent development there.

The training, in a way, has paid off, and Peking is still investing in recruiting people from Latin America, from Africa, and from Asia for the people's wars of the future.

Mr. SCHULTZ. This training would be in the Maoist line of Marxism-Leninism and would not—this is not the Russian training now?

Mr. WALKER. Of course, there are many items that are similar. It is a training in understanding the world revolution of our times, the ultimate contradiction between the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism, as they put it.

There is much ideological background but, in terms of the actual combat-type training, Peking stresses the role of insurgency in the countryside and the surrounding of the cities. In other words, they project their formulas for success which brought them to power despite \$2 billion of aid the U.S. gave to the Nationalists and, despite a whole number of other items, they project those as having world relevance.

Mr. SCHULTZ. My thought was where their allegiance would be, who would be directing and controlling them. That would be China as opposed to Moscow.

Mr. WALKER. Most of the guerrilla insurgents, as Peking put it very bluntly, must look to Peking for inspiration. Moscow has become a center for the revisionist renegade clique. They accuse Moscow of having sold out to the U.S. imperialists and, therefore, Peking they regard as the bright hope for revolutionary warfare in the "third world."

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you comment on the connection in the international communist movement of the CPUSA and particularly the China side of it?

Mr. WALKER. I think you are into a field where I am not really competent, though I have read some detailed testimony, including some before this committee. I think you have got me out of my depth and I think it would be a mistake for me to attempt to talk about something that is not in my field.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you, sir. Could you tell us the purpose and what the aftermath has been of the "Cultural Revolution" China has experienced?

Mr. WALKER. The "Cultural Revolution" was, in many respects, a party purge. It was a very formidable attempt to regenerate revolution in China. It was an attempt to reengage the party loyalty and it was, in a way, an attempt of Mao Tse-tung to get back in power.

Now the "Cultural Revolution" has been a very tragic thing for the Chinese people. Part of its results has been a hiatus in education. Part of its results has also involved sending great numbers of educated people down to the countryside, "Hsia fang" they call it—sending them down and they are just lost forever.

Now why would Mao Tse-tung embark on this? It is a very long, a complicated, bit. It involves their differences with the Soviet Union. It involves his worry about the growing bureaucracy in China. It involves some real down-to-earth criticism of his party line and, particularly, it involved differences of opinion over the approach to

agriculture and, in many respects, it probably involved formidable disagreements within the military as to what was the best path for building national power. And if they were going to build modern national military power and sophisticated weapons system-type military power they were going to have to go back into some sort of relationship with the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard some people say that the "Cultural Revolution" was a total failure. Do you look upon the "Cultural Revolution" as a total failure from Mao's point of view?

Mr. WALKER. Mao got rid of his enemies. He has been a great purger and, in terms of what his proclaimed goals were, to really keep the society revolutionized and get rid of Chinese bureaucratic tendencies, I suspect in the long run it has been a failure.

It is a reflection of Mao's pattern of rule. The Chinese communist pattern of rule, as one Indian put it, is, in the West, when they want to do something, they pass a law; in communist China, they start a campaign.

So the pattern of rule over the 21 years has been one of never-ending campaigns following one on the other. This was just the most intense, probably, of all of them and the major targets were the intellectuals, many of whom had been criticizing some of Mao's hare-brained schemes over the party bureaucrats, some of whom were really just sitting back and enjoying positions of high power and thinking they were entitled to a better life than some of the peasants around them.

Mao is an idealistic egalitarian to a certain degree.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did succeed in getting rid of many of the dissenters and silencing them in some fashion.

Mr. WALKER. This brings up one aspect, Mr. Ichord, I think is worth bringing in here. There is just so much we don't know. The fetish for secrecy in communist China prevents us from knowing too much.

Now there is a place called Chung-Nan Hai which is a part in the palace area where, apparently, K'ang Sheng and some of the others who are presumably purged even by the general who disagreed with Lin Piao. They are still there. He has purged them and they still exist and they are still talking about the traces of the influence of Liu Shao-ch'i and the party revisionist out in the countryside.

So it may be too early to judge. Actually, what Mao is after—he called it "p'o-chiu li-hsin"—destroy the old and raise up the new. What he was after really was to destroy many of the aspects of traditional Chinese culture which, in his view and in part he may have been right on some of them, stood in the path of modernization and power-building for China.

And, on this score he really failed because Chinese culture is too long, too deep, too rich to be destroyed by one of Mao Tse-tung's campaigns. That is one of the reasons why I put into my initial statement that he still has to speak in the language of Confucius when he talks about his communist paradise to come; he calls it "ta-t'ung," which is a Confucian term.

So his "Cultural Revolution," if it was to remake the Chinese people whom he called poor and blank, and that was his biggest misassess-

ment of the Chinese people, if this was his goal, it was bound to be a failure.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Could you elaborate a little bit? You mentioned the Chinese base and some of the problems that the Chinese had. You were touching on this just now. I wonder if you might elaborate a little more about the population, the minorities, what feedback does Mao have from the people, and what chance do they have to dissent?

Mr. WALKER. People have a little chance to dissent. In an authoritarian or totalitarian structure like this it requires real imagination for someone who has never seen the Chinese scene to picture the extent of the poverty, the division, the real problems of the Chinese scene.

I mentioned a couple of them. Let me elaborate just briefly on these. At a minimum, the mainland of China is adding 15 million people per year to its already overburdened land and, when you think in terms of the roads, schools, and hospitals, and so forth, that just have to be built to accommodate 15 million people in 1 year.

If China is going to make progress, this is a formidable problem. Now this is a problem for the new ninth central committee and one that Chou En-lai is probably trying to tackle despite Maoist dogma.

But if one examines the 25 members of the Politburo and alternate members—there are 25 all told—of the new ninth central committee, they have made a quantum jump downward in terms of the kind of educated economists and planners who could cope with this population problem looking ahead to the next decade.

Then there is a matter of national minorities. We look at China and we see that big thing on the map and we tend to think of it in terms of a unified country. It is anything but unified. Roughly half the country is predominantly an area peopled by non-Chinese people, most of whom dislike Chinese.

Interestingly enough, there are over 50 million of them and these are the people that occupy the most strategic border regions and some of the minerally richest regions of China. Little wonder they are so sensitive over continuing revolt in Tibet, because these revolts among the minority peoples tend to trigger off one after another, tend to communicate to each other. So there is this tremendous problem.

Then there is the whole problem of literacy and communications in a tremendously divided land. The Chinese learn the same language, those who can read, but they don't speak the same language.

(At this point Mr. Drinan returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. WALKER. So these are all tremendous problems in a very weak and frequently divided China. And these are ones that any leadership, communist or Nationalist, these are problems we are going to have to attempt to solve where one item gets related here.

Unless they could prove that they are succeeding on the world scene, then there is going to be a loss of credibility at home and, therefore, this is why they play up their leadership role in the world revolution, particularly in the "third world."

Mr. SCHULTZ. This brings up an interesting question. You talk about the diversity of the peoples themselves, their backgrounds, their very languages. What is the role of ideology?

Mr. WALKER. There have been several books written on just this subject. You know facts are never a match for a stubborn theory, as far

as communists are concerned, and Mao Tse-tung and others can really bend the facts of China to suit their own predispositions.

Thus, for example, in the early part of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, they did a complete about-face on their approach to birth control and they became very pristinely pure communists and insisted that there could not be such a thing as overpopulation.

They did a complete about-face. They even implied there was a labor shortage in China, not enough people to go around. Then, as the "Great Leap Forward" failed and by 1959 and '60, it was really a tragic time in China, thanks to one of the great helmsman's grandiose schemes.

Then they suddenly realized they are going to have to do something about family planning. So the party put very stringent rules about late marriages and separating boys from girls and sending them out to the frontier areas to help develop the new frontier, and so forth. There was obviously a major policy shift here, but it was all glossed over and handled beautifully ideologically. In the same way, although they can be very pristine and pure in interpreting their disagreement with the Soviet Union, they were going to argue it in ideological terms and they frequently could be caught in changing their position.

But there are a couple of items that were basic fundamentals of a commitment to this faith, and it is an act of faith. First of all, there is the commitment to the class struggle approach. Then there is Mao's commitment of the importance of contradictions in society and in the world and, as far as the Chinese are concerned, a really formidable commitment to the efficacy of violence, that "war is a great school."

This is what I think we tend to underestimate.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you pursue that a little further. You mentioned the war as a people's war and their propensity for violence.

Mr. WALKER. I don't have to pursue it further. Let me quote Lin Piao for you. We sit back and we sometimes say, could they really mean this, and yet they constantly warn us, we believe this; we take our doctrine seriously.

Lin Piao:

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffering on the people. But the destruction, sacrifice, and suffering will be much greater if no resistance is offered to imperialist armed aggression and the people become willing slaves. The sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of mankind. Temporary suffering is repaid by a lasting or even perpetual peace and happiness. War can temper the people and push history forward. In this sense, war is a great school.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have a comment here by Lin Piao, quoted at the last national party conference, which is in line with that. I would like to hear your observations:

Chairman Mao especially reminds us after the enemy's guns have been wiped out that there will still be enemies without guns. They are bound to struggle desperately against us and we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit the greatest of mistakes.

Mr. WALKER. This April 1969 statement of Lin Piao which you are reading is primarily focused internally. He was referring to the success of revolution and he was also trying to say that his reason for continuing the party purge that was started in China during the "Cultural

Revolution"—he was saying that because the "Cultural Revolution" is all over, the ninth party congress symbolized in April '69, this doesn't mean we should relax the vigilance.

And, indeed, as we watched, they brought out a fair number in 1969 that fall and again last year in 1970, a fair number of people. We have no idea how many hundreds or even thousands for great show trials like they used to hold 20 years ago and mass executions. And the message was being carried very eloquently on radio and TV to the Chinese people.

They held a mass trial like [Fidel] Castro held in the early years and like were held in the early years of the Chinese People's Republic. They held a mass trial in the Worker's Stadium in Peking where they brought nine people in. They even showed pictures of them. They put them to death right there on the spot. That carries a good message. This was the sort of continuing purge that Lin Piao—he has plenty of enemies inside the Chinese communist hierarchy—that Lin Piao was talking about, I think.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you care to speculate where Lin Piao is going in the hierarchy of the Government?

Mr. WALKER. My crystal ball never has been very clear on China and I have been wrong so frequently, as have most of us. I think this is an important thing to get across. The sooner we get away from trying to maintain academic infallibility about China and our predictions, the better off we will be.

Mr. SCHULTZ. He is mentioned in the new constitution.

Mr. WALKER. He is Mao's closest comrade in arms and designated as the successor and the best interpreter of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. But Lin Piao himself has been sick. He is an old man.

In fact, this is the real problem of the ninth central committee and the current ruling elite in mainland China. They are old men. The new central committee is 5 years older than the last central committee was and they haven't really made way for some of the people who, let's say, are the same age they were when they came to power.

Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, these are old men. They are first generation revolutionaries. They have been fighting a very long and intense battle.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you comment for us on the new constitution. I am not certain. Is it in effect today?

Mr. WALKER. No, they have not held their national people's congress. The Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan released a draft of a constitution. Most of our people tend to regard this as a genuine working draft which will be debated and will become the basis of the new constitution. Probably not too many changes will be made.

It is much, much shorter than the former constitution and details are very varied. I think the clearest thing that we can say is that this constitution is, more than anything before, the enshrinement of Mao Tse-tung and Mao Tse-tung's thought.

This is the major thing. Interestingly, among the bill of rights which constitutes one of the articles, the first right that the people are given is to support Mao Tse-tung and Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, may I interrupt at this point and inquire as to how long you estimate it will take to finish your inter-

rogation of Dr. Walker. I point out that we are running very short on time, as we must take Mr. Connolly in executive session.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I can conclude now if you would like to go into questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Doctor, I hated to interrupt and certainly the committee could well afford to avail itself of your very expert testimony in this field. It has been very informative and a very valuable addition to our record, but we are running very close on time if we are to conclude at 10 minutes of the hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Dr. Walker, I would like to ask you a few questions on news items recently. One was the situation, I suppose you would call it the cadre that was found down in Mexico, according to newspaper accounts, trained in North Korea. Do you know whether they were trained by the Chinese in North Korea or by the North Koreans?

Mr. WALKER. I do not know for certain, Mr. Schmitz. The North Koreans—I think this is a bit of information that might be put in—the North Koreans have made a shift back to a Chinese line. Chou En-lai's brilliant diplomacy—and he is truly a brilliant diplomat—brought them back into that, and the North Koreans have profited greatly from the Chinese pattern of cadre training that was developed at Yen-an during World War II. The North Korean cadre training process is more designed and patterned after the Chinese than the Soviet.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So it could have been either?

Mr. WALKER. In all likelihood, it was North Korea. They consider themselves quite good at that.

Mr. SCHMITZ. The other question about another wire service story yesterday, which I haven't had time to look into in detail myself, is a story that our policy for our delegation to the U.N. was going to be to allow Red China into the United Nations as long as the United Nations didn't object to the Nationalist Chinese. Could you comment on that? Are you familiar with the story?

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. Policy changes have been in the works for quite a long time and I think one has to say that if the Chinese People's Republic were admitted to the U.N. at the expense of the ejection of the Chinese Nationalists or the Republic of China, this would, indeed, reflect rather sadly on the credibility of the U.S. commitments overseas. So it is a very delicate problem. Neither side wants to accept two Chinas, and my own guess is that even if it is voted that they come in, the delegates from Peking will not come to the U.N. until the Nationalists are thrown out.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Can you say the reverse to that, if the Chinese communists come in, the Nationalist Chinese will get out voluntarily?

Mr. WALKER. They have played this game both in Paris and elsewhere. It is probably a game of chicken—who is going to stay there right till the last minute—but I doubt that the U.S. will ever change its position to the point that is advocated by some, of just kicking the Nationalists out of the U.N.

Mr. SCHMITZ. But, on the other hand, if they take the Nationalist Chinese at their word, our Government will walk out in protest. If the Chinese communists come in, they could wash their hands of that situation. By the way, I am opposed to a change of policy.

Mr. WALKER. Let me make a couple of points clear, Mr. Schmitz. A nuclear-armed China somehow has got to be brought into the mainstream of the world. Isolationism as a nuclear power becomes dangerous.

I think they have had 20 years to learn that Mao's thought is not the answer, and meanwhile, there have been all these tremendous developments around the periphery of China. Therefore, if you want to look at it the way Peking looks at it, they don't really, I think, want into the U.N.—for a number of reasons.

In the first place, they wouldn't be a great power. The great powers all have a number of votes they could gather at the U.N. and, aside from Albania, China wouldn't have any other votes to go along with it. Then, they regard the U.N. as a place run by the Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists, and they don't want it on that score.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So you are saying they are not as interested in getting in as some of their friends are interested in getting them in?

Mr. WALKER. I think you put it very well.

Mr. SCHMITZ. One other question that is related to that. You mentioned the intensive "hate U.S." campaign that seems to be the keystone of their foreign policy. I assume that there is also a "hate Nationalist China program."

Mr. WALKER. They don't want to deign to give the Republic of China or China herself that much attention. They frequently refer to them as the "running dogs of American imperialism" or Chiang Kai-shek whom they call a political corpse.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That was going to be my question. They have been successful in eliminating any or all allegiance to mainland China, any allegiance that might not historically be owed to the Nationalist Chinese.

In other words, what is the situation? Have they been able to stamp out any strong feelings?

Mr. WALKER. There are still going to be some people who harbor memories of different days, but I think what we forget is that at least more than 75 percent of the Chinese living in mainland China today have no living memory of a precommunist period. So they are talking about something that has happened over a period of three decades. We are off in a whole new ballpark.

What existed at the time of the Korean war is quite different from what exists today in many respects, whether it is in terms of numbers of people added or the problems that Mao faces as the initial revolutionary elan has sort of disappeared from the regime.

So my own guess is that although there are some older people who do remember, there are very few on mainland China who have any inkling about what Taiwan is or what it is about. They read only the articles that are published in *The People's Daily* about how "the poor people on Taiwan are starving; they are mowed down by American servicemen there with machine guns and they are under the oppressive heel of American imperialism."

Mr. SCHMITZ. There is little clandestine activity on the part of Nationalist China.

Mr. WALKER. That I can't comment on. They did get the constitution; they did find out that Mao Tse-tung was going to step down, and

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occasionally they come up with all sorts of intelligence which proves they are useful to us China watchers, but I can't comment on that.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Thank you very much. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for the pressure of time, Dr. Walker. We truly do appreciate your appearance and cooperation with the committee.

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(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., Tuesday, March 30, 1971, the committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session.)

STATEMENT OF FRANK N. TRAGER*

(The following article by Frank N. Trager, with Robert F. Bordonaro, which appeared in the Fall 1969 issue of *ORBIS*, was submitted for inclusion in the record:)

*Prior to continuation of these hearings on April 1, 1971, Chairman Ichord directed this statement be included in the record at this point.

THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: THEIR MEANING FOR ASIA*

by Frank N. Trager, with Robert F. Bordonaro

IN April and June 1969, the rival centers for world communist leadership convened two long-postponed party conferences. The one in Peking was held first. Contrary to previous practice, the Communist Party of China (CCP) did not invite other communist parties and friendly groups. The meeting in Moscow, initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), sought to maximize the attendance of communist parties and fraternal elements. Each gathering heard speeches by their respective leaders and adopted resolutions on policy, i.e., a combination of communist ideology (theory) and strategy (practice). The content of these documents with reference to their implications for the noncommunist states of Asia is the subject of this article.

I

On April 1, 1969, the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opened in Peking with 1,512 delegates in attendance. Though these congresses were originally intended as annual party affairs, seventeen years had elapsed between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses (1928 and 1945, respectively); eleven years were to pass before the Eighth Congress was held in 1956; and nine years of turmoil went by before Chairman Mao Tsetung (new spelling) and his deputy, Defense Minister Lin Piao, opened this congress "with grandeur." Chairman Mao delivered an as yet unpublished speech. The congress' agenda consisted of three items: the "political report" by Vice Chairman Lin Piao on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP; revision of the party's Constitution; and election of the new CCP Central Committee.¹

Except for official communiqués, information from within the

*This article has been adapted from a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in New York in September 1969.

¹*Hsinhua*, Peking, April 1, 1969. The pecking order became clear on the first day of the twenty-four-day congress. Lin Piao was named in Chapter I of the new Constitution as Chairman Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor," and together with Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng (in that order) constituted the new Standing Committee of the new twenty-five-member Politburo. The wives of

congress is sparse. Foreign communist party representatives, spectators and press were largely absent or excluded.² There appear to have been only three plenary sessions, each lasting about a half-day and each the subject of a communiqué, on April 1, 14 and 24 respectively. "Group discussions" were employed to study Mao's speech, Lin's Report, and the draft Constitution. This phase of the congress was completed on April 14. The remaining ten days presumably were given over to the election of the new Central Committee.

The present Constitution, amended only slightly from the draft that appeared in Taipei in December 1968, and Lin's Report were "unanimously adopted" by the delegates.³ The Constitution atypically provides for Lin Piao's succession. It elevates Mao Tsetung's thought (MTT) to an equal place with Marxism and Leninism, thereby creating a new ideological trinity. Henceforth, the CCP takes "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking." Mao is constitutionally described as having "brought it [Marxism-Leninism] to a higher and completely new stage," one "in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory."⁴

Mao and Lin are included in the latter. They are all members of the new 170-member Central Committee. Alternate members totaled 109. Names of the Central Committee were announced on April 25. Fifty-two of the 170 members of the Eighth Party Congress appear on the new list. All twenty-nine provincial-level Committee Chairmen, appointed in the wake of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), are Central Committee members or alternates. People's Liberation Army representatives account for 44 per cent of the total Central Committee membership. For further data and analysis on this point, see Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, and "Who's Who at the Center of Mao's Communist Party," in *What's Happening on the Chinese Mainland* (a bi-weekly newsletter of facts and analysis published in Taipei), May 18, 1969. The latter contains brief biographies of all twenty-five members of the new Politburo.

²At the Eighth National CCP Congress, more than fifty fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties were represented. This time, not even Albania was present, though its party and its leader, Enver Hoxha, alone of all parties and leaders friendly to the CCP, were singled out for mention by Lin Piao in his Report. These facts underscore the extent to which the CCP under the Mao-Lin leadership has isolated its domestic scene from the fraternal parties in recent years, primarily, I believe, because of the unsettled issues created by the GPCR upheaval.

³The text of the Ninth CCP Congress communiqué approving the Constitution and Report was distributed in English by *Hsinhua*, April 14, 1969, and reprinted in the *New York Times*, April 15, 1969. The original draft of the new Constitution, translated by the American Consulate-General's office in Hong Kong, was reprinted in the *New York Times*, January 8, 1969.

⁴Excerpts are drawn from Chapter I, "General Programme," of the 1969 Constitution. Note that Mao Tsetung's thought is grammatically given as "Mao Tsetung Thought," conveying the impression of an "ism." In point of fact, Mao's philosophical contributions to Marxism-Leninism have been rather slight, as amply demonstrated by Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1966).

The Constitution also stipulates the party's emphasis on "class-struggle," "seizure and consolidation of state power by armed force," and "struggle against both right and 'left' opportunist lines." The CCP "upholds proletarian internationalism . . . and fights to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its center, and the reactionaries of all countries."⁵ State power is defined as "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in which all organs of power — the People's Liberation Army, the Communist Youth League, other revolutionary mass organizations — "must accept the leadership of the Party."⁶

Lin Piao's dull and repetitive eight-part Report — some twenty-two legal-size, single-spaced pages in length — is largely an expansion of the Constitution, a paean to MTT, and a history and justification of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The brief concluding section is an exhortation on unity within the country and among patriotic "Overseas Chinese" in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Of special significance here is Section VII, "On China's Relations with Foreign Countries." Lin charges that the United States and the Soviet Union are at one and the same time imperialist rivals who, according to Leninist doctrine on imperialist war, are "locked in strife" and who also "collude . . . in opposing China, opposing communism, and opposing the people, in suppressing the national liberation movements and in launching wars of aggression." The Soviet leadership comes in for special condemnation. It is accused of practicing "social-imperialism and social-fascism." It is identified with the Czars, Hitler and Japanese militarism, having imposed a dictatorship on Czechoslovakia under the guise of the "so-called theory of 'limited sovereignty'" and encroached militarily on Chinese boundaries in an attempt to provoke "border incidents" and sabotage and subvert the CCP.

China, according to Lin, "has drawn a clear line between herself on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism on

⁵Chapter I, 1969 Constitution.

⁶Chapter III, "Organizational Principle of the Party," 1969 Constitution. On July 1, 1969, all major official newspapers editorially called for the formation of a "strong core of party leadership" in all levels of the dominant Revolutionary Committees set up in the later stages of the GPCR. The editorial emphasized that the process of rebuilding the party structure must be undertaken "gradually" and according to the "concrete conditions" of the respective Revolutionary Committees. (See the *New York Times*, July 2, 1969.) Obviously, this leaves power in the hands of the military who in fact control these committees.

the other." The CCP is determined to unite and fight together with all genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, and with the revolutionary people of all countries against the forces of imperialism, revisionism and reaction. Lin specifically pledges China to "firmly support" revolutionary struggle in Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, and other countries and regions in Asia. However, his remarks were not confined to the lower end of the strategic spectrum, i.e., revolutionary warfare and insurgency. He also addressed the problem of conventional and nuclear war:

We must . . . on no account ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war . . . at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and . . . a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared. . . . Whether the war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents the war, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will not last long.⁷

From this review of developments during the Ninth Party Congress, a number of conclusions seem justified. The congress established the primacy of the Mao-Lin leadership within the CCP. It defended the political utility—ignoring the dislocations and disruptions—of the GPCR, for the latter helped the congress to overcome its party opposition. It sought to heal some of the wounds of the cadres and the party by starting to rebuild the latter within the framework of military dominance in the Revolutionary Committees.⁸ The CCP continued to identify its chief enemies as the USSR revisionist clique and the imperialist ruling circles of the United States. Above all, the congress reaffirmed a *hard-line policy* calling for revolutionary struggles everywhere, particularly in noncommunist Asia. The heightened emphasis on domestic unity and patriotism under the auspices of the People's Liberation Army, which has been strengthened and deployed to

⁷The full translated text is in the author's possession. Excerpts were published in the *New York Times*, April 29, 1969. Lin's exclusion of Cambodia, Ceylon and Pakistan is not accidental. Ceylon opened trade relations with Peking in the early 1950's; Cambodia received the first direct grant from Peking in the mid-1950's; and Pakistan sided with Peking against India. Peking still maintains more or less "revisionist"-type connections with nonrevolutionary governments.

⁸One theme from Mao's "extremely important" but unreported speech, mentioned in the first official communiqué (April 1), is quoted in the second official communiqué of April 14, and it, then, becomes the repeated theme of scores of subsequent reports and press comments. It reads: ". . . we hope that the present Congress will be a congress of unity and a congress of victory and that, after its conclusion, still greater victories will be won throughout the country."

various border regions, complements and is in turn reinforced by China's militant foreign posture.⁹

II

The recent International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties was, from the Soviet point of view, long overdue. As early as 1962, Khrushchev had proposed such a meeting, in major part to reaffirm Soviet leadership in the latter's dispute with the People's Republic of China (CPR).¹⁰ His successors, Brezhnev and Kosygin, initially ignored that political gambit while attempting some form of reconciliation with Mao Tsetung. Their failure in this respect led to the revival of the proposal and the convening of a preparatory meeting held in Budapest in 1968. However, resistance from several communist parties, the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, and Moscow's justification of that act in terms of its new theory of "limited sovereignty" once again forced a postponement. Finally, on June 5, 1969, Moscow had its way. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was host at the Kremlin to seventy-four other parties from around the world.¹¹ For thirteen days this third post-Stalin conference of Moscow-led communist parties heard speeches generally in support of communist unity, "socialist" internationalism, and anti-imperialism. The controversial subjects of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship and the communist invasion of Czechoslovakia, the pre-conference thorns that had prevented an earlier gathering, found their way into the discussions.

It is unnecessary to recount here the controversy which erupted over the Czechoslovakian question. In spite of its efforts to exclude

⁹The final communiqué, New China News Agency (NCNA) International Service in English, Peking, April 24, 1969, is a useful summary of the major themes of the congress. It includes the list of 279 Central Committee members and alternates. Various elements in this summary have been noted in the American press. See, for example, on the drive for unity, the *New York Times*, April 24 and May 25, 1969; on the "hard line," *ibid.*, April 28, 1969; on preparation for war, the *Wall Street Journal*, June 19, 1969 and the *New York Times*, July 6, 1969.

¹⁰Only as communist affairs in Europe impinge upon the Asian concern of this article will they be treated here.

¹¹Of the seventy-five attending parties, two were unlisted for "security" reasons. They were the underground parties from Nepal and the Philippines. Five of the fifteen ruling parties were not present: Albania, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. Cuba sent an observer. Other Asian parties not represented were those of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Viet Nam and New Zealand. Attending Asian parties included those of Australia, India, Mongolia, East Pakistan and Ceylon. For a comprehensive list of the conference roster, consult the "Communiqué on the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties," reprinted in Supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), June 30, 1969, p. 24.

a discussion of the issue, Moscow found itself openly and sharply criticized by several delegations for its role in the August invasion.¹² These attacks were met by defenders of the Warsaw Pact, and more specifically by the reaffirmation in the Final Document of the Brezhnev thesis on "limited sovereignty,"¹³ i.e., the right to intervene militarily across boundaries on behalf of "socialism."

While the most controversial issue, Soviet-Chinese relations, was carefully omitted from direct mention in the Final Document, it was not omitted from the speeches and discussions. On June 7, Brezhnev, in his second and most important formal speech to the delegates, delivered a wide-ranging attack on the CCP and Mao Tsetung.

"Frankly," he said, "we had no intention at all of touching on this question at the Meeting."¹⁴ However, "the nature of the decisions taken by the Ninth Congress of the CCP have forced us to deal with it." This he did at length. He charged that Mao Tsetung and his supporters had attacked "the principles of scientific Communism"; started "a political offensive against the Communist movement"; engaged in "hostile acts" and "armed conflict" against "the socialist countries"; and, sin of sins, proclaimed

¹²See the *New York Times*, June 9 and 15, 1969.

¹³This widely current phrase is not that of official Soviet spokesmen, who prefer to term the Brezhnev thesis "principles of proletarian [or socialist] internationalism." The Final Document, "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces," was adopted by the conference on June 17, 1969. (Reprinted in Supplement to *New Times* [Moscow], June 30, 1969, pp. 25-39.) It carefully omitted direct reference to the Chinese and Czechoslovakian issues. See also Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's speech of July 10, 1969 to the Supreme Soviet, "Questions of the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union." (Reprinted in Supplement to *Moscow News*, July 1969.) The Brezhnev thesis was expanded into an official statement, "Sovereignities and International Duties of Socialist Countries," published in *Pravda*, September 27, 1968; text in the *New York Times*, September 27, 1968.

In the above-mentioned speech, Gromyko reiterated in short form the Soviet's intention "to defend to the end the chosen road ["socialist" as perceived by Moscow] against any encroachment — concealed or overt — to divert people from this road and to take away the socialist gains from the people." At the conference Rumania's President Nicolae Ceausescu rebutted the Brezhnev doctrine by pointing out that the principles of proletarian internationalism, justifying Soviet "fraternal aid" [read military intervention] to Czechoslovakia do not invalidate "principles of equal validity" that recognize "independence and national sovereignty, equal rights and noninterference in the internal affairs" of fraternal states. (*New York Times*, June 10, 1969.) See also U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine*, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1969).

¹⁴"For Greater Unity of Communists, For a Fresh Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," reprinted in Supplement to *News From Ukraine* (Kiev), June 1969. All quotations in these several paragraphs are taken from Part II of the speech, titled "Some Problems of the Communist Movement and Unity of Action in the Struggle Against Imperialism."

MTT as "the Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch," endeavoring to hoist its banner "over the globe."

Brezhnev, mindful perhaps that he should seek to avoid any appearance of interfering in the "internal" affairs of other fraternal parties and states, carefully indicated that he would not undertake an analysis of "the events in China over the last several years," but would at this conference "dwell primarily on the international aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy." Thereupon he warmed up to his task. The CCP was guilty of all the crimes that the Ninth Party Congress had leveled against the CPSU. It was "revisionist," "chauvinist" and "adventurist"; it organized "subversive splinter groups . . . in nearly 30 countries"; it is preparing and "calling . . . for war"; it has departed from proletarian internationalism and shed its socialist class content; it "directly or indirectly" helps imperialism "by everything it does." In summary, he said:

. . . the attack on the Soviet Union all down the line, the specious propaganda, mud-slinging at the Soviet people, at our socialist state, our Communist party, fanning hatred against the USSR among the people of China and, last but not least, resort to arms; intimidation and blackmail in relation to other socialist states and the developing countries; flirting with the big capitalist powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany — those are the guidelines of China's present foreign policy!

Each accused the other of the same crimes — and with the same epithets.

At the close of the conference, the assembled delegations acted on and issued the above-cited Final Document. Not all parties present signed it.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the Soviets had scored a significant victory. They had held their long-wanted conference with a majority of the world communist parties and groups. They had hurdled the Czechoslovakian question. They were able to present their case against the CCP. Above all, they were able to gain virtually unanimous support for their present, major strategic line: For Communist Unity, For Struggle Against Imperialism. To quote from the Final Document:

The existing situation demands united action of Communists and all other anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use may be made of the mounting possibilities for a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war.

¹⁵See note 11. For various reasons, five parties (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) did not sign; four (Australia, Italy, Reunion and San Marino) signed only the section on tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle; and six (Austria, Morocco, Rumania, Spain, Sudan and Switzerland) signed with reservations.

With respect to Asia and other underdeveloped areas, the document presented a classic Leninist analysis of the revolutionary situation:

Social differentiation is developing in the newly independent countries. There is a sharpening conflict between the working class, the peasantry, and other democratic forces, including patriotic-minded sections of the petty bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and, on the other, imperialism and the forces of domestic reaction, the elements of the national bourgeoisie which are increasingly accepting a deal with imperialism.

It is necessary to exploit this contradiction, thereby enhancing the anti-imperialist struggle, by strengthening "the alliance between the socialist system, the forces of the working-class movement and national liberation." In blunter terms:

The present situation demands greater militant solidarity of the peoples of the socialist countries, of all contingents of the international working-class movement and national liberation in the struggle against imperialism.

As an earnest of this declaration, the conference "unanimously" adopted a special message of support for the "struggle for liberation" in Viet Nam.¹⁶

To implement the line laid down in the Final Document, Moscow secured agreement to appoint a thirteen-party commission to prepare for a world anti-imperialist congress. Thus, by word and by deed, Moscow, to quote Brezhnev, had provided "the fraternal parties of Asia, Africa, and Latin America a platform from which they can further step up the national liberation movement in a world-wide revolutionary process."¹⁷

A comparison of the above-quoted sections of the Moscow statement with the documents of the Ninth CCP Congress reveals an obvious convergence, both as to the estimate of the revolutionary situation and what should be done about it. As a matter of fact, Moscow has duplicated Peking's list of "imperialist" enemies around the globe, including social democratic party leadership and (in some countries) social democrats (i.e., socialist parties) who are in power.

It would not be excessive to remark that once again Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian, and Wang Min, the Chinese, who made their mark at the 1935 Seventh Comintern Congress, were, in the

¹⁶*Pravda* editorial, June 16, 1969. The Final Document also called for "coordinated measures" and "joint efforts" by all socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese struggle.

¹⁷Excerpt from a Brezhnev article, "Communist Movement is in the Period of a Further Uplift," *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, August 1969.

Buddhist manner, reborn at the two communist meetings. Beyond the serious factional rivalry for hegemony in the movement, the external policy differences between Moscow and Peking with respect to the "other," noncommunist camp, were and are tactical. How to do it, not what is to be done, is the issue. Both sides clearly understand "it" to be the international advance of communism.

III

What relation do these two meetings have to the Asian scene? Are their speeches, resolutions and final documents mere words? Or do they constitute, in whole or part, a restatement of communist ideology and an operational code — a "line" of strategy and tactics — for the application and acquisition of power at any given place and time? Though the answers to these questions are to a certain extent predictions about the future, they are not wholly speculative. For they rest on previous and exploitable experience that circumstantially and inferentially supports probable conclusions. Nor does one need to enter the futile debate as to the primacy or potency of communist ideology, power and interests. For again, analysis of any given situation in Asia or elsewhere should reveal the relationship of all three.

If some argue that ideology is dead or, in Daniel Bell's phrase, "has come to a dead end," it is nonetheless true that the communists who participated in and supported the general outcomes of the Moscow and Peking meetings deliberated and acted *as if* communist ideology was alive and vitally important to them. Their ideological expression reaffirmed the now classic elements of Marxism-Leninism. The dialectical and historical process still divides the world into two classes and two camps. The eleventh thesis of Marx and Engels on Feuerbach, to wit, "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it," is still doctrine. Revolutionary change is brought about by revolutionary practice (the operational code). The instrumentality is the proletarian class led by what Lenin called "the vanguard of the revolutionary forces . . . an organization of revolutionists" whose members constitute a profession." They will guide the struggles, selecting strategy and tactics arising from their diagnosis of objective conditions; they will utilize the conflicts and contradictions between and among the antagonist class and imperialist countries to advance the goal of revolutionary change, the classless communist society of the future.

If some argue that it is power and interest, not ideology, that motivate communist states and organizations, as power and interest also motivate noncommunist states and organizations, then it may be said that the calculus of communist power and interest is almost always rationalized in ideological and teleological terms. In both instances, theory and practice are to lead to the identical consequences.

One of the cutting edges of the communist movement wherever it is, and at every stage of development, is the Leninist *kto kogo*, who/whom question: Who controls whom? Who will destroy whom? Who will dissolve whom? Who will defeat whom? For Lenin, and all those, including Mao, who follow the Leninist path, "there is not, nor can there be, any third path, nor can there be any sentimentality."¹⁸ Variations in strategy and tactics are always permissible and even necessary in the light of "objective conditions," as understood by communists. But there can be no ultimate compromise on who/whom when the communists represent one of the two parts of that proposition. No communist party or faction anywhere has disavowed Lenin, whose writing and teaching, on the impending 100th anniversary of his birth, still form the basic, rich curriculum of all communists. They, as did Lenin, understand the consequences of their thought and action. If they do not succeed in dominating, controlling, defeating and destroying whoever is their adversary, then in Lenin's phrase they can expect to be "smashed and strangled."

Whatever view of the foregoing is adopted, it is pertinent to look at the Asian data at least since the end of World War II. The communists have acquired Manchuria, North Korea, mainland China, North Viet Nam, Tibet, and slices of India, Laos and South Viet Nam. They are legally members of the Royal Laotian government, and at this writing govern in two states of India. They have violated the territorial integrity of Cambodia and blackmailed the sovereign powers of Macao and Hong Kong. They have launched episodic or continuous armed attacks (i.e., revolutions called "national liberation movements") against the governments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Viet Nam. No state in the area,

¹⁸ Lenin, Speech, at a Congress of Political Education Departments, October 17, 1921. See Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), Chapter XVIII, Sections 2-4. This remarkable book deserves constant study, for its analysis and research have not been blunted in any way by the passage of time. Leites and I completely disagree on the war in Viet Nam, but this fact in no way impairs my estimate of his book.

including those that in one way or another secured freedom from previous Western imperialist power, has been free from communist harassment, subversion and insurrection. However others may analyze and explain communist successes and failures in the post-World War II Asian world, communist analysis and explanation are always and everywhere put forward in terms of the right or wrong diagnosis of "objective conditions," and, therefore, the right or wrong application of Marxist-Leninist ideology, strategy and tactics. Who/whom is always filled in both before and after the act.

One may characterize their record in a spectrum that ranges from "the communists have been cautious" or "they have not been very successful for all their effort" to "their gains have been most significant." It depends on how one counts and who is counting. The difficulty of the arithmetic is compounded by the fact that students of Asian affairs tend to "identify" with the countries or regions of study. Thus, China, Japan and India loom large while the Inner and Southeast Asian countries seem small. My assessment, perhaps in part because I am associated with Southeast Asian studies, ranges toward the latter end of the spectrum.

For more than two decades — during and after the successful struggle for independence — communist parties, whether regarded by others as "monolithic" or "polycentric" in orientation, have kept Asian countries in turmoil. At virtually every stage of their political conduct, these parties followed, accepted or adopted whatever strategy had been approved by the main communist center to which they were loyal and attached, i.e., Moscow and/or Peking. The thrust of the communist movement was conditioned by the two alternating or sometimes simultaneously employed classic communist strategies: the "hard," revolutionary, insurrectionary line loosely referred to as the "united front from below"; and the "soft," noninsurrectionary struggle loosely referred to as "the united front from above."

In some respects the role of the main Communist Party in Burma (BCP) furnishes an archetypal model of communist behavior. Toward the end of World War II, the BCP in consonance with Soviet communist policy entered into a "united front from above" alliance with nationalists and socialists. When it failed to achieve power in that alliance, it enthusiastically adopted Moscow's insurrectionary line proclaimed at the original 1947 Warsaw meeting of the Cominform. Moscow propaganda —

if not more than that — vigorously supported the BCP and castigated the “social fascist” leadership of independent Burma between 1947 and 1954. In this effort, Moscow was ably seconded by the CCP after Mao Tsetung and Liu Shao-chi came to power in mainland China.

The post-Stalin change in the international communist line led to the active promulgation of the “soft” line heralded in Asia by Chou En-lai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (with Prime Ministers Nehru and U Nu), the 1955 Bandung Conference, and the visits of Bulganin and Khrushchev to South and Southeast Asia. Certainly the so-called USSR-Burma “aid” program represents the highwater mark of this period. During the following years, it became clear that while Moscow and Peking seemed to be pursuing a government-to-government “soft” line—replicative of the Seventh Comintern Congress period — they were covertly encouraging and supporting the BCP’s insurrectionary effort. Peking, rather than Moscow, especially in the 1960’s, proved to be more valuable in this regard to the BCP, so the latter became pro-Peking. In the interim, Peking once again overtly approved the hard, insurrectionary line and openly supported, trained and supplied its BCP satellite.¹⁹ Illustrative of the strategic outlook of pro-Peking communist elements throughout South and Southeast Asia is the following excerpt from a recent BCP statement:

To win the war [i.e., against the Ne Win regime] and seize political power, it is necessary to use military force as the central means; it is necessary to establish the union of all nationalities with the peasantry as the basis and broaden the united front; and the work of party building is the key.²⁰

Though the occasions, intensity and tactics of the communist assaults on the governments of Asia vary from the Burmese ex-

¹⁹I have elsewhere documented this development of communist policy vis-à-vis Burma. See F. N. Trager, *Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1966); “Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era,” *ORBIS*, Winter 1968, pp. 1034-1054. For a regional analysis of the same phenomena, see *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and “The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia” in William Henderson, editor, *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), Chapter 6. For an exposé of the USSR’s covert subversive operations in Burma by a Russian diplomat who personally participated in them and subsequently defected, see Aleksandr I. Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma*, edited, with an introduction, by Simon Wolin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962).

²⁰BCP Central Committee statement quoted in “Burma Communist Party Leads People’s Struggle,” NCNA International Service in English, April 27, 1969. Peking regarded this statement as an example of “integrating Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought with the concrete practice of the Burmese revolution.”

ample, these attacks have been pressed relentlessly throughout the postwar period of independence, guided by the strategy and tactics of the communist center to which the various communist parties remain attached.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the period. However, the following data on such communist assaults — political and military — are representative of the area.²¹

Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk's concern for the territorial integrity of his country has been motivated in the past by the fact that Cambodia is flanked by her two historical opponents, South Viet Nam and Thailand. However, this concern has more recently yielded first place to his "growing recognition that insurgency within Cambodia, rather than being a sporadic and geographically spotty problem, [is] beginning to represent a continuing malaise of widening geographical proportions."²² He has identified three elements as composing and leading this insurgency: the Thai Patriotic Front, the Pathet Lao, and the Viet Minh (i.e., North Vietnamese communists). To paraphrase from Sihanouk's press conference of May 23, 1968, the Thai and Laotian insurgents are sponsored by and depend on, respectively, Peking and Hanoi. The latter, according to Sihanouk, is "now contemplating pushing the Pathet Lao ahead to devour Cambodia."²³

Beset by these difficulties, Cambodia now appears to be facing a new diplomatic thrust on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have sent as their new ambassador to Phnom Penh, Sergei

²¹The interested reader may pursue this subject in a number of sources. In addition to the titles by Trager and Henderson, mentioned in note 19, see J. H. Brimmet, *Communism in South East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); A. Doak Barnett, editor, *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Robert A. Scalapino, editor, *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements* (2nd edition) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). The discussion which follows is based on data from "A Survey of Asia in 1968," *Asian Survey*, January and February 1969. (In January and February of each year, beginning in 1963, the *Asian Survey* has presented a series of country studies for the states of South, Southeast and East Asia by leading specialists in the field.)

²²Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Shadow Over Angkor," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, p. 58.

²³Excerpt of the press conference reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 64. Throughout the spring and summer of 1969, *Agence Khmer-Press*, the official Cambodian Information Service, published news accounts and Sihanouk's speeches detailing battlefield encounters between the Royal Cambodian Army and elements of the Khmer Rouge insurgents and North Vietnamese troops. See the *New York Times*, July 30, 1969, and South-East Asia Treaty Organization, *Trends and Highlights*, May 1, 1969, pp. 17-21, July 1, 1969, pp. 24-27, and October 1, 1969, pp. 16-18 (hereafter cited as *Trends and Highlights*).

M. Kudryavtsev, one of the most senior of all Soviet diplomats with service in Berlin, London, Bonn, Paris, and the United Nations. During his tour in Ottawa, Kudryavtsev was cited by a Canadian Royal Commission as "the probable head of an espionage ring exposed years ago by Igor Gouzenko."²⁴ In view of his impressive background, Bernard K. Gordon raises the question:

Why so senior a Soviet diplomat in Cambodia, with its six million persons and few objective resources of interest to the Soviet Union? Although no firm answer is possible, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that the Soviet Union may have chosen Phnom Penh as the base for its expected effort to become involved again in Southeast Asia.²⁵

Laos. In 1963 I wrote that the signing of the Geneva Declaration of 1962 did not end the struggle for Laos. It represented at best a pause as Laos and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia entered a new — and perhaps decisive — phase. I pointed out then that serious fighting had already erupted between the Pathet Lao and neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's forces; that the former already were violating the cease-fire agreements; and that Souvanna Phouma had appealed to Great Britain and the Soviet Union (the Geneva co-chairmen) for help to preserve his government and restore peace.²⁶

Since that time the situation has continued to deteriorate. In 1963 Prince Souphanouvong, titular leader of the Pathet Lao, resumed the military struggle to "liberate" Laos. There can be no doubt that responsibility for the resumption of hostilities lies in Hanoi. As Paul F. Langer recently noted: "Ever since World War II, the North Vietnamese Communists have sponsored and nurtured Laotian insurgency, furnishing guidance, training, material and weapons, and military manpower."²⁷

As a result of the continuing warfare, Laos has become a *de fac-*

²⁴Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁵*Loc. cit.*

²⁶Frank N. Trager, "Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia," *ORBIS*, Fall 1963, pp. 578-579. In 1969 Laos continued its as yet unsuccessful effort to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to reconvene the Geneva Conference and help to restore peace. *New York Times*, July 31, 1969.

²⁷"Laos: Preparing for a Vietnam Settlement," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, p. 69. For a case study of the North Vietnamese role in the Pathet Lao insurgency, see Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, *The North Vietnamese Military Adviser in Laos: A First Hand Account* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, July 1968). See also *The White Book on the Violations of the Geneva Accords of 1962 by the Government of North Vietnam* (Vientiane, 1968) which places total North Vietnamese military strength in Laos at approximately 40,000 and Pathet Lao strength at 30,000 men. For recent developments, see "The Military Situation in Laos," *Trends and Highlights*, December 1, 1969, pp. 10-13.

to partitioned country. The Pathet Lao, its political "front," the *Neo Lao Hak Sat* Party, and its control group, the *Phak Pasason Lao* (People's Party of Laos²⁸) dominate "the largely mountainous region along the Vietnamese border and the Royal Lao-tian Government (RLG) holds the more developed and more populous Mekong plain."²⁹ But it is questionable whether this rough demarcation will hold until a new cease-fire can be arranged. Militarily, the position of the RLG worsened considerably in 1969, especially during the rainy season that normally provides an opportunity to recoup losses.³⁰ The four-sided negotiations in Paris on the Viet Nam conflict, based on the Johnson-Nixon decisions for a declining U.S. military role in mainland Southeast Asia, have afforded the insurgents and North Vietnamese communists greater opportunities to pursue their objectives in Laos.

Thailand. "The uncertainty among Thai leaders," writes Frank C. Darling, "assumed heightened proportions [in 1968] as external and internal Communist threats continued to confront the kingdom."³¹ Darling notes that the Peking-supported Thai United Patriotic Front was active in the northeast provinces where Thai guerrillas, trained by the Chinese communists at a base near Hanoi, have been captured by the Royal Thai Army. Additionally, communist insurgent activity in the tribal areas of the north and along the Thai-Malayan border³² has occupied the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

There can be no doubt of Peking's heightened interest in and support for what it calls the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces." Mao's works have been translated into Thai and distributed to "party members and revolutionaries." Peking claims that since "the first

²⁸That is, the Communist Party whose cadres have been trained in North Viet Nam, Communist China and the Soviet Union.

²⁹Langer, "Laos: Preparing for a Vietnam Settlement," *op. cit.*, p. 70.

³⁰*Trends and Highlights*, April 1, 1969, pp. 26-30, June 1, 1969, pp. 12-15, September 1, 1969, pp. 32-34, October 1, 1969, pp. 13-15; and the *New York Times*, July 28 and August 25, 1969. The Chinese communists, with a "road force" of 20,000, are reported to have extended roads from Yunnan into Laos for about ninety miles, reaching a point near Muong Houn "just sixty miles northeast of Luang Prabang." *New York Times*, October 16 and 29, 1969. See also three articles by Henry Kamm, *ibid.*, October 26-28, 1969.

³¹"Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," *Asian Survey*, February 1969, p. 115.

³²Located in this area is the headquarters of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), a group whose membership is predominantly Chinese. The MCP remnant forces now number approximately one thousand. During 1969, MCP elements clashed repeatedly with RTG authorities, necessitating an intensified police effort in the border region. *Trends and Highlights*, December 1, 1969, pp. 3-6.

rifle shot of the people's armed struggle was fired in 1965 in the Pu Pan Mountain [of] northeast Thailand . . . armed struggle [has] spread to 33 of the 71 provinces of the country."⁸³ Characteristic inflation in Peking's propaganda need not detain us. Nor at this time is there reason to doubt Thailand's determination and ability to meet the threat. What is clear is that Thailand is a primary target for Peking and the Pathet Lao-Hanoi complex.

Korea and Viet Nam. The communist role in the divided states of Korea and Viet Nam is well known. In each case the communists acquired their portion of the once unified colonial state under World War II conditions. In that sense, one may say there is an aspect of legitimacy to their presence in North Korea and North Viet Nam since that presence emerged as a result of an actual or tacit agreement among the victorious allies following the defeat of the imperialist Japanese and Vichy French. But it became the communist aim to take over by any means, including war, that portion of these countries to which they did not have the same legitimate access. This aim continues to be the prime cause of their campaign against the noncommunist states of South Korea and South Viet Nam.⁸⁴

Malaysia and Singapore. The communists have not been able to make much headway in Singapore. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party captured all fifty-eight seats in the 1968 elections for Parliament. The Prime Minister has been quoted as saying that if the communists had chosen to participate in the election (which they officially boycotted), he would not have been surprised if they had collected "over 15 per cent of the votes, which would have ensured them some six to seven seats in the House."⁸⁵

Malaysia's difficulties since the declaration that ended the 1948-1960 "Emergency" caused by the communist insurrection are primarily "racial"; they inhere in the erupting strife between the roughly 50 per cent of the population that is Malay and 40 per

⁸³NCNA International Service in English, Peking, April 26, 1969. See also "A survey of [Peking's] propaganda for the period 1 November 1968 to 1 February 1969," *Trends and Highlights*, March 1, 1969, pp. 4-7.

⁸⁴I have treated the Vietnamese issue at length in *Why Viet Nam?* (New York: Praeger, 1966). For an analysis of Peking's role in the war, see Robert F. Bordonaro, "Communist China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: A Reconstruction of their Relations in the Post-Geneva Period, 1954-66" (unpublished Masters thesis, Department of Politics, New York University, 1968).

⁸⁵Jerome R. Bass, "Malaysia and Singapore," *Asian Survey*, February 1969, p. 125.

cent composed of Chinese who were born in Malaya.³⁶ Nevertheless, communist guerrilla activity continues on Malaysia's borders with Thailand and Indonesian Borneo. In June 1968 remnants of the forces of Chin Peng, head of the Malayan Communist Party, were strong enough to organize a successful ambush against Malaysian security troops in the Kroh-Betong border area. The action was characterized by a Government White Paper as a "dramatic gesture to signal the beginning of resurgent Communist militancy."³⁷ Since then, there have been occasional reports of communist terrorist action on both sides of the Thai-Malayan border and of close Thai-Malayan counterinsurgency cooperation in the area. Finally, the communist-infiltrated, if not dominated, Sarawak United People's Party remains active in the federal state of Sarawak.

While the insurgent activity is mainly Chinese and Peking-oriented in character, Malaysia has recently opened up a new chapter in her relations with the Soviet bloc. In 1968 the USSR was Malaysia's largest rubber customer; Rumania purchased \$18 million worth of Malaysian goods while selling Kuala Lumpur commodities worth only \$30,000. Both Rumania and Bulgaria have offered Malaysia long-term credits and deferred-payment plans for purchases or against deliveries in rubber, tin and other Malaysian products. Although Peking has complained against the "Soviet revisionist clique" attempting to make itself "an intimate pal of the Rahman puppet clique . . . the notorious neocolonialist product," it has nonetheless become the fourth largest buyer of Malayan rubber (after the USSR, the United States and Great Britain).³⁸

The new Soviet trade initiative in Southeast Asia's most economically progressive country, enhanced by the fairly successful Trade Fair of September 23-October 12, 1969 (the first such event in ten years), is an "investment" with obvious political

³⁶See Frank N. Trager, "The Federation of Malaysia: An Intermediate Failure?," in Thomas M. Franck, editor, *Why Federations Fail, An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), pp. 125-166.

³⁷Bass, *op. cit.*, p. 128; *Trends and Highlights*, September 1, 1969, pp. 30-31. Mention should also be made of the insurgency in the states of former British North Borneo (i.e., Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah). A pro-Peking group known as the North Kalimantan People's Armed Forces has been active there since 1962. Last year Peking claimed the guerrillas had "developed revolutionary base areas" and were "carrying on a mobile guerrilla war in the hilly regions bordering upon Indonesia and in the jungles of Sarawak." NCNA International Service in English, December 28, 1968.

³⁸*Trends and Highlights*, May 1, 1969, pp. 11-13.

implications. Approximately 200 guests from Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were brought to the fair. These efforts are apparently related to Moscow's effort to establish a presence in the area by drawing a number of the countries of South and Southeast Asia into a so-called system of collective security.

The Philippines. Lawlessness and political violence have increased in the Philippines. In part this is attributable to what Jean Grossholtz calls "the Huk resurgence in Central Luzon." Hukbalahap (i.e., communist) "killer squads" are now operating in this area, which was known in the days of the insurgency as "Huklandia." In response, the government reportedly organized its own killer squads to assassinate Huk leaders and supporters, but lack of success prompted President Marcos to "switch tactics." He freed the well-known Luis Taruc, former Huk leader who had allegedly renounced communism while in jail (since 1954) and become a Roman Catholic, hoping thereby to use Taruc's influence over other Huks; stepped up his rural reform program especially in Pampanga and Tarlac provinces, long regarded as Huk strongholds; and ordered a demilitarized peace and order drive in Central Luzon.³⁹

The new program did not work. By the end of 1968, the volume of Huk terrorist attacks, liquidations, and even assaults on the Philippines' armed forces significantly increased. The Huks had used the demilitarized period to regroup, recruit and prepare for more guerrilla activity. They were said to be assisted by a Communist Chinese army general who gained illegal entry in 1967. In early 1969, President Marcos restored military and police action against the Huks everywhere, except in the two above-mentioned provinces where he apparently still hoped to demonstrate the effectiveness of his reform and amnesty program.⁴⁰

During the year there were additional reports of an upsurge in communist activities. The Huk "shadow government" increased its influence in the towns and villages of Central Luzon, especially Angeles City, reputed center of the movement. Citizens who refused to pay Huk "taxes" were systematically liquidated. From November 1968 to April 1969, 106 died violently in Tarlac

³⁹Jean Grossholtz, "The Philippines: New Adventures with Old Problems," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, pp. 50, 54-55. One recent report indicated that Taruc has been "trying to reorganize the old Socialist Party and has been pressing for the legalization of the Communist Party." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 25-31, 1969, p. 484.

⁴⁰*Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 1, 1969.

and Pompanga provinces alone. The deterioration in security in these provinces brought on a renewed government drive against the Huks. But by mid-year they had begun to extend their activities to the sugar-rich province of Occidental Negros to the south, and there were reports of Huk recruitment drives in Mindanao and the Visayan islands. The increase in scope and intensity of Huk activities as well as the capture of "subversive documents" in raids in Tarlac and Capas led government leaders to speculate that the Huks might be carrying out a long-term plan for a full-scale rebellion.⁴¹

Indonesia. Indonesia, too, has had a "significant resurgence of Communist activity."⁴² The summer of 1968 witnessed the most decisive encounter between the government and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) since the latter's attempted coup in September 1965 and the aftermath of that struggle. The PKI had regrouped in an area giving it the best advantages Java has to offer in the form of difficult terrain — the South Blitar region. With Peking's encouragement — frequent radio and news broadcasts calling for revolutionary armed struggle — it was apparently planning the first phase of a guerrilla war against Suharto's government. The latter had warned Peking twice, in April and again in August 1968, to stop meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. During this period, the Indonesian Army located the "strong redoubt" of the PKI and smashed it. More than "800 Communist members or suspects were captured, including eight of those believed to be the top 10 leaders of the PKI underground." Among them was Oloan Autopea, reputed to be the successor to Aidit. Interrogation and captured documents "led to the arrest of secret PKI agents elsewhere, including more than 20 field-grade officers of West Java's Siliwangi Command."⁴³

One interesting aspect of the Indonesian situation has been the positions taken by Moscow and Peking.⁴⁴ The latter has consistently condemned the Suharto regime from October 1965 onward. Since 1967 it has openly supported the PKI's "'victorious' application of Mao's strategy of struggle in the countryside." After the PKI defeat at Blitar, it castigated Moscow as

⁴¹*Ibid.*, May 4-10, 1969, p. 324, August 17-23, 1969, pp. 452-453, September 21-27, 1969, p. 814.

⁴²John M. Allison, "Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists," *Asian Survey*, February 1969, p. 132.

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 132-133. See also Jay B. Sorenson, "Moscow's Djakarta Dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 8-14, 1969, pp. 613-617.

⁴⁴This paragraph is based on Sorenson, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

"the greatest danger to . . . the Indonesian Communist Party," and charged Moscow with collaborating with the United States in making available to Suharto's government military supplies which the latter presumably used in its attacks on the PKI. *Pravda* in a September 1968 statement "assigned Peking direct responsibility for July and August, for the 'thousands' killed in East Java." Mao and his clique were guilty, according to the Soviets, of "adventurism," of turning Indonesia "into a firing ground."

In the meantime, Moscow has had to reassess its Indonesian policy in light of the Suharto government's strong anti-communist attitude and the renewed militancy of the PKI. It has been forced to accept rescheduling of Indonesia's huge debt to the USSR incurred during Sukarno's regime, but has been able to halt shipments of spare parts for the MIG's, Ilyushins, and other military equipment previously allocated to Djakarta. And it has allowed civilian projects, such as the Asahan hydroelectric complex in North Sumatra, to stand unfinished. It is significant to note that Indonesia was omitted from the list of "friendly" countries designated by Foreign Minister Gromyko as possible members of an Asian collective security system. These developments, despite the recent renewal of low-level trade in nonstrategic goods, probably represent a pause until Moscow can reassess its position and decide how to continue in that sprawling, inviting island empire.

India. With respect to the execution of communist policy, the case of India resembles that of Burma. Between 1947 and 1959, Moscow and Peking (after 1949) treated existing governments in India to the same set of "hard" and "soft" strategies in the same sequence, though not with the same effects. Their divergence on policy emerged after the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Moscow, already at odds with Peking, refused to alter its "soft" line, while Peking reverted to the "hard" line both had pursued before 1954. (Peking's line on Burma changed only in 1967.)

There are now three communist parties in India. The one under Chairman S. A. Dange, the original CPI, is loyal to Moscow. The second, under E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former Chief Minister of Kerala,⁴⁵ and Jyoti Basu, Deputy Chief Minister of West Bengal, began as the CPI (Marxist), critical of Moscow and friendly to Peking. When its section in West Bengal, represented

⁴⁵In October 1969 Namboodiripad's United Front government, headed by the CPI (Marxist), collapsed due to interparty rivalry. It was replaced by a new coalition under the Chief Ministership of a Right Communist, Chelatt Achuta Menon.

in that state's coalition government, supported the suppression of a peasants' protest at Naxalbari and thereby was condemned by Peking as "revisionist," the third communist party emerged. Known as the Marxist-Leninist CPI and led by Charu Mazumdar, the latter, formed in May 1969, is staunchly loyal to Mao and MTT and is pledged to fight against all "revisionists."

There is no doubt that the "2000 years" of Indian-Chinese friendship, "Hindi, Chini, Bai, Bai" — the slogan of Nehru, Krishna Menon, Arthur Lall and others in the 1950's — was fractured in 1962 and remains so to the present. But the Moscow-Delhi relationship is more subtle. Moscow is friendly to the Congress Party government (especially to the Congress forces controlled by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi), as it has been since the post-Stalin era. But it also finds a way to support the CPI. As the Congress Party displays its increasing fissures and incapacity to govern, Soviet criticism becomes more intense. India recently felt called upon to lodge a protest against Radio Peace and Progress and gently remonstrated with the Soviet government for having proceeded to build in India a multi-million-dollar cultural center, despite India's regulations prohibiting such projects. Meanwhile, Moscow has taken steps to realign the CPI and the CPI Marxists, now scorned by Peking. It supports "parliamentary fights" and participation in coalition state governments where necessary. It urges support for the CPI's demands, designed to push the present Gandhi-led Congress government over the brink to economic disorder. Peking, on the other hand, supports the Nagas, the Naxalbari "revolt" of the peasants, and other revolutionary confrontations.

It is in this sense that the Soviet "soft" line, as always, is the more dangerous. It operates on two levels: correct or "friendly" government-to-government relations where it can use its power of aid and trade as a political weapon; and propaganda and other means of support for its indigenous communist followers who, by one means or another, expect to "take over." On the other hand, Peking's unsubtle, blunt name-calling and hostility are so clearly recognizable that the decision to be "for" or "against" its policy can be made by any literate political mind.

IV

Intense factional rivalry between the Maoists within and outside mainland China and the leadership of the CPSU has af-

fects the Asian communist parties. On the whole, the ruling communist parties have either remained loyal to Moscow (Outer Mongolia) or have tried to steer a balanced course between the CPSU and the Maoists (North Viet Nam and North Korea). Where "splits" have occurred within a national party, e.g., India, Moscow has retained the support of at least one section. However, the majority on the Asian roster of communist parties or factions are generally pro-Peking. Whether the new *Analects*, MTT, will retain its political control over mainland China and its influence among the communist parties or factions of Central, South, Southeast and East Asia remains to be seen. There is reason to question the survivability and continuing Asian influence of the Maoist "dynasty" (not to be confused with the CCP), with Lin Piao as constitutional but unhealthy heir apparent and Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and Lin's wife, Ye Chun—both members of the top group in the new Central Committee — as two potential rival empresses. The extraordinary "cult of personality" represented in Mao and MTT, surpassing anything accorded to Stalin in his lifetime, is predictably unsustainable once Mao departs the scene. On the other hand, the danger of irrational or adventurist Maoist behavior in the short run is heightened. Communist China has a significant number of medium-range ballistic missiles. Three new launching sites are reportedly being built at Shenyang, Nanchang and Nanning. These are in position to affect Japan, Taiwan, South Viet Nam and Thailand. Brezhnev reminded his comrades in his June 7 speech that

possibly, many . . . here remember Mao Tsetung's speech in this hall [of the Kremlin] during the 1957 meeting. With appalling airiness and cynicism he spoke of the possible destruction of half of mankind in the event of an atomic war. The facts indicate that Maoism is not calling for a struggle against war, but on the contrary, for war which it regards as a positive phenomenon in historical development.

It will be recalled that during the period of the Sino-Indonesian axis, 1960-1965, Sukarno with the backing of Peking raised the banner of coalition, called the New Emerging Forces (NEFO), which, in the manner of the Leninist "two-camp" thesis, would oppose the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO). NEFO at that time included Indonesia, Communist China, North Viet Nam, North Korea and Cambodia. With funds supplied by Peking, Sukarno staged the 1963 GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces), a rival to the Olympic Games, and tried to organize a large international NEFO conference. At the height of the axis

relationship, Foreign Ministers Subandrio and Chen Yi issued a joint statement in January 1965 reaffirming their mutual international obligations and agreeing "to strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field."⁴⁶

There is no evidence yet that Indonesia and Communist China had formally agreed to a pact or treaty, but in 1965 the Peking-Djakarta axis was moving in that direction. NEFO, despite Sukarno's bombast, was an organizational step beyond that envisaged by the 1955 Bandung Conference. It foreshadowed an alliance system between communist and noncommunist, so-called Third World, governments. The effort collapsed in the aftermath of the September 30, 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, but it has been revived in another quarter.

In the full text of L. I. Brezhnev's June 7 speech to the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties,⁴⁷ the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee devoted considerable attention to four types of Soviet-inspired international organizations: the Warsaw Treaty Organization; the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; the need for "a sound alliance of all progressive anti-imperialist forces," a new "world-wide anti-imperialist front" to combat the rival "system" of capitalism-imperialism, "above all U.S. imperialism, the main force of world reaction"; and "a system of collective security in Asia."

This last item, coming near the end of a long, three-part speech, had received a careful buildup in the preceding text. It rested on an analysis of "Communist assistance to and support of these young countries of Africa and Asia," their roles in the anti-imperialist, anti-neocolonialist struggle, their class composition (workers, peasants, intelligentsia, youth), and their national liberation struggles and movements. Brezhnev pointed out that the European communist parties had addressed themselves to "a concrete program of achieving the security of the European peoples, stability of frontiers and peaceful cooperation of European states." Now, he said, "the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia." He omitted, at this point, Africa.

There appears to have been no further public discussion or resolution on this issue at the June meeting. However, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Troyanovsky, on his return to Tokyo, in-

⁴⁶Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 262-264.

⁴⁷"For Greater Unity of Communists, For a Fresh Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *op. cit.*, note 14.

licated that various Soviet ambassadors to Asian countries had been recalled for consultations during June, but that the Soviet Union had not yet decided which specific countries in Asia should be invited to join the proposed security system. He favored as many as possible.⁴⁸

Though several comments appeared and questions were raised about the meaning of Brezhnev's proposal, it was left to Foreign Minister Gromyko to amplify in some respects the intent of the General Secretary. On July 10, in a far-ranging report on foreign policy, Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union, an Asian and a European power, seeks collective security systems "where the danger of unleashing armed conflicts is concentrated."⁴⁹ Such a system, he went on, is not "directed against a certain country or group of countries." It is "a question of the collective efforts of all Asian states of safeguarding security in that part of the world in their common interests." Then, in a series of disjointed paragraphs, he mentioned divers noncommunist Asian countries in the following order: Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Ceylon, Malaysia and Singapore. With all of them the USSR desired "friendly," "good-neighborly," cooperative or cordial relations. Apparently, these states could be considered for potential membership in the USSR's Asian collective security pact.

One must assume that Brezhnev and Gromyko are aware that most Asian governments for various reasons desire to avoid collective security systems, whether led by Moscow or Washington. The Soviets also know that some Asian leaders are cautiously moving toward regional associations which join "neutralist" states to others that are currently allied with Washington. Moscow optimally would like to have Asian regional associations join with it in its "system of collective security," but in proposing such a system, the Kremlin has more immediate strategic and tactical objectives in mind.

At least two hypotheses may be advanced for this Soviet move. It may be interpreted, to quote Peking, as "an anti-China military alliance"⁵⁰ designed primarily to serve Soviet strategic interests vis-

⁴⁸Tokyo General Overseas Service in English, June 29, 1969.

⁴⁹"Questions of the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, note 13.

⁵⁰NCNA Peking International Service in English, reporting a *Hsinhua* correspondent's text, June 28, 1969. There is ground for this Peking interpretation. On May 28, 1969, in an article by V. Matveyev, a leading political commentator, *Izvestia* called attention to the China issue and alluded to what Brezhnev later announced in his speech of June 7. Matveyev also pointed to the withdrawal of British and American forces from the area.

à-vis the CPR. The second hypothesis derives from the foregoing analysis of the more subtle character of Soviet ideology and practice. The Soviets have invested heavily in Asia, both in such communist countries as Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Viet Nam,⁵¹ and in certain noncommunist countries. These investments now provide leverage to gain access to the Indian Ocean, hasten the decline of the West's influence in the area and prevent any new Asian regional grouping from acquiring significant defense capability.

In this connection, it is instructive to note the amount of economic and military aid the Soviet Union has invested in neutral Asia since the Bulganin and Khrushchev visits to Asia in 1955-1956. (See Table I.)

TABLE I ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOC AID TO "THIRD WORLD" OR NEUTRAL ASIA, 1954-1968 (In \$U.S. Millions)		
	<u>Military Aid</u>	<u>Economic Aid</u>
Afghanistan	\$ 250	\$709
Burma		40
Cambodia	10	30
Ceylon		82
India	610	1948
Indonesia	1340	635
Laos	under 5*	
Nepal		20
Pakistan	10	234
	\$2225	\$3698

*now formally excluded

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968*, Research Memorandum RSE-65, September 5, 1969, and Stephen P. Gibert and Wynfred Joshua, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

As Americans know from experience, the use of aid as a political weapon is not a guarantee of increased diplomatic leverage in the target country. Sometimes it is even counterproductive. But it is still true that all bilateral aid-giving countries, big or small, believe in its utility. It seems plausible to assume that there exists a direct connection between Moscow's trade and aid program in

"Moscow's military and economic aid to North Viet Nam has been running at a rate of \$1 billion annually since 1965, indicating that its support for "wars of national liberation" is more than mere rhetoric. See Bordonaro, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

South and Southeast Asia; its desire to organize a system of collective security in the area—especially in light of the British withdrawal from Asia and the continuing reduction of U.S. combat forces on mainland Southeast Asia; and its strategic interests vis-à-vis Communist China. The convergence of these three factors provides a more adequate—and in our view a correct—explanation of Soviet behavior. The Soviets appear to be taking advantage of the Chinese threat to draw the above-mentioned Asian countries into their ideological orbit. For this purpose, their heavy investment in Asia over the past twelve years serves as an additional instrument in their diplomatic briefcase. If this hypothesis is correct, it represents still another example of the coalescence of ideological and strategic interests which has been central to Soviet foreign policy for over half a century.⁵²

V

In a sense, there is no conclusion to an article of this kind. The two communist meetings defined their respective ideology, strategy and tactics within the recognizable pattern of previous communist gatherings. True, there is a serious factional fight between the respective leaders of the CCP and the CPSU. In earlier decades such factional fights were not uncommon within and between communist parties. They led to purges, splits, liquidations, assassinations, to formations of separate "internationals," and to armed invasions of one communist-controlled state by another. The differences between the factions have always been intensely felt and severely treated. As Lenin said, there is no "third road." The CPSU appears to have more ample means of all kinds at its disposal than its current rival, the CCP.

For the Asian countries, objects of both rival interests, one can easily predict futures that do not hold promise of peaceful development. They have been kept in turmoil and conflict for more than two decades of their independence. East Asia will probably suffer least and mainland Southeast Asia most from future communist strategies. The latter will continue to be guided by

⁵²Dr. Bernard Gordon, who commented on this paper when it was presented at the annual American Political Science Association meeting in September 1969, pointed out that the USSR sought but did not receive a base on Java in 1963; that there exist at present informal refueling agreements between Moscow and New Delhi; and that Cambodia's new port at Sihanoukville (built in part with U.S. aid) may be the political target for Moscow's current moves in Cambodia. There is no doubt that Moscow is currently seeking a military-strategic beachhead in the Indian Ocean area.

communist ideology, by a "two camp" analysis of the Asian world.

Some observers of the current communist scene believe that for Peking dominance and control over mainland Southeast Asia is vital. That is, Southeast Asia with respect to Peking is comparable to Eastern Europe with respect to Moscow, or Canada and Mexico to Washington. For Moscow Southeast Asia is of strategic importance, not a vital national interest. The distinction between the view from Moscow and that from Peking has at best a short-run significance. It will matter little to the victims whether the application of communist ideology, power and interest is made by Leonid Brezhnev or Mao Tsetung.

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STATEMENT OF MILORAD POPOV*

(The following is a section of the profile of the United States written by Professor Milorad Popov, who is assistant editor of the Hoover Institution *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*.)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The communist movement in the United States includes a number of rival parties, with estimated memberships ranging from fewer than 10 persons to some 13,000 and offering a broad variety of views in their domestic and foreign policies. In addition to these "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist parties are numerous groups—primarily among young persons and the country's ethnic minorities—that espouse Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology.¹ Mercurial in their political views and often heterogeneous organizationally, these latter groups, such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panther Party (BPP), continued in 1969 as in the previous year to represent a challenge to the regular communist parties (see below).

CPUSA. The oldest and largest of the orthodox communist parties in the United States is the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), founded in 1919. In 1967 the party became federally legal, following a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (see *YICA*, 1968, p. 609), but electoral restrictions against it are in force in certain States.

In May 1969 the party's general secretary, Gus Hall, estimated that the CPUSA had a membership of 12,000 to 13,000 (*Washington Post*, 2 May). While the dues-paying membership figures quoted by Hall approximated those claimed in 1968, there was no apparent reference in 1969 to earlier party assertions of an additional 100,000 supporters (see *YICA*, 1968, p. 609, and *YICA*, 1969, p. 834). The population of the United States is 202,748,000 (estimated 1969).

The CPUSA is not represented politically at either national or local levels. The party's most recent major bid for elective office was made in 1968, when it sponsored the candidacies of Charlene Mitchell and Michael Zagarell to the posts of President and Vice President of the United States, respectively. This was the first time that the CPUSA had contested a presidential election since 1940, when its then general secretary, Earl Browder, received 48,579 votes, with the party on the ballot in 32 States. In 1968 the CPUSA was on the ballot only in the States of Minnesota and Washington and received 1,075 votes out of a total of some 78 million. In 1969 elections in New York City, the party's candidates were Rasheed Storey for mayor and Jesús Colon for comptroller. Neither contestant was successful.

Organization and Leadership. The CPUSA is organized along the lines of democratic centralism. At the party's 19th National Convention, in 1969 (see below), the secretariat section of the CPUSA was abolished. Thus, theoretically, authority is to flow from the national convention (which should be held every 2 years according to the party's constitution), to the national committee, to the national executive board, and then to the districts, where organizations may be set up on the levels of States, counties, sections, and clubs. In some districts where membership is sparse, the organizational channel runs directly from the district to the club. Clubs are set up on a variety of bases, such as electoral subdivisions, neighborhoods, areas, shops, or industries. In the months following the 19th National Convention it appeared that the name of the national executive board had been changed to the national political committee and that the functions of the former secretariat were to a certain degree being carried out by an "organization bureau," headed by Daniel Rubin as national organizational secretary.

The 19th National Convention reelected Gus Hall as general secretary of the party and Henry Winston as its chairman. It also elected an 83-member national committee. This committee, in turn, elected the national executive

*Prior to continuation of these hearings on April 1, 1971, Chairman Ichord directed this statement be included in the record at this point.

¹ The numerous organizations and factions in this category are not considered Marxist-Leninist groups by officially constituted communist parties, either domestic or foreign; their review, therefore, goes beyond the limitations of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. For further information see Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "Radicalization and Fragmentation of the New Left," in *Liberty Under Law. Anarchy, Totalitarianism* (n.p., American Bar Association, 1969). See also such publications as the weekly *Guardian* and the monthly *Liberation* (both published in New York) and the publications of the respective organizations (cited by Drachkovitch, *op. cit.*).

board (or national political committee as it was later called). This latter group is believed to comprise the following 20 persons: Gus Hall, Matthew Hallinan, James Jackson, Arnold Johnson, Claude Lightfoot, Hyman Lumer, George Meyers, Charlene Mitchell, William Patterson, John Pittman, Irving Potash, Roscoe Proctor, José Ristorucci, Daniel Rubin, Rasheed Storey, Jarvis Tyner, Henry Winston, Carl Winter, Helen Winter, and Michael Zagarell. Most of the members of the national political committee are also party officials. In addition to the aforementioned posts held by Hall, Rubin, and Winston, the following were officials in 1969: Hallinan (educational secretary), Jackson (international affairs secretary), Johnson (public relations secretary), Lightfoot (cochairman of the Black Liberation Commission), Lumer (national education director and associate editor of *Political Affairs*), Meyers (cochairman of Labor Commission), Mitchell (secretary of Black Liberation Commission), Patterson (cochairman of Black Liberation Commission), Pittman (coeditor of *Daily World*), Proctor (cochairman of Labor Commission), Carl Winter (coeditor of *Daily World*), and Zagarell (national youth director).

Outside its party structure the CPUSA in 1969 had no official auxiliary bodies (such as organizations for young persons and women). Nonetheless, the party was active in a number of organizations which, though professing independence of the CPUSA, followed the party's policy and directives and were composed primarily of party members. One of the principal organizations falling into this pattern was the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America, which acted as the unofficial youth movement of the CPUSA and whose chairman was Jarvis Tyner. During the course of 1969 the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs—whose membership had declined drastically since 1967 (see *YICA*, 1969, p. 835)—was gradually dissolved as preparations were made for the founding of an official CPUSA youth group (see *Daily World*, 25 September, 23 October, 13 and 25 November, and 4 December).¹

The CPUSA derives its principal source of support from the States on the east and west coasts, primarily from the States of New York and California. Within labor organizations the party is insignificant. In his speech to the 19th National Convention, Henry Winston noted that in 1966 (at the time of the party's 18th Convention) the CPUSA organization was "practically nonexistent in the South," and also admitted that "the organizational status of [the party] was nearly nonexistent in basic industry throughout the country." While claiming that since that time "hundreds of clubs" had been formed "from one end of the country to the other," Winston called "on the whole Party to make a decisive turn to build the Party and the press among the workers in basic industry, in auto, steel, aircraft, electronics and transport first of all, in all industrial centers of our country, with special attention to the South." (Henry Winston, *Build the Communist Party: The Party of the Working Class*, New York, New Outlook Publishers, 1969, pp. 5, 6, 14). In pursuance of the party's policy of "industrial concentration," the convention resolved to single out the above industries and to give "special attention" to the party districts of Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and Indiana (*Daily World*, 7 May; *Political Affairs*, July 1969).

Party Internal Affairs. The CPUSA held its 19th National Convention in New York City from 30 April to 4 May 1969. The convention was attended by 245 regular and 19 alternate delegates and by some 100 invited observers. Foreign representation included Sergio Kentish and Rafael Romero, international affairs secretary and labor secretary, respectively, of the Puerto Rican Communist Party, and Norman Freed, member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party of Canada.

One of the main features of the convention was the CPUSA's attempt to re-establish party unity and discipline, which apparently had undergone erosion since the convention in 1966. Appeals for a strict adherence to the practice of democratic centralism were reiterated by Gus Hall and Henry Winston and were included in the final Main Political Resolution adopted by the delegates.² In his remarks to the convention, Winston declared: "Comrades, factionalism is a most destructive force. It is incompatible with membership in our Party. It

¹ At a convention in Chicago, 7-9 February 1970, a new "Young Workers Liberation League" was founded. The league, which also uses the name "Young Communist Liberation League," comprises in its leadership many of the former W. E. B. DuBois Clubs leaders, in addition to leaders of the CPUSA such as Jarvis Tyner and Michael Zagarell.

² For texts of Hall and Winston's speeches and the Main Political Resolution see Hall's *On Course: The Revolutionary Process* (96 pp.), Winston's *Build the Communist Party: The Party of the Working Class* (32 pp.), and the party's *The United States in Crisis: The Communist Solution* (96 pp.), all published in New York by New Outlook Publishers, 1969.

must be rooted out of our ranks, firmly and without hesitation." Turning to the issue of opposition expressed by party militants to the CPUSA's support in 1968 of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, he stated :

It is important to understand that democratic centralism is indivisible. It must apply to all policies, all decisions without exception. Some comrades who disagree with the Party's position on the events in Czechoslovakia have asked why we cannot demand unity on domestic questions but allow disagreement on international questions. These comrades fail to see the oneness of Party policy. They fail to see that it stems from one body of theory, one set of principles. Differences on international questions are therefore quickly reflected in differences on domestic questions. (*Build the Communist Party*, pp. 25, 26; see also *Political Affairs*, July 1969, p. 13.)

Gus Hall, in his speech to the convention, underscored the need to "put an end to a situation where a small number of comrades can keep the Party in constant internal turmoil." He pointed out that the CPUSA's unity was threatened from "Right and Left pressures," and that the membership had "many political and ideological hangups." (*On Course*, pp. 93-94.) The Main Political Resolution adopted by the convention encompassed many of the critical remarks expressed by Winston and Hall. The resolution referred to "widespread conservatism" in the party's ranks as having led "repeatedly to tailing behind events and to sectarian isolation," while, at the same time, it noted that "petty-bourgeois radicalism and 'Leftism'" were "by no means without influence in Party ranks." Also noted were "a number of weaknesses in the work of the Party leadership at all levels." It was claimed that there existed "a serious gap, a lack of contact, between leadership and membership," and that "bureaucratic tendencies and formalistic approaches to work" were "all too widespread." (*The United States in Crisis*, p. 88.)

In an evaluation of the convention, organizational secretary Daniel Rubin stated that alongside "the outstanding achievements of the Convention there were a number of weaknesses." One of these, according to Rubin, was the failure to solve all problems of party unity. (*Political Affairs*, July 1969.) While the new leadership of the party in the 20-member political committee (see above) appeared to comprise only supporters of Gus Hall, dissidence (primarily centered in California) was still apparent within the party. In the fall Dorothy Healey, the chairman of the party in Southern California, was removed from her post and reportedly expelled. Later in the year Al Richmond, editor of the CPUSA West coast organ, *People's World*, another leading member of the CPUSA and like Dorothy Healey an opponent of the party's views of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was replaced in his editorial function by Carl Bloice, a member of the national committee.

Domestic Views and Policies. In its Main Political Resolution the CPUSA's 19th National Convention stated: "The brightest star on the political horizon is the process of radicalization taking place among the American people. It is an historic development of great meaning" (*The United States in Crisis*, p. 65). The complex nature of the alleged "radicalization" in the United States, however, combined with the CPUSA's continuing apparent desire to legitimize itself to as broad a sector of the public as possible, confronted the party with the task of adopting policies which to some of the membership at times appeared irreconcilable. Thus on the electoral level in 1968 the party's "three-pronged" tactic of working within the two-party system, supporting "forces who had gone beyond reliance on the [Democratic and Republican] parties," and campaigning for the CPUSA had caused considerable misunderstanding within party ranks (see *YICA*, 1969, pp. 836-7).

In his speech to the party's 1969 convention, Gus Hall reviewed both the advantages and the pitfalls of this tactic. He stressed that party members should "see the three prongs of [CPUSA] policy as expressing three phases of one movement. They also resemble a chain in that if one link is dropped it affects the whole chain. Therein lies the danger of one-sidedness." Referring to the party's support in 1968 of the presidential campaign of Eugene McCarthy (a member of the U.S. Senate seeking nomination by the Democratic Party), Hall lamented: "Such one-sidedness occurred also in working within the Democratic Party with the idea that the McCarthy movement was the only form of independence." (*On Course*, pp. 65-70.) The convention's Main Political Resolution reiterated: "It is necessary to shift emphasis to meet changing situations, but

a correct electoral policy demands giving leadership on *all* levels, not only in words but in deeds" (*The United States in Crisis*, p. 25; emphasis in text).

During 1969 opposition to the CPUSA's multioriented approach was evident from both left and right wings of the party. At the convention the left opposition represented by the "Portland Youth Club Statement" submitted by Don Hamerquist accused the party leadership of "postponing the struggle for socialism until the democratic struggles are won." Referring to the "Portland Youth Club Statement" as "the most outspoken attack on the party along these lines," Hall stated that its call for a "pure" revolutionary strategy would "only lead in one direction—toward the bog of ultra-Leftism and Trotskyism." Criticism from the right was also expressed at the convention in a resolution submitted by the Southern California District Convention, which Hall characterized as seeing "only the existence of individual democratic struggles" and rejecting "any idea of their integrated, anti-monopoly character." Claiming that such an approach reduced CPUSA policy to "that of bourgeois liberals, who also see democratic struggles but cannot see the basic class character of monopoly capitalism," Hall warned: "This too leads only in one direction—into the bog of social democracy." (*On Course*, pp. 85-86; see also *Daily World*, 3 May.)

The debate within the party as to the most effective policies to be carried out for the furtherance of CPUSA aims was evidenced by the fact that by the end of the year no final party program had been published—despite repeated assurances of its imminent publication and the issuance of two drafts since 1966.¹ On the other hand, the flexibility of political options available to the CPUSA within its multi-form strategy gave the party a certain degree of freedom in its activity during the course of the year.

One of the major areas of activity in which the CPUSA participated was that of opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam. Prominent party members were active in the preparatory work for and participated in the demonstrations organized by the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam, which in July was renamed the "New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam" (NMC). The CPUSA also offered its solidarity to the demonstrations organized by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), although decisionmaking participation in the latter organization appeared to be only indirect through cooperation between the NMC and the VMC.² Mass demonstrations on 15 October were organized by the VMC and on 13-15 November by the NMC and VMC jointly. Earlier in the year the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam organized demonstrations in Washington, D.C., on 18-20 January to coincide with the presidential inauguration ceremonies.

On 15 April this same organization sponsored marches in several major U.S. cities. CPUSA support for and participation in these earlier activities, in contrast to those in the fall, appeared to be limited. Moreover, activities organized by the Student Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (SMC)—including demonstrations on 5-6 April (see below)—did not receive significant CPUSA support, the presumable reason being that since 1968 (see *YICA*, 1969, p. 844) the SMC has been under the control of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). While SWP also held considerable influence within the NMC, a certain degree of limited cooperation between the CPUSA and the Trotskyists was evident, but in some States, such as California, rivalry between the two parties was bitter, particularly in the latter part of the year (see *The Militant*, 31 October, and *Combat*, 15 November, both of New York).

In connection with its activity in opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam and in the implementation of a number of its other policies, the CPUSA continued in 1969 to be increasingly critical of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other extremist elements within the so-called New Left. The trunt of CPUSA criticism appeared to be leveled at the SDS, particularly after the latter's convention in Chicago (18-22 June) when the SDS organization split into a number of factions, with approximately half of the national delegates aligning themselves with the Worker-Student Alliance (WSA) faction, a group controlled by the pro-Chinese Progressive Labor Party (PLP, see below). CPUSA attacks, however, appeared to be considerably less vehement than those expressed by the Socialist Workers Party, whose Young Socialist Alliance affiliate

¹ *A New Program of the Communist Party, U.S.A.*, New York, New Outlook Publishers, 128 pp., was eventually published in May 1970.

² For further information on NMC-VMC relations see statement by Hon. Richard H. Ichord in U.S. Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 91st Cong., 4 November 1969, pp. E9287-89.

represented an increasingly stronger source of attraction to extreme-left youths (see below). While in its reporting of New Left activities the CPUSA repeatedly lamented their tendency toward the use of "confrontation tactics" and "ultra-leftist rhetoric," the party's attitude appeared to be best summarized in the Main Political Resolution of its 19th Convention:

Many of [the New Left] have become involved in catch-all organizations of Leftward-moving students. They embrace many political trends ranging from liberal to anarchist and ultra-Left. The dominant trend remains middle-class radicalism. With regard to their attitude to the working class, a good many in these organizations retain a Marcusean bias and orient themselves toward the national liberation movements. We must, of course, seek to work with these organizations and to influence them.

We must appreciate the speed of their development, and their contribution to the struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and racism. Through such appreciation we can constructively discuss ideological questions with them, reduce differences, and bring even larger numbers to the positions of Marxism-Leninism. (*The United States in Crisis*, pp. 61-62.)

On the issue of civil rights and the problems of minority groups the CPUSA in 1969 as in previous years offered its solidarity both to reform-oriented groups and to those advocating extreme measures. A noticeable development with regard to the latter was the party's rapprochement with the Black Panther Party, which still continued to voice Maoist views in its political statements, though to a lesser degree than before. The BPP-sponsored "National Revolutionary Conference for a United Front against Fascism" on 18-21 July in Oakland, Calif., attracted a number of CPUSA participants, including the party's leading theoretician, Herbert Aptheker, who delivered a keynote speech. Earlier, the CPUSA's 19th National Convention passed a resolution which, claiming that the BPP had "recently moved to organize and lead black workers in industry," committed the CPUSA to "join forces and initiate cooperation with the Black Panther Party in pursuit of these and other goals vital to the liberation of the black people and the victory of the working class" (*Daily World*, 15 May).

This call was reiterated late in the year in an article in *Political Affairs* (November 1969) by William Patterson, cochairman of the CPUSA's Black Liberation Commission. While noting that the BPP leadership had "embraced the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung" and were "enraptured with the role Che Guevara was attempting to play in the countries of South America," Patterson claimed that the BPP "in a remarkably short time, through struggle, had displayed tremendous political growth, development and flexibility." Adding that the Panthers still showed "grave ideological weaknesses" in their political outlook, Patterson concluded:

The membership of the Communist Party should stand in the forefront in defense of the Black Panthers. While conducting a dialogue with the Panthers on the differences that exist between us, this must not stand in the way of solidly supporting the efforts of the Panthers to defeat racism and bring about unity of the black and white working class.

In another area of concern for minority issues, the CPUSA in 1969 showed hitherto unexpressed emphasis to the problems of the American Indian. During a 3-day CPUSA "National Conference on Indian Liberation" in October at an unidentified "location in the west," Milford Sutherland, a member of the party's national committee, pointed out that at the 19th National Convention the CPUSA had "moved from placing Indian Liberation from being an incidental issue affecting a small number of downtrodden people to a recognition that it has great importance for the future of the country." (*Daily World*, 28 and 30 October, and 6 November).

International Views and Policies. A steadfast supporter of the Soviet Union in all its policies, the CPUSA reaffirmed its alignment in 1969. In his speech to the party's 19th National Convention, Gus Hall in referring to relations between communist parties devoted considerable time to defending the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against charges that it advocated the "limited sovereignty of socialist nations." Stressing that the Soviet Union had been "the foremost fighter throughout its long history for the independence and full sovereignty of nations," he reiterated the CPUSA's support for the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968. (*On Course*, pp. 79-82). Hall also placed blame for the Sino-Soviet border disputes on the Chinese, stating: "The armed border attacks on the Soviet forces were due to the Mao dictatorial leadership, which is following a path of rank nationalism and great-power chauvinism." He went on to express "severe condemnation of this crass and dangerous violation of socialist unity and socialist internationalism." (*Ibid.*, pp. 82-83).

In its published commentaries and articles on other communist parties and states the CPUSA also reflected its allegiance to the CPSU. It reported extensively and favorably on developments in countries such as the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, both strong supporters of the Soviet Union. It also defended the Polish government against charges of anti-Semitism (e.g., *Daily World*, 10, 11, 14, 22, and 23 January). In an apparent reflection of Cuban-Soviet rapprochement (see *Cuba*), the CPUSA gave unprecedented favorable coverage to developments in Cuba. In mid-August a high-level delegation (reported as the "first such" since 1960) visited Cuba at the invitation of the Communist Party of Cuba. The six-man CPUSA delegation was headed by the party chairman, Henry Winston (*Daily World*, 13 August). The CPUSA continued also to have cordial relations with the pro-Soviet communist parties in Latin America, with apparent particular cordiality with that of Argentina. Thus on 6 June the *Daily World* reported that the Communist Party of Argentina, at its 13th Congress (25-29 March 1969) had elected Gus Hall an "honorary member of [its] presidium."

In an apparent reflection of Soviet wooing of nonaligned communist parties, combined with a growing interest in North Korea during 1969 among radical groups in the United States, the CPUSA gave considerable favorable emphasis to reports on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its communist party. In this context, the *Daily World* (16-30 September) published an 11-part series of articles on North Korea, which were followed (on 23 and 30 October) by lengthy articles on Kim Il Sung—"Profile of a Patriot"—and on "Korea's Cultural Renaissance."

On all other international issues, from support of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to solidarity with the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the CPUSA followed the Soviet line. With regard to the Middle East, the line was followed despite apparent opposition within the CPUSA from a number of its Jewish members and also opposition from two CPUSA-oriented publications, the *Morning Freiheit*, a Yiddish-language daily, and *Jewish Currents*, a monthly, both of New York (see Hall, *On Course*, p. 90, and *New York Times*, 30 March).

International Party Contacts. CPUSA leaders continued to travel widely in 1969 as they had done the previous year. During the last week of March, James Jackson, international affairs secretary, represented the party at a conference in Moscow on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Communist International. On 4-6 April a party delegation including George Meyers and Claude Lightfoot attended the 20th Convention of the Communist Party of Canada. At the beginning of May, Dorothy Healey was a CPUSA representative in Moscow at events marking the 24th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. The CPUSA was represented at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow on 5-17 June, by delegation led by Gus Hall and Henry Winston. Other members of the delegation were James Jackson, William Weinstone, and Helen Winter. Charlene Mitchell and Bettina Aptheker Kurzweil attended the Sixth Congress of the Soviet-controlled Women's International Democratic Federation, in Helsinki, on 14-17 June. Gil Green, member of the party's national committee, visited Cuba in July, and the aforementioned high-level delegation led by Henry Winston was there in August.

Also in August, a three-man delegation headed by John Pittman traveled to North Korea, remaining there from 19 August to 9 September. Claude Lightfoot visited East Germany in mid-August, where he reportedly issued an "appeal for world support of the persecuted Black Panthers" (*Daily World*, 20 August). Henry Winston led a party delegation to a rally in Moscow on 1 September in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the CPUSA. Gus Hall attended the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in early September and subsequently conferred with Leonid Brezhnev, secretary-general of the CPSU, in Moscow on 16 September.

Publications. The two principal publications of the CPUSA are the *Daily World*, a newspaper published in New York five times a week (Tuesday through Saturday), and *Political Affairs*, a monthly theoretical organ. Other publications following the party's line include *People's World*, a weekly San Francisco newspaper; *Freedomways*, a quarterly review addressed to Negroes; *Labor Today*, a

bimonthly trade union magazine; *American Dialogue*, a quarterly cultural magazine; and *New World Review*, a quarterly magazine on international issues. Former control exercised by the CPUSA over the monthly *Jewish Currents* and the daily Yiddish-language newspaper *Morning Freiheit* appears to have diminished somewhat (see above).

STATEMENT OF VICTOR H. KRULAK

(After the close of the hearings, the speech made by Lt. Gen. V. H. Krulak, USMC, retired, before the World Affairs Council in San Diego, Calif., on March 4, 1971, and biographical data on General Krulak were submitted for inclusion in the record. The biographical material and statement follow:)

LT. GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, RETIRED

Victor Harold Krulak was born in Denver, Colo., January 7, 1913, and was commissioned a marine second lieutenant upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, May 31, 1934. While at the Naval Academy he was coxswain and captain of the crew. His first assignment after completing Basic School at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was with the Marine Detachment aboard the USS *Arizona*, followed by an assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy.

In March 1937 Lieutenant Krulak sailed for Shanghai, China, where he served with the Fourth Marines for 2 years as an intelligence officer and company commander. During this period he began a study of the Chinese people and Chinese military thought which persisted through his career. In 1937-38 he had an opportunity to observe firsthand the Sino-Japanese war and prepared a study of Japanese landing craft which was of great value to the United States in its own landing craft development program.

Lieutenant Krulak departed China in May 1939. On his return to the United States, he completed the Junior Course at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in June 1940, and in October of that year sailed with the 1st Marine Brigade (later the 1st Marine Division), for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he took part in the testing and development of the amphibian tractor, which was later to be of such value in World War II. He was serving on the staff of General Holland M. Smith, then commanding general of Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, when World War II broke out. In May 1942 he was promoted to major.

In September of 1942—then a major—he volunteered for parachute training and was designated a parachutist on February 15, 1943. The following month he sailed for the Pacific area and at New Caledonia took command of the 2d Parachute Battalion, 1st Marine Amphibious Corps. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1943 and took his unit into combat that September at Vella Lavella with the Second New Zealand Brigade.

The following month, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak commanded the diversionary landing of a Marine Task Force on Choiseul in the northern Solomons to cover the Bougainville invasion. During this action in which his command was continually engaged with larger Japanese forces, he earned the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism and the Purple Heart for wounds received in combat. He returned to the United States in November 1943, served at Headquarters Marine Corps until October 1944, then went overseas again.

Overseas, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak joined the newly formed 6th Marine Division as operations officer, taking part in the 82-day Okinawa campaign, then moving, with the division, to North China to participate in negotiating the surrender of Japanese forces in the Tsingtao, China, area.

Returning to this country in October 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak reported to Quantico where he served as assistant director of the Senior School, and participated as one member of the group of officers and civilians who fashioned the basic law affecting the Armed Forces—the National Security Act.

Ordered to Pearl Harbor in June 1950, there Colonel Krulak served as operations officer of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in the early days of the Korean conflict. Subsequently, he moved to Korea as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Division.

Colonel Krulak remained in Korea until the winter of 1951, when he returned to Washington for duty at Headquarters Marine Corps as secretary of the General Staff until June 1955. During this period, and in conjunction with officers from the Navy Department, he helped to design the Navy Department General

Order, which still prescribes the basic relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps.

In August 1955 he rejoined Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, serving as Chief of Staff until he was promoted to brigadier general in July 1956, at which time he assumed duties as assistant division commander, 3rd Marine Division, on Okinawa.

On his return to the United States in July 1957, General Krulak became director of the Marine Corps Education Center, Quantico. While at Quantico, he was promoted to major general in November 1959.

The following month, General Krulak assumed command of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, and in February 1962 was transferred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. In this capacity he advised the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff on guerrilla and irregular warfare.

Upon his departure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March of 1964, General Krulak was assigned as commanding general of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, with the rank of lieutenant general. Serving in this capacity, he commanded all of the marines in the Pacific Ocean area for the ensuing 4 years, from California to Vietnam. During this period he made some 54 trips to the Vietnam theater of Combat Operations. He retired from active duty May 31, 1968.

Since retirement he has been president of the Copley News Service and director of editorial and news policy for the Copley Newspapers.

General Krulak has pursued an extended interest in Chinese history, the economics of national security, and the preservation of our environment. He has written and lectured extensively on these subjects and has received six Freedom's Foundation awards for public addresses.

He has an honorary doctor of laws degree from the University of San Diego.

STATEMENT OF VICTOR H. KRULAK

China—the oldest state in the world. One quarter of all mankind, embodying a culture of depth and continuity unmatched elsewhere on the globe.

One quarter of all mankind; a people who have evolved, in six fateful decades from an Oriental Empire to a communist society.

One quarter of all mankind, most of whom now have memory of no other sort of life than one characterized by deprivation, mass coercion and terror.

In 1809 Napoleon said, "Let China sleep. When it awakes, the world will be sorry."

China is indeed awake and, unless the world faces realistically the nature of that awakening, it is indeed likely to be sorry.

In one brief discussion, it is not possible to treat adequately all the aspects of Red China's interface with her neighbors and with the world at large.

A real understanding of this interface involves consideration of the burden on the little nations of Southeast Asia who must live with a hungry and acquisitive China; of their problems of survival.

It involves an understanding of the race between China and India for modernization and power.

Of the hunger of Japan for Chinese raw materials;

Of the impact of fertilizer, antibiotics and the pill on China's future.

Of the dispute between China and the U.S.S.R. over millions of square miles of border area.

Of the tragic turmoil that has beset China for 25 years.

Of the true state of affairs in Peking today.

But in the interest of time and simplicity, I will speak today on one matter only—what is happening to Mao Tse-tung's government; where it is headed today, and what it means to us.

We are faced with a crisis—nothing less—where the matter of recognition and U.N. membership of Red China are concerned. What should we do, in our own self-interest?

This, of course, has to be a product of what China is; what she means and, more important, *who* is speaking for the 750 million people. In short, just what is going on in Peking? Can we deal with Mao Tse-tung? Should we deal with him?

And that was the purpose of my trip to the Far East—to learn the answers to those questions.

I visited Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and Hong Kong.

I spoke to government leaders, U.S. and foreign diplomats, businessmen, journalists, military people, and personal friends in these areas and hammered continually on the basic question—How strong is Mao's government? What is it doing? Where are its aims? Where is it going? What does it all mean to us?

I believe I got some of the answers.

Just as skilled doctors are likely to disagree on either the diagnosis or treatment of a disease, so the many people to whom I spoke were not unanimous on either the situation in Red China or what needs to be done about it. Mostly, they spoke confidentially and with great candor.

I was impressed, in the end, that their viewpoints did not diverge greatly, and from it all, I believe I was able to distill a clear picture of how a group of real experts sees the situation.

First, let us talk briefly of background. Recall that the Chinese society has lasted for over 2 millennia, based always on the family as the embodiment of the Confucian ideology and as the fabric which held the people together.

The Manchus understood this, and tried to exploit the Confucian system. So did the Mongols before them.

But not the communists. After 2,000 years of family existence, when the communists came into power in 1949, the first thing they sought to destroy was the family.

In a society which had been largely independent of oppressive central government domination in 20 centuries, the Maoists undertook almost overnight to break up the family as a bourgeois instrument of inequality.

They took the farmer from his wife—they dismembered the family fishing crew. They took the children from their parents, set up boarding schools and nurseries, said that all children belonged to the state and tried to teach them to despise their parents.

As a basically independent people, the Chinese had shown an astonishing amount of initiative over the centuries.

The communists undertook to destroy this initiative, and to substitute slogans and theories.

Since they were looking for mechanical efficiency more than anything else, the communists turned their back on the greatest reverence of all where the Chinese people are concerned—the land.

They did such outrageous things as desecrate sacred burial areas, bulldozing over graves and otherwise affronting an ethic that went back for 2,000 years.

They did all of this in order to break with the past and to change the attitude of the people into one of complete subjection to the communist system.

The years between 1950 and 1965 were a constant procession of experiments—experiments involving millions and millions of people, and each aimed at destroying the old order and replacing it with something that would be kindred to Marxist theory.

Each of the experiments gradually faded off in the face of stubborn resistance on the part of the Chinese people. They just would not change. Sometimes they went through the motions. They nodded their heads obediently. But, in the end, they ignored the orders.

Mao Tse-tung and his closest advisers could not stand for this and, in 1966, they launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which was probably the bravest and, at the same time, the most foolhardy idea that anyone has ever attempted to perpetrate on a great mass of people.

Mao realized that he was growing old; that all of his previous experiments had been failures and that he had the opportunity for no more than one more big endeavor. He determined that the only way to correct his previous mistakes was to destroy completely his whole system and to recreate a brand new one which followed the most idealistic communist design.

It is not easy for the world to realize that, despite his personal brutality, Mao is a romantic, a pure Marxist; probably the greatest Marxist theoretician alive.

He sees his destiny clearly—as the man who never compromised; the man who was charged by fate to bring the real essence of Marxism to reality; first, in the lives of 750 million Chinese, and ultimately throughout the world.

Nothing dare stand in the way of his great experiment; least of all the lives and welfare of the people involved. Mao has been given to violence in the face of disagreement since his childhood, which was turbulent because of his impatience and his violent temper.

His consummate brutality where his colleagues and his people are concerned should be no surprise to anyone who reads his history. The blood of millions is on his hands.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was born of a series of experimental failures, each one going to defeat in the face of quiet stubborn resistance by the millions of peasants that are China.

First, there were rural communes, separating 300 million husbands, wives and children, aimed at converting the whole land into impersonal "production units." Children were to be wards of the state. Men and women were to be allowed to cohabit, not as a part of normal existence, but simply for procreation.

It was a failure.—It resulted in less food, lower industrial production, more work and unfulfilled promises.

Then there was total change. Mao determined—almost overnight—that there would be a general subordination of everything to industrialization—"The Great Flying Leap Forward."

This was intended to project China dramatically into the world's manufacturing producers. It included a program of ten million crude backyard blast furnaces, presumably to make industrial steel.

It was a failure, too. The people were lost in a welter of complicated instructions. The backyard steel was almost worthless, and there was a by-product of famine because of reduced emphasis on food production.

Then a dramatic re-shift was decreed—a return from industrialization to a new emphasis on agriculture.

The country was hungry.—Five million dead of famine in a single year.

This, too, was a failure, simply because the bulk of the increased food production went to the cities, and not to the farmer who raised it.

He quickly lost interest.

The next experiment was a period of self-criticism; a program where Mao encouraged critics of Maoism to speak out freely. He called it his "Thousand Flowers" program aimed at getting to the heart of their lack of progress by encouraging critics of the regime to speak their minds.

That failed too. Mao and his cohorts were shocked by the volume and violence of the criticism. They simply could not take the truth. Almost a million so-called activists were ultimately executed for speaking their mind. Ten million more were uprooted and sent to prison or work camps. The brief period of candor came quickly to an end.

Then the Maoists decreed an attack on science and technology, condemning them as opponents of the classless society.—This failed too. It took only a brief year or two to make clear that technicians, scientists and trained men were needed to make the machinery of government and commerce go.

They were far from finished.—An effort was made to convert cities into pure Marxist urban communes, with every act of city living and working completely communized. No initiative; no personal freedom.

Failure. Inefficiency in administration, bureaucracy and stupidity resulted in chaos, hunger and just plain refusal of millions of stubborn Chinese to work.

Then the Maoists tried a mass birth control program to help fight famine.

Failure. The Chinese family would not cooperate.

In the face of this incredible pattern of experimentation with the lives of his people and the unvarying pattern of failure, there was a brief and significant period in 1965 and 1966 when things grew better. This was not because of any improvement in government or enlightenment in leadership but simply because of exhaustion.—The Communist Party relaxed its pressure to experiment, probably because they were worn out and devoid of ideas.

For a brief moment, the people were left alone to live their own simple lives. The result was almost miraculous—more food, more tranquility, more consumer goods—not only because the low level party functionaries were tired of putting their efforts behind Maoist experiments with the lives of the people.

Mao himself, in 1966, was sick with Parkinson's disease; 74 years old, a consummate failure in his effort to prove that Communism is a practise as well as a theory. Weakened physically and mindful that his years were numbered, he determined to make one last major push; one designed to transcend in both scope and results all of those experiments that preceded it.

He decreed what amounted to an attack on his own party mechanism, or the machinery and principles of Marxism.

His scheme was to wipe the slate clean, get rid of every official who had exhibited any doubt whatever of the efficacy of Maoism, purge the intellectuals who had raised questions regarding the regime, wipe out the remaining large businessmen, and try again to create an absolutely classless, totally communized

society. The only people to be left undisturbed were farmers and laborers in industry.

The Red Guards were Mao's instrument; schoolboys in the main; boys who had never been off the farm or out of the classroom.—He turned them loose in the Autumn of 1966 with a free hand to eliminate every vestige of anti-Mao thought. Mao and his cohorts expected that the youths would have done their purging in a month or so, and they certainly expected that the youngsters would respond to the direction of the party leaders.

But it did not work that way. They went wild—killing, stealing, battling among themselves, losing sight completely of the Marxist idealism that was supposed to govern their actions.

The rampaging of the several million irresponsible youth simply crystallized and intensified the opposition to Mao—both in and out of the party. Anti-Mao groups took courage and came out into the open. The country was in turmoil. Strikes and even street fighting between the Red Guards and the contesting factions were common. Wherever he could get someone to obey, Mao's repression was brutal. Deaths and imprisonment were the order of the day.

The government in Peking existed in form, but not in any substance. The fact was, in 1967 and part of 1968, nobody was in charge at the top. It was a hollow shell. Low level civil functionaries did pretty much as they pleased. Many simply stopped functioning. People everywhere felt relief at the lack of government supervision, and were free to criticize Mao and his minions. Under the influence of anti-Maoists, things grew substantially better, particularly in the countryside.

Mao saw that his regime was tottering—about to be engulfed in civil war, involving not just the party, but the cities and farms as well. In desperation he finally turned on the farmers and laborers, whom he had spared previously. He declared that all dissident farmers and industrial workers had to be purged, too. He ordered the people's liberation army to enter the battle to restore and keep the peace.

The only problem was, large segments of the liberation army were not loyal to Mao. The great bulk of the forces insisted on remaining aloof; refusing to enter the conflict, refusing to intervene in Mao's behalf; willing at most, to keep some semblance of law and order in the countryside.

In the end, the army was loyal only to itself. Its leaders realized that it stood as the only stabilizing power in all China. They were not committed to ideology as much as to maintaining the focus of power, and building up their nuclear strength against a possible confrontation with the Russians. They are tough men, they are patient men. They have the strength, and it grew clear, as early as 1968, that they would ultimately run the country.

With political opposition visible on all sides, with the army insisting on staying in the wings, Mao saw his era coming to an end and, like the real fighter that he is, elected to give it one final try.

Almost with a wave of a wand, in late 1968, he went all the way. He declared that henceforward all of China—urban and rural—would become a truly proletarian state, with absolutely every act of authority discharged by committees of the people.

Whether it was a store, a farm, a factory, a newspaper or a school, it would be administered by committees of the persons doing the work. Everyone would have the same pay and the same privileges. Committee members would be subject to instant recall by their fellow workers.

Of course, the idea collapsed. The Chinese people were fed up with arbitrary experiments that disrupted their lives. They were patient and quiet, but simply ignored Mao and his directives. He was defeated by his own philosophy. He had always said, "Let the masses manage the affairs of the state." They did.

That brought us up to about 1970—a year or more ago. Mao since has had to offer a procession of face-saving compromises—just to stay in a position of nominal authority—more freedom for the farmer, amnesty for his enemies, concessions to the army. That is what is going on now. The Mao regime is trying desperately to put on the face of success, to preserve the fiction that their Marxist inoculation has taken on the Chinese people; that he and his cohorts are in fact the nation's leaders.

The fact is, they are not. They are hated and ignored today, and another in the long train of Chinese dynasties is passing. Although among the shortest, and certainly the most oppressive, like all of its successors over a 3,000 year span, like the Mongols and the Manchus, it will simply have to leave some mark on the amorphous Chinese people.

The Chinese administrative procedures of the future will certainly see the effect of Maoist totalitarianism. The viciousness of Mao's 20 years of attack on his enemies will be felt everywhere, and the Maoists mania of totally isolated superiority will make relations with the outside world most difficult for his successors to engineer.

Mao believed he and his China were destined to make over the world. His successors are going to have to make up their minds that wars of national liberation are really not their bag, that they will be lucky if they can manage their own internal affairs while maintaining some facade of sovereignty in facing the outside world.

They have grave economic problems, brought on by a quarter of a century of experimentation. They have serious agricultural problems. Even though this year's grain harvest was good, it is still less than needed for a bare subsistence diet.

In the face of these facts, all of which are available to the Department of State and thus to our legislators in Washington, it will be well to go directly to the subject of Red China recognition, and the United Nations.

It is obviously a major issue facing the United States this year. In addition to the Communist countries, several of the larger non-Communist nations have established some form of relationship with Peking; Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Sweden and Norway are the principal ones.

Last year about 40% of the required 66% of the United Nations were in favor of seating the Maoists. Now the pressure is on us.

There the key phrase is, "Establish a meaningful dialog."

Some of the U.S. diplomatic people to whom I spoke, some of our business people, some of our foreign friends, speak to the wisdom of our "talking meaningfully to a people who constitute a quarter of all mankind." And the implication is that we should do it at once.

But by no means does everyone feel this way.

Others contend that, applied to the conditions of today, this is the worst sort of sophistry, and I have to agree.

Even if we could somehow talk to the Chinese people at large, they wouldn't know what to talk about. They are simple, provincial folk, whose horizon does not extend far beyond their own village. Eighty-five percent of them are existing at the subsistence level or below. Their only aim is to survive; their only satisfaction, caring properly for their elders; their only pleasure, sleeping with their wives.

A dozen times I was reminded that the government which purports to represent them does not. Nobody really does. As I have said, the Maoist leadership is a failure. The great leap forward failed. The great flying leap failed, and the great proletarian cultural revolution failed in a wave of unprecedented blood letting.

Mao has largely lost the helm to a group of generals to whom power and not dialectic is the key and the objective.

What Senators Fulbright and McGovern and our "meaningful dialog" proponents are really contending is that there is some benefit to be found in intercourse, not with the men in the fields and factories, but with a tiny hard core of men—Mao and his threadbare satellites.

And just who are they?

They are a band of nihilistic Marxist brigands who have survived literally by killing off the opposition wherever they found it. Their murders have numbered 15 million since 1949.

They are a group of arrogant and frightened men who have failed in every one of their social experiments, who inspire no loyalty among their people, who really have less popular mandate than Atilla the Hun.

They are a group of perennial losers who, in 1967 and 1969 came within an eyelash of being destroyed as they attacked the very fabric of their own regime.

They are a group of vicious minds who labor under the grotesque idea that they must remake the world; who hate us and all we stand for with a bitterness that defies description; who have supported, sustained and nourished our enemies wherever and whenever they could.

Dialog with them? We might as well get in bed with a nest of rattlesnakes, that is, assuming they would be willing to get in bed with us, which is doubtful.

There is a Chinese proverb that is applicable here—"If you wish to know the road ahead, inquire of those who have travelled it."

Inquire of our British cousins.

They were anxious to create a "meaningful relationship" with Mao and his bandits because of the economic benefits. "Seven Hundred and Fifty Million

Customers," they said. After two years of humiliating haggling, they finally got the Maoists to sign a paper that was supposed to begin a diplomatic and economic give and take.

What became of it?

Ask the British businessman, a tiny trickle of trade, perhaps sixty million dollars annually, and a negative trade balance at that.

Seven hundred and fifty million customers—all broke.

Ask Sir Donald Hopson, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Peking, who, at the beginning of the Red Guards fiasco in 1966, had to stand while Mao's bullies beat him physically, sacked his Embassy and violated the Embassy's women before his eyes.

Ask the Russians—Mao's ideological cousins, and bandits in their own right. Ask them about dialog with the Chinese Marxists.

Ask the Black African countries that have been disillusioned by their presumed Chinese benefactors.

Ask them to tell us just why they threw the Reds out.

Ask them all. Ask them all just how much "meaningful dialog" they had with a "quarter of all mankind". And ask them how they would behave if they had it all to do over again.

The fact is, the United States of America has an opportunity today that comes to few generations. It has both the chance and the challenge to contribute directly to the peace of the world by standing up and telling it like it is, to say, with the confidence of the world's own experience, that there is no such thing as "meaningful dialog" with cutthroats, that where the Mao group is concerned, no written agreement has any value.

"You cannot wrap fire with paper," said a Chinese philosopher.

We can be the rallying point to the whole world on this issue if only we cease equivocating and raise our national voice with the truth.

Dialog with China? There is no argument there. Certainly, we must have it and, if it were definitely in our selfish national interest to do so, we would be justified in dealing with the cutthroats this very day.

But it is not in our selfish national interest. There is no pressure whatever on us to dignify them or help perpetuate them. There is no pressure whatever on us to demoralize the opposition to Mao inside China.

There is no significant promise of fruitful trade with them; not now, or in the early future.

There is certainly no promise of greater security for us in talking with Mao and his irresponsible chauvinist comrades.

It will be far better to talk when there is someone respectable and responsible to talk to. If we will just wait, the Chinese people will throw them out for us. All we need to do is be patient.

"There is a day to cast your nets, and a day to dry your nets," say the Chinese.

We will do well to dry ours for awhile. And that, I submit, should be our national policy.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning, I offered the generalization that China is in both torment and in ferment, and that her torment is critical to the world.

I hope the picture I have projected through the eyes and lips of others, gives meaning to those words.

I hope I have been able to underscore truths that we cannot—that we dare not—elude.

First, the peace of the world—the tranquility of the United States of America—are at stake in Asia.

Second, the economic well being—the standard of living—of the United States of America—are at stake in Asia.

If we walk away from our commitments there, we can expect results so bitter that a generation of Americans will have to pay dearly—in terms of encouragement beyond measure to Red China, with the specter of a Communist dominated Southeast Asia—to include Singapore, Burma, Malaysia and maybe Indonesia.

Whether we like it or not, whether we want it or not—the United States of America has a role to play in Asia.

Ming Yun I Ting.

It is decreed.

If Americans believe in their country and their future, they will heed this ancient counsel.


APPENDIX I




Photograph taken prior to escape showing: 1. Erich Bley; 2. Bob Lowe; 3. Ken Agnew.
(See testimony, page 41.)





Group photograph taken 1 day after escape (Nov. 28, 1970) showing: 1. Ken Agnew; 2. George Butler; 3. Erich Bley; 4. Marlis Bley; 5. Dr. Peter Rost; 6. Dr. Manfred Kupfer; 7. Dr. Reinhold Kupfer; 8. Karl Bley; 9. Doyle Bluemle; 10. Sven Bley; 11. Bob Lowe.
(See testimony, page 41.)





Wristwatch worn by Karl Bley when he jumped ship. (See testimony, page 53.)




<p>Name <i>Bley</i></p> <p>Vorname <i>Karl Heinz</i></p> <p>geboren am <i>27.4.46</i> in <i>Köln</i></p> <p>Mitglied seit <i>11.4.60</i></p> <p>in welcher Grundeinheit aufgenommen <i>Oberer Dienst</i></p> <p>Kreisleitung und Datum der Ausstellung <i>Bitterfeld den 8.7.60</i></p>	 <p><i>Karl Heinz Bley</i> Eigenhändige Unterschrift</p>  <p><i>[Signature]</i> Unterschrift eines Sachverständigen der Kreisleitung</p>
---	---

Karl Bley's Free German Youth identification pass. (See testimony, page 53.)



Pages from Karl Bley's Free German Labor Union membership booklet.
(See testimony, page 53.)



Pages from Karl Bley's Free German Labor Union membership booklet.
(See testimony, page 53.)

VEB DEUTSCHE SEEREEDEREI ROSTOCK



*jetzt Betrieb
- Kaderabteilung -*

Liniendienste

Großbritannien
Belgien/Niederlande
Finnland
UdSSR
Nord-Levante - Süd-Levante

Westafrika
Rotes Meer
Ostafrika
Kuba
Indien

Ihr Zeichen

Ihre Nachricht

Unser Zeichen
PAK 1 84.

Hausapparat

25 Rostock, den **23.12.68**

Beurteilungsanforderung

Der Kollege / Die Kollegin **Kley, Karl-Heinz** geb. am **nicht bekannt**

ist / war bei Ihnen beschäftigt als **Betriebsanführer** hat sich bei uns für eine Tätigkeit in unserer Handelsflotte beworben. Entsprechend der besonderen Struktur unseres Betriebes, hervorgerufen durch unsere Schiffsverbindungen mit dem kapitalistischen Ausland, besonders nach den Maßnahmen vom 13. August 1961, ergeben sich für die Hochseehandels-schiffahrt besondere Kaderrichtlinien, die unbedingt beachtet werden müssen.

Aus diesem Grunde bitten wir Sie, umgehend eine umfassende Beurteilung zu erarbeiten und **unbedingt in zweifacher Ausfertigung**

dem Bewerber für die Aussprache zu übergeben (gegebenenfalls versiegelt, auf Ihren Wunsch wird dem Bewerber eine Empfangsbestätigung mitgegeben) ~~an unser Einstellungs-büro zu übersenden.~~

Diese Beurteilung muß vom Parteisekretär, FDJ-Sekretär und BGL-Vorsitzenden mit unterzeichnet und vom Betrieb (Dienststelle) gestempelt sein

Auf folgende Gesichtspunkte bitten wir, besonders einzugehen:

1. Fachliche Leistungen (einschließlich Arbeit-moral und Arbeitsdisziplin)
2. Die Treue zur DDR, Stellung zum Wehrpflichtgesetz und zur Ableistung des Ehrendienstes in der NVA, sowie zu Maßnahmen der Partei und Regierung
3. Ausführliche Schilderung der bisherigen gesellschaftlichen Mitarbeit (konkrete Darlegung über die Mitarbeit in der Partei oder in Massenorganisationen des Betriebes sowie im Wohngebiet erforderlich)
4. Weitere Hinweise:
 - a) evtl. Verbindungen nach Westdeutschland und Westberlin, Republikfluchten in der Verwandtschaft
 - b) Alkoholgenuß und Lebenswandel

Abschließend muß in der Beurteilung **unbedingt** zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, ob Ihr Betrieb (Ihre Dienststelle) den Bewerber für geeignet und würdig hält, in der Handelsflotte zu fahren.

Hierbei lassen Sie sich bitte davon leiten, daß jedes Besatzungsmitglied als bewußter Bürger unseres Staates im Ausland auftreten muß. Sollten Sie Ihre konkrete Meinung hierzu nicht darlegen, kann die Bewerbung nicht weiterbearbeitet werden.

Für Ihre Bemühungen im voraus recht herzlichen Dank.

VEB Deutsche Seereederei

i. A. *[Signature]*
Leiter des Einstellungs-büros Flotte

Postschließfach 188 Postanschrift: Haus der Schifffahrt Telefon 37681

Karl Bley's application for employment as engineer assistant, machinist, at Seereederei Shipping Combine. (See testimony, page 54.)

[Translation of foregoing application for employment]

PEOPLE'S OWN (INDUSTRY) GERMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
R O S T O C K

29 July 1968

REQUEST FOR EVALUATION:

Comrade Karl-Heinz BLEY, date of birth unknown, who was employed as a member of your firm, has applied for a position in our shipping fleet. In view of the unusual characteristics of our organization, particularly our shipping relationships with the capitalistic countries, and especially considering the preventive measures of 13 August 1961, a series of selective measures have been developed for the merchant fleet which must be strictly adhered to.

For the above reasons, you are requested to evaluate the above individual in detail, with your reply to be submitted in duplicate. (The applicant will be furnished with the results of your evaluation in a sealed envelope - if desired, a receipt may be obtained.)

This evaluation must bear the signatures of the Party Secretary, FDJ Secretary and the Chairman of the BGL, and be authenticated by the issuing firm.

It is requested that particular attention be devoted to the following areas:

1. Technical performance (including working morale and discipline).
2. Loyalty to the GDR, attitude toward the draft law and toward absolution of military service in the National People's Army, as well as attitudes regarding rules of the Party and the Government.
3. A detailed description of the applicant's participation in community activities (specific examples of participation in Party activities and organizations within the firm as well as in the community are desired).
4. Additional Guidance:
 - a. Affiliations, if any, with West Germany and West Berlin; relatives who have defected from the Republic.
 - b. Affinity for alcohol, and life style.

Finally, the evaluation must conclusively indicate whether your firm considers the applicant suited for and worthy of service in the merchant fleet.

Please be advised that every member of the merchant fleet must represent our State in foreign countries as a dedicated citizen. In the event you are not convinced that this is the case, this application cannot be processed further.

Please accept our thanks in advance for your cooperation.

PEOPLE'S OWN GERMAN SHIPPING COMPANY

/s/

Head, Fleet Employment Office

NOTE: The organization FDJ (paragraph 3) is the Freie Deutsche Jugend, a state-controlled youth organization (Free German Youth). Meaning of BGL in the same paragraph is unknown, however, it is probably a trade organization or form of union. Addressee is illegible, except that it is translated as " Firm, Cadre Division."

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